Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

135. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jones) and the Under Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Communist Economic Affairs (Terrill) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, September 12, 1959.

SUBJECT

• United States Action to Counter Soviet Penetration of Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a primary target for Soviet penetration. The Soviet activity in that country affects vital United States interests in South Asia and poses a threat to the entire Indian subcontinent and the Middle East. It is therefore believed that Afghanistan must be regarded as an “emergency action area”, requiring us to bring to bear all our economic and diplomatic resources to thwart Soviet ambitions.

I. Introduction

A. Importance of Afghanistan

The Soviet Union attaches great defensive and offensive importance to Afghanistan. Its apparent immediate objective is to make that country so dependent upon the Soviet Union that its government will lose freedom of decision in its relations with the West, in effect becoming a Soviet protectorate. We believe the U.S.S.R. looks upon Afghanistan not only as a prize in itself but as a valuable political and military fulcrum for exercising leverage on the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East. If the Russians were in effective control of Afghanistan they would have driven a wedge between Iran and Pakistan, be within three hundred miles of the port of Karachi, and be in a position to stir up trouble among all the tribal peoples of Pushtunistan along the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier. Pakistan would be under pressure to seek an accommodation with Soviet power; the Shah of Iran’s will to resist Soviet encroachments would weaken; and other precarious border areas like Nepal and Bhutan would be tempted to turn away from the West.

Thus, the defenses of the entire Indian subcontinent would be gravely endangered. The subcontinent is of vital importance to the United States because of its huge population, significant natural resources, and strategic command of free world air and sea routes. Furthermore, successful Soviet penetration of Afghanistan would increase communist political pressures and military adventures along the entire free world periphery stretching from Turkey to Laos.

B. Soviet Program

The U.S.S.R. has demonstrated its willingness to pay a high price in order to achieve its penetration of Afghanistan. It has made what amounts to a pre-emptive bid for economic and military penetration of that country. The importance which the Soviet Union attaches to this penetration was shown most recently by an $80 million grant—the first which the U.S.S.R. has made outside its satellites. Since 1954 the Soviet Union has committed approximately $300 million in economic and military aid in Afghanistan (for details see Tab A).² Its arms program is estimated at about $75 million. Much of its economic aid, particularly in road construction and POL storage facilities, is noteworthy for its rapid execution, flexibility and close coordination with diplomatic and propaganda maneuvers, in addition to its magnitude and composition.

C. United States Program

The United States economic program since 1952 has totaled about $150 million (details in Tab B). Of the approximately 70 million dollars committed in U.S. aid to Afghanistan since 1956, almost 40 million dollars remains to be utilized. It is estimated that expenditure under these previous commitments will take two or three more years.

The composition of the total U.S. program has been, in general, adequately balanced between construction works, technical assistance and consumer goods. However, the execution of certain projects has seriously lagged and optimum achievement of U.S. objectives has suffered for lack of firm coordination on various programs. As a result U.S. prestige has reportedly suffered and Afghanistan’s appreciation of Soviet capabilities has been enhanced.

II. United States Aims

The increasing inroads which the U.S.S.R. is making in Afghanistan require a re-appraisal of our position in Afghanistan. It would not be prudent for the U.S. to withdraw from Afghanistan nor would it be feasible to attempt to outbid the Soviet Union at this time. Therefore we must operate on the reasonable assumption that Afghan leaders do not desire to become completely dependent on the U.S.S.R. In the final analysis, it is their responsibility to determine at what point Soviet penetration threatens the political integrity of the country and to undertake policies to restrain such penetration. United States action, therefore, should be calculated to achieve the following specific points:

1. To demonstrate to the Afghans that we are genuinely interested in the country’s economic development and political independence; and

2. To show the Afghans that the U.S. and the free world are an effective source of support against Soviet pressures now and a logical means of reducing their dependence on the Soviets in the future.

