164. Editorial Note
On April 14, the Embassy in Karachi transmitted a 24-page despatch to the Department of State, entitled “Pushtunistan: An Acute Phase of a Perennial Problem.” A brief summary of the despatch, which preceded the main text, reads as follows:
[Page 344]“Summary
“There are two main parts to the so-called Pushtunistan Problem. One is the endogenous demand for Pushtunistan emanating from within the tribal area and which seems to be simply a desire for the formation of a Pushtu-speaking administrative Division or Province, within Pakistan. The second is the exogenous demand, made by Afghanistan and backed by the USSR, that the Pushtu-speaking peoples in the tribal areas of Pakistan should be given the right of ‘self-determination’. This view is predicated on Afghanistan’s current non-recognition of the Durand Line agreements and on the claim that Pakistan does not hold suzerainty over the tribal areas.
“Afghanistan, prior to the recent Daud–Khrushchev communiqué, had indicated a willingness to drop the issue if Pushtu-speaking tribal leaders issued statements that they were satisfied in Pakistan. Pakistan rejected this proposal as being too vague and as containing a trap which would undermine its legal stand that its border extends up to the Durand Line and that the question was an internal matter.
“The virulent propaganda war which both sides have waged on the issue since the failure of the Ayub–Naim talks in January, 1960 has been exploited by the USSR, which has reiterated its support of Afghanistan on the issue, and which apparently has sought to use the Pushtunistan issue as a means of fishing in troubled waters, and of pursuing its own propaganda aims and policy objectives.
“The United States has so far attempted to avoid becoming embroiled in the issue in order not to jeopardize our delicate relations with Afghanistan, and not to engage in a major cold war dispute with the USSR on the issue. At the same time US silence on the issue has tended to strain somewhat our position in Pakistan. However, US policy in the area and that of its allies is based on recognition of the Durand Line as the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. While the US may wish not to strain relations with Afghanistan by taking a legalistic position on the question, it is equally vital to protect our basic legal position in order to avoid alienating Pakistan, encouraging further Afghan demands, and inviting the USSR to pursue the Pushtunistan issue in a more aggressive manner.” (Despatch 932 from Karachi; Department of State, Central Files, 790D.00/4–1460)