Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

160. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, March 8, 1960—8 p.m.

848. Have already reported that in my last conversation with Daud he made a plea for greater assistance from the US.² It seemed strange to me that he would use this occasion to do so, as I had called on him to leave the aide-mémoire regarding a propaganda truce and as visit was immediately following Khrushchev departure. It may be that he thought he would not see me again prior to my return from consultation,³ although it was apparent he had no immediate plans to leave Afghanistan for medical treatment. Daud’s plea for continued and even greater assistance was impassioned, and he said he glad I had traveled much in this country and knew of its desperate needs.

Naim and Daud have now made same general plea as regards economic aid. Their greatest concern seems to be their inability to get either affirmative or negative answers to their requests. In this connection, while we may look upon list of projects orally presented by Naim in Washington as mere suggestions, it obvious Afghans consider they have made request upon US for these projects just as surely as if it had been done in writing. Believe, therefore, after my return from Washington they should be given definite answers even though several of them will apparently be negative.

Daud’s second point of significance is that we change our procedures if possible. What he wants is a commitment that we assume a portion of foreign assistance required under their second five-year plan. This would allow a better basis for planning and would accord Afghans treatment comparable to that we give India. If such over-all figures could be fixed, at least to the extent allowed by your legislative process, then subsequently projects could be chosen up to this over-all amount. He said if such procedures could be used, RGA would accept our advice as to whether any particular project for which they desired use our aid, was in our view uneconomical or otherwise unjustified.

Am aware this type approach difficult for us but admittedly recipient country does have better basis for planning if it can be done. Would appreciate any comments as to what devices towards this end have been worked out for India or other countries that might be applied to Afghanistan.

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 789.5–MSP/3–860. Confidential.
2. Reference is presumably to telegram 836 from Kabul; see footnote 4, Document 158.
3. Byroade was scheduled to arrive in Washington on April 3 for consultations. Rountree was also scheduled to be in Washington for consultations; their visits were planned to overlap so they could discuss matters of mutual concern with Department officials.