Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

166. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Byroade), White House, Washington, April 23, 1960¹

Washington, April 23, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Call by Ambassador Byroade on the President

I called on the President, 9:20 a.m., on April 23. I first conveyed greetings and best wishes from His Majesty, King Zahir, to the President. After a brief introductory and non-official conversation, I told the President I would like to mention two or three things to him if he had the time. He asked me to go ahead.

I told the President I was most concerned at our continuing failure to do a good job overseas on construction projects in connection with our foreign aid program. I felt, in many cases, we had assumed commitments which we were not able to carry out effectively under our present organizational set-up. I told him of the report of a recent Corps of Engineers’ study on methods and procedures being used in Afghanistan, and how that report brought out the divergence in the methods used by ICA and the Corps overseas. I said that I felt the present system of trying to let all contracts, and amendments thereto, here in Washington had proven itself entirely unworkable. I said I was also of the opinion that ICA could not obtain qualified personnel to supervise their own construction projects.

I reminded the President of our discussion of over a year ago on this same subject,² in which I had tentatively suggested that all major construction work overseas be performed by the Corps of Engineers. I was even more certain now than at that time that such a major shift should be made. I had discussed the possibility with Mr. Riddleberger and with Mr. Dillon, and was raising the subject with him with Mr. Dillon’s approval. I ended this presentation by saying I hoped he would support such a shift if it could be worked out as being feasible by all concerned.

The President spoke with knowledge and feeling on the general subject. He said he was tired of hearing of complaints of waste, mistakes, and delays in this program. He hoped such a solution as I had proposed might prove to be practical. He thought Mr. Dillon should call a meeting with Mr. Riddleberger and the Chief of Engineers as soon as possible to try to work out the details. He told me of the major speech he plans to make on May 2³ and spoke with some feeling about the attitude of appropriation committees on the Hill. He also referred to certain Congressmen who spend all of their time trying to find mistakes overseas which can be used against the administration in Congress. I told him that I thought the recommendation I had made, if accepted within the Executive Branch and then cleared openly on the Hill, would reduce Congressional criticism of ICA. The President said again to go ahead and see if the matter could be worked out.

I explained the general situation in Afghanistan as being sort of an “economic Korea”. I felt the Soviets had selected certain nations in the underdeveloped areas to test the advantages they could gain through economic assistance and so-called economic competition. I believe that, among other things, they were endeavoring to find out just how far the United States would go in this type of warfare—both in terms of material resources and moral courage. Of all these countries, conditions in Afghanistan were probably most favorable to the Soviets. I felt that there was a real need for a long-range commitment from the West to that country, but realized this might not be possible at the present time. I told the President I planned to explore this further with the proper officials before leaving Washington.

The third and last subject I mentioned briefly was the deteriorating situation between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the so-called “Pushtunistan” dispute. I said the merits of the issue were far too complicated to attempt any detailed discussion but wanted him to know I thought the situation most serious. Indeed, I did not believe Afghanistan could remain neutral, or perhaps even independent, if their relations with Pakistan continue to deteriorate. I said I felt Ayub was doing a very good job on internal matters and on relations with India. He was, as well, a recognized good friend of the United States. I felt, however, he was making a major mistake in the handling of the Afghanistan program and that the “tough line” he was pursuing could only drive Afghanistan closer toward the Soviets. The President asked if Ambassador Rountree and I could not together come up with some remedy to the present situation. I told him that we were both in Washington for this purpose, but that so far we had not found any acceptable new approach that we might make. I told him, however, that we would continue to work on the problem as it was too serious to ignore. The President said he hoped that would be the case and expressed his concern over the general situation. He hoped that the Department of State, with our help, would be able to keep the matter from getting any worse and eventually to be able to ease the tensions over this problem.⁴

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Afghanistan. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Byroade on May 2.
2. Not further identified.
3. Reference is to the President’s speech on the Mutual Security Program, delivered on May 2; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1960, p. 811.
4. On April 25, the President spoke with Ambassador Rountree about the Pushtunistan dispute, among other matters. Rountree indicated that he was not hopeful that there could be an early solution to the problem. “He felt there might be a possibility, however, of arriving at some modus vivendi by which the virulence of the propaganda campaign on both sides could be reduced. The possibility of the Pakistan Government unilaterally re-establishing some political or geographical entity for the Pushtu-speaking peoples was mentioned. The President again emphasized the desirability of finding some means of improving the situation.” (Memorandum of conversation by Rountree; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)