Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

137. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 53–59

Washington, September 22, 1959.

THE OUTLOOK FOR AFGHANISTAN

The Problem

To estimate probable developments in Afghanistan’s internal affairs and international position over the next few years.

Conclusions

1. The prospect for political stability in Afghanistan is relatively good for the next few years. The royal family enjoys the support of the armed forces and its position appears secure. Prime Minister Daud will probably continue to exert a major influence in the country. (Paras. 8–10, 13, 15–17)

2. Over the longer term, some major change in the present political situation seems inevitable as the armed forces become conscious of their growing power, and as they and the literate urban element are affected by Communist and other foreign influences. (Paras. 18–19)

3. Modernization of Afghanistan’s armed forces and the improvement of its primitive economy are being achieved at the cost of considerable dependence on the Communist Bloc. For the foreseeable future, Afghanistan will be almost entirely dependent on the USSR for support of its armed forces. The Soviets are also in a position to use their extensive trade relationships with the Afghans to put heavy economic pressure on the country. If the USSR were to cut off this aid and trade Afghanistan would have difficulty even now extricating itself under its own power, and its chances of being able to do so will decrease as time passes. The Afghans could avoid severe economic hardship or capitulation to Soviet demands only if the West undertook to help meet their modest import and export requirements. (Paras. 12, 20–29)

4. The USSR will almost certainly attempt gradually to tighten its grip on Afghanistan but will exercise care to avoid provoking a crisis. Any move to take over control of the country would raise problems for broader Soviet strategy. Nonetheless, the Soviets would probably go to considerable lengths to protect their position if it were directly challenged by the West. (Paras. 37-38)

5. Afghanistan’s neutrality seems likely to take on an increasingly pro-Soviet tone. Because of their pique at the US and reluctance to antagonize the USSR, the Afghans will probably continue to support the Soviet position on issues which they do not believe to be of direct interest to Afghanistan. We believe, however, that Daud and his associates still consider the preservation of their country’s independence to be the primary objective of their policy and that for some time to come at least they would resist any Soviet effort to infringe on their sovereignty. (Para. 36)

6. In view of the increased hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan since the advent of the new military regime in Karachi, settlement of the Pushtoonistan dispute or any major improvement in relations between the two countries is improbable over the next few years. Sporadic violence in the border area is possible but is unlikely to lead to large-scale hostilities or to closure of the border. (Paras. 31–32)

7. The Afghan regime resents US support for Pakistan and considers the US aid program in Afghanistan to be limited and slow-moving. However, it will continue to welcome ties with the US as a counter to expanding relations with the Bloc and probably hopes that the US would bail Afghanistan out if the Soviet Union began to apply economic pressure. (Paras. 39–41)

Discussion

[Here follows a detailed discussion of Afghan internal developments and economic situation in numbered paragraphs 8–29.]

III. International Position

Afghanistan’s Foreign Policy Objectives

30. Afghanistan’s principal concern, now as for more than a hundred years, is the preservation of the country’s independence. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Afghans worked toward this objective by preservation of the country’s isolation from the rest of the world and acceptance of its status as a buffer between Russian and British power. Since World War II, the problem has been complicated by withdrawal of British power from the Indian subcontinent and by Afghan desires for foreign aid to promote internal development. In its search for foreign aid, the Daud regime has opened the country to outside influence on an unprecedented scale, at the same time trying to reduce the political impact by proclaiming a policy of strict neutrality in the struggle between the great powers and encouraging active competition between the Communist Bloc and the West. Daud and most influential Afghans still appear to be confident of their ability to pursue this policy without compromising their independence, and they are unlikely of their own accord to modify their policy in the foreseeable future.

Relations with Pakistan and Iran

31. Since 1947 there has been almost constant friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Afghans have actively attempted to promote their influence among the several million Pushtu-speaking people who live in Pakistan through the Pushtoonistan movement which demands a special status for Pakistan’s Pushtoons.² Daud is deeply committed to Pushtoonistan and in 1955 used Western refusal to support Pushtoonistan and Western aid to Pakistan to justify his acceptance of assistance from the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Pakistanis have used their influence among the Pushtoons in Afghanistan to embarrass the Kabul Government and have toyed with the idea of trying to unseat Daud through tribal action. Relations improved somewhat in 1957–58 during the course of an exchange of visits by Afghan and Pakistani leaders but cooled off again after the advent of the military regime in Karachi. The new Pakistani regime (which contains a strong Pushtoon element) is apparently less willing than its predecessor to negotiate with Daud on the Pushtoonistan issue.

32. Under these circumstances, any major improvement in Afghan-Pakistani relations is improbable over the next few years. Indeed, the prospects are that relations will deteriorate further in the next year or so. Any such deterioration would probably be reflected in renewed disturbances in the border area and efforts by each side to stir up the tribes within the other’s territory. Tension could grow to the point where the border might be closed as in 1955. We believe, however, that the odds are against either this or major military action by either side during the period of this estimate.

33. Afghanistan has also had difficulties with Iran, but these are of considerably less importance than those with Pakistan. Daud apparently feels that Iran’s membership in the Central Treaty Organization and its receipt of military assistance from the West have upset power relationships in the area and made it more difficult for Afghanistan to maintain its policy of neutrality. There is also a longstanding dispute between the two countries over the disposition of the waters of the Helmand River. Afghanistan is in a favorable position because of its control of the upper reaches of the river, and as long as it has other grievances against Iran, the odds will probably remain against settlement of the quarrel.