III. Proposed Plan of Action

In order to give effect to U.S. aims set forth in the third alternative above, a vigorous plan of action, as outlined below, should be undertaken:

A. Economic Action

1. Speed is of the utmost importance. The most immediate need is for U.S. action, particularly administrative action, to implement existing programs. Rapid execution of present projects which have lagged for some time (including the important regional transit project, the Kabul University project, and the air project) should be used as an example of our new-found effectiveness, energy and interest in Afghanistan. We should concentrate upon completion of present projects without regard to minor cost increases resulting from the speed-up.

2. We should undertake rapid agreement and execution of a small number of effective new projects amounting, under present thinking, to about $5 million a year over a period up to five years. This projected total of about $25 million would probably be the minimum amount necessary to have the desired effects. This total amount of aid could be divided among DLF, ICA and PL 480. The use of Section 104(d)³ local currencies now held in India and other countries would be contemplated. It is important that we convey to the Afghans the magnitude of our total proposed additional aid, as firmly as United States policies and procedures will permit, pointing out that this amount is in addition to the remaining $40 million of present commitments.

3. The United States, in collaboration with other free countries, should (a) seek to re-direct Afghan trade by such measures, for example, as arranging for in-bond transit through Pakistan of Afghan exports to India, U.S. participation in trade fairs and exhibits in Afghanistan with U.S. private business attendance, and arrangements for regular or emergency supplies of petroleum or other key products through Pakistan; and (b) initiate planning studies of the most effective means, and estimate the cost to the U.S., of bringing about a reduction in Afghan economic and military dependence on the U.S.S.R.

4. The United States and other free-world countries should collaborate to expand Afghan training programs and to promote an enlarged program of exchange of prominent officials and visits of Afghan leaders. United States representatives should endeavor to bring about a review of, and possible increase in, United Nations training and technical assistance programs in Afghanistan.

B. Political Action

1. Authorize our Ambassador to Afghanistan to discuss with the Prime Minister, as soon as possible and in a manner best calculated to achieve our aims, the total strengthened U.S. economic program as may be recommended by the Action Group (suggested in IV below).

2. Invite King Zahir to the U.S. at the earliest possible date. This should be followed by invitations to other high-ranking Afghan leaders, particularly military officers such as the Afghan Chief of Staff. The coming visit of Foreign Minister Naim⁴ should be utilized to impress him with U.S. military, political and economic power.

3. Increase the number of Afghan military officers to be trained in the United States. Continue to encourage Turkish influence in Afghanistan; in particular, Turkey should be urged to appoint a strong Ambassador with an adequate staff to Kabul as soon as possible. We should also continue to support current Turkish proposals for increased training of Afghan military officers in Turkey. When Turkish plans for the establishment of a Military Staff College in Afghanistan are firm, we should consider giving financial support to that project.

4. Consolidate the preponderant U.S. position in the field of Afghan education. Expand the cultural exchange program by inviting larger numbers of Afghan leaders and students to the U.S. with a corresponding flow of Americans to Afghanistan.

5. Encourage additional diplomatic links between Afghanistan and free world countries. A number of free world countries, among them Canada and Australia, are not represented in Kabul. With British effectiveness seriously hampered for historical reasons, the influence of other Commonwealth countries should be brought to bear on the Afghan problem.

6. Continue to urge Pakistan and Afghanistan to seek an accommodation over the Pushtunistan dispute, and particularly to refrain from inflammatory propaganda against each other. An exchange of high-level visits between Pakistan and Afghanistan officials should be encouraged.

7. Foster closer Afghan-Iranian relations, making special efforts to urge both countries to resolve the Helmand River dispute.

C. Collaboration with Other Countries

Effective politico-economic action in Afghanistan requires close coordination with other countries. We should, in every way possible, attempt to strengthen Afghanistan’s present links and create new ones with the United States and other free world countries in order to make it clear to Afghan leaders that total reliance on the U.S.S.R. is not a matter of necessity. Our consultations with other free world countries, several of which have an interest in countering Soviet penetration of