143. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 13, 19591
SUBJECT
- Afghanistan’s Relations with Pakistan—Pushtunistan as the Key Issue
[Here follow the same list of participants and the paragraph describing the background of the conversation as the memorandum of conversation, supra.]
Substance of Conversation
The Foreign Minister noted that the President, when he had received the Foreign Minister the day before, had referred to the Pushtunistan problem as a “territorial” one. Prince Naim believed that this was not the proper interpretation of it. Actually seven million or so Pushtu-speaking people living in what is now Pakistan merely wanted to have the freedom to express their views regarding their own future. This had not been given to them even at the time of partition when it had been given to other communities in what had been undivided India. Prince Naim insisted that the Afghanistan Government had formally explained to Pakistan that Afghanistan had no “territorial” claims.
A year or so ago when Mirza had been President of Pakistan there had been an exchange of visits between Mirza and the King of Afghanistan. The Pushtunistan issue at this time seemed to have some chance of becoming resolved. Since the new regime in Pakistan, however, had taken over, Ayub seemed very cool toward negotiating with Afghanistan. The Foreign Minister knew, nevertheless, that the Pakistan Government was aware of the problem since its former Ambassador in Kabul had often discussed it with him, Prince Naim. Ambassador Khattak had suggested, for example, that Pushtunistan leaders in Pakistan might make statements of loyalty to the Pakistan Government. If they did so, the Ambassador inquired of Prince Naim, what would the attitude of the Afghanistan Government be? The Foreign Minister said [Page 304] that he had told the Ambassador that all that the Afghanistan Government wanted was that the Pushtu-speaking peoples along the western frontier of Pakistan be given an opportunity to freely express themselves. Almost ten years had now been “wasted” in futile approaches to the Pushtunistan issue.
The Afghanistan Government would welcome any good offices or advice which the United States Government might be willing to extend toward settling the issue because the United States was “a friend of both Afghanistan and Pakistan”. Actually, Prince Naim continued, he was always in touch with the American Embassy in Kabul on this question, hoping that somehow a better atmosphere for the resolution of the issue might be created. It seemed to him that it was the Pakistanis who were reluctant to approach the problem.
Mr. Jones asked if the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Qadir, had raised it when he had called upon Prince Naim the night before. The answer was that Mr. Qadir’s call had been almost entirely a courtesy visit. The Afghan Foreign Minister reiterated that he believed that there must exist a reasonable way in which to resolve both the Helmand and Pushtunistan problems. All three countries involved needed peace and tranquillity to satisfy the economic aspirations of their peoples.
In concluding the almost hour long conversation reported in this memorandum and two associated ones, the Secretary stated that he wanted to reassure Prince Naim, as the President had done, of the United States friendship for Afghanistan and its desire to help Afghanistan in such ways as it appropriately could to solve Afghanistan’s domestic economic problems and to help improve its relationships with its free world neighbors. The Secretary concluded that he personally appreciated the Foreign Minister’s visit. He trusted that Prince Naim would try to come each fall to the General Assembly session. If the Foreign Minister were able to do this, the Secretary hoped that he would take the opportunity to visit with the Secretary.
Prince Naim, in reply, thanked the Secretary for the latter’s expression of friendship and for all that the United States Government had done for Afghanistan. He said that Afghanistan, like other countries, needed badly the friendly cooperation and assistance of the United States. The United States Government, he concluded, had always shown sympathy with and understanding of his Government’s problems. His Government in turn had been in the habit of always discussing these problems with the United States before talking about them with any other power.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10–1359. Confidential. Drafted by Bartlett.↩