173. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1

358. Called on Daud today to comply with instructions Deptel 2412 (not repeated all addressee posts). Told him my government extremely concerned developments along border and then read to him carefully paraphrased version my instructions. Changed sentence which stated their actions might be misunderstood by Pakistan to read that they might be misunderstood “not only by Pakistan but by world opinion”.

After careful study this paraphrased text Daud asked for further explanation to determine real meaning of sentences. I told him that I thought wording clear and stressed that important part was expression of hope by my government that RGA would exercise restraint and avoid any steps which might enlarge conflict. He then asked if this was unilateral effort of US or was similar expression our views being given Pakistan.

I told him that we viewed situation with such gravity that we were urging restraint with both countries. However he must realize that our position in Pakistan could not be described in same words as our position in Afghanistan. Said I thought he should know that we had been pressed several times recently by friends and allies to reaffirm our public position regarding the Durand Line. We had resisted these pressures, not because of any change in position on our part, but rather from desire avoid any type unnecessary public statement that might create ill feeling. However we still committed publicly in prior statements to recognition of Durand Line and there no change in our policy in this regard. This was important factor to keep in mind and greatly affected US position as by his own statement disturbances and difficulties were across border and outside Afghan territory.

Daud said that basis RGA policy was not aggression and most important tenet their policy was desire for peace and solution of problems through negotiation and not by force. On Pushtoonistan question he felt RGA stand was obvious and should be understood. They had never claimed any territory nor did they now have this in mind. He said difficulties in Bajaur area were created deliberately by Pakistan intrigue designed cause trouble. He said any disturbances between [Page 361] Pushtoon tribes and Pakistanis across border would affect tribes on this side of border and that tribes themselves would not remain idle under these conditions. If things got worse and more complicated it would be difficult or impossible to stop tribes on this side of border. As we were friend of both sides he hoped we would let Pakistanis know that this type of action could have very serious repercussions.

Told Daud I was concerned at international posture of Afghanistan in this particular case and wished understand his line of reasoning more clearly. I drew map of area showing Durand Line. I said it clear that Afghan territory extended to this line. There might be difference of opinion as to what lay across line. He would say it was free Pushtoonistan and/or occupied Pushtoonistan. Others would say that it was Pakistan. By whatever name it called it clearly not Afghanistan and he himself had just said they sought no more territory. If he agreed that demarcation of territory under RGA control stoped at Durand Line how could Afghanistan maintain the position in world opinion that moving groups of any sort beyond line was not an act of aggression?

Daud said he agreed as to where Afghan territory stopped but felt that informed opinion would understand that they not aggressors. He then drew map of his own showing tribal areas which extended across border as if it did not exist. He emphasized over and over again that any disturbance in a particular tribe on one side of line affects that part of same tribe living on opposite side of border. It was clearly Pakistan’s obligation not undertake any activity on their side of the border which would affect tribes within Afghanistan.

He stressed that opposite was of course also true. In this case he stressed that Pakistan had taken actions which affected tribes on the Afghan side and RGA could not remain idle because of artificial border which had no meaning to tribes concerned.

Daud continued, without stopping, no comment on late publicity given to incident in Pakistan and particularly statement of Qadir September 27. He obviously greatly exercised by Qadir’s statement indicating Afghanistan had support of outside “big power”. He asked what could be meaning of such a statement from responsible man. He said Afghanistan was neutral country, had no allies and was not associated in any form of military or other alliance. Such a statement not true of Pakistan. Any statement regarding support of either country by outside powers would seem to apply more aptly to Pakistan than Afghanistan. He said these false and baseless statements were being made to confuse world opinion and cover up Pakistan’s own sinister acts. Afghan military forces were along border as precaution only. He said they would never plan aggression against their Pushtoon brothers. If actual aggression was to be committed it would have to be from Pakistan side. He said he had taken initiative to see Pakistani Ambassador [Page 362] Rahman two days ago and asked in friendly way that things not be allowed to get worse. Daud said that he told Rahman that it was his firm conviction that resort to force in state of world tension as it exists today would never solve any problem but that only way was to negotiate in good faith and with good will.

I repeated again at end of conversation our deep concern and our hope that restraint would be exercised to avoid what could become disastrous situation for all involved. He thanked me again for US concern and efforts.

Byroade
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9–2960. Secret; Niact. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Karachi, Ankara, Bangkok, London, and Tehran.
  2. Telegram 241, September 27, instructed Byroade to inform Daud that the United States viewed “with concern” the border hostilities, (Ibid., 689.90D/9–2660)