152. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
2072. From Murphy. During the course of the motor trip of one hour from Begram Airport to Kabul accompanying Prime Minister Daud, there was opportunity for a quiet discussion. I found Daud friendly and well disposed but highly sensitive regarding his policy of [Page 326] accepting military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union, as well as on the general subject of Afghan relations with Pakistan and Iran. For him the keynote seemed to be the abject poverty of the Afghan population and his determination to raise their standard of living, accepting help wherever he could get it. I made a few mild references to experiences of other limitrophe areas receiving Soviet “aid” and mentioned anxiety prevailing regarding construction of “strategic highway network”. As to the dangers flowing from acceptance of aid from the Soviet Union and the presence of Soviet technicians, this is a risk he is prepared to take. In discussing the construction of a highway system he said that it was all well and good for the West to talk about the danger of strategic highways. As far as he is concerned, however, historically Great Britain was never willing to help Afghanistan with either a rail or highway system, and was always ready to leave his country in isolation and poverty. This led to quite a dissertation by him about the wrongs suffered by Afghanistan at the hands of the British, including the destruction of Kabul on two occasions. He described with evident satisfaction the defeat of the last British expeditionary force with the loss of all hands.
In Karachi Ayub had referred to Daud as “dumb”. After this rather emotional discourse by Daud, that is not my impression. His viewpoint may be parochial but it is based on stubborn notions of Afghan interest and tinctured with strong historical prejudice. He manifested deep distrust of the Pakistanis. His state of mind regarding the Russians seems to add up to a calculation on his part of the risk involved with the conclusion on his part that the risk is worthwhile taking. He spoke of Soviet cooperative attitude regarding transit of exports by rail via the Soviet Union as compared to Pakistan’s lack of cooperation. He left no doubt of firm determination to exploit present Russian willingness to assist Afghanistan’s economy and to build up a military force. At the same time he evinced most friendly attitude toward the United States and implied hopefulness that we would continue to cooperate with Afghan.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 861.0089/12–1059. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Kabul.↩