Afghan-Soviet Relations

34. Daud and his government are aware that they are running a risk in opening Afghanistan to Soviet influence, but feel that they would run a greater risk if they had not strengthened the country’s military and economic position. After five years of increasingly close relations with the Communist Bloc, there is ample evidence that the Afghans are still suspicious of Soviet motives and tactics. At the same time, they are apparently satisfied with the speed and extent of the Soviet aid program and with the political support given them by the USSR on such issues as their quarrel with Pakistan. In general, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union have enough compatible short-term interests, political as well as economic, to make profitable a fairly high degree of cooperation between them.

35. In the past year or so, there have been indications that a few influential Afghans are beginning to feel that the Communist Bloc is gaining a preponderance of power over the West and that Afghanistan, because of its geographic location, must inevitably orient itself toward the Bloc. This attitude probably derives in part from disillusion with the West over the limitations of Western aid and the favorable effect of several years of correct Soviet behavior. Left alone, this feeling could grow and eventually deprive Afghan leaders of their most important weapon in countering Soviet penetration, i.e., the traditional will for independence.

36. To date, however, the bulk of the evidence indicates that Daud and most Afghans still consider the preservation of Afghanistan’s independence to be the primary objective of their policy, and we believe that now and for some time to come at least they would resist any Soviet actions which they considered to infringe on their sovereignty, regardless of the cost to their economy. At the same time, because of their pique at the US and their reluctance unnecessarily to antagonize the USSR, they will probably continue willing to support the Soviet position on some international issues which they do not believe to be of direct interest to Afghanistan. Thus, their neutrality seems likely to take on an increasingly pro-Soviet tone.

37. We believe that the USSR will probably continue to exercise care to avoid provoking a crisis. In 1953–1955, the USSR’s objective was probably to deny Afghanistan to the West in the face of Western moves to create the “northern tier” alliance. Since then, the Soviet Union has gone on to expand its influence in Afghanistan as a means of exerting pressure on neighboring pro-Western Pakistan and Iran and of opposing Western interests in the area generally. In the process, the USSR has invested an unusual amount of money and effort. For example, the $80 million Soviet grant for improvement of the Kushka–Herat–Kandahar road is the first major Soviet grant assistance to any country outside the Bloc.

38. The USSR will almost certainly attempt gradually to tighten its grip on Afghanistan, and it would probably go to considerable lengths to protect its position if this were to be directly challenged by the West. The Soviet leadership may see Afghanistan as the gateway to ultimate expansion into the subcontinent. However, at the moment, any move to take overt control of the country would raise problems for broader Soviet strategy. Furthermore, the Soviets probably believe that their position and prospects in Afghanistan are developing favorably. We therefore believe it unlikely that the Soviet Union has radical objectives in regard to Afghanistan in the immediate future. We believe that, barring a major change in Soviet tactics or an inadvertent Soviet alienation of the Afghan regime, the present pattern of Soviet-Afghan relations will persist for some time.

The Western Position

39. Afghan attitudes towards the West are ambivalent. There is still a lingering suspicion of the UK throughout the country. West Germany is generally held in high esteem, although its influence in the economic field has decreased as the Soviet aid program has expanded. Daud and his colleagues believe that the US denied them political and security support while giving such support to Pakistan. They are also disgruntled with what they feel to be the limited and slow-moving US aid program. Indeed, some of them have asserted that the US offers aid projects only to exclude the Soviets and is not interested in implementing the projects for the benefit of the Afghans.

40. At the same time, the Afghan leaders have made it clear that they welcome continued ties with the US as a counter to their expanding relations with the Communist Bloc. Thus, they have encouraged US activities in education, while excluding the Communists from this important field. They have also continued to send a few military officers to the US for training. They probably remain hopeful that the US would bail them out if the Soviet Union began to apply economic pressure.

41. From the Western point of view, both the position of the royal family and the personality of Daud have major advantages and disadvantages. The royal family is suspicious, autocratic, and generally hostile to Pakistan, but it has brought a relatively high degree of stability to the country, and its members are almost certainly aware that there is no place for royalty in a Communist system. Daud is more aggressive than other Afghan leaders on the subject of Pushtoonistan and is apparently prepared to go further in his dealings with the Communist Bloc. At the same time, Daud is probably more capable of maintaining internal security and restricting Communist penetration while promoting the necessary economic development program.

42. We believe that in general there is unlikely to be any major change in Afghan attitudes toward the West in the near future—given continued Soviet forbearance and the absence of an open clash with Pakistan. However, a gradual increase in Afghanistan’s dependence on the Bloc appears probable during the next few years. The speed and extent of any such increase will depend largely on the desire and ability of the West to regain the confidence of Afghan leaders and to play an effective role in the country’s economic development program. If Afghanistan should try to extricate itself from its dependence on the Bloc, its chances of success would depend primarily on the West’s willingness to provide the necessary support.

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency, approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the President to appropriate officers of cabinet level and the members of the NSC.

   According to a note on the cover sheet, the following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and The Joint Staff. All members of the IAC concurred with the estimate on September 22 with the exception of the representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

2. Afghan demands have varied from a plebiscite in the Pushtu-speaking tribal area just inside the Pakistan border to complete independence for an area encompassing half of West Pakistan. [Footnote in the source text.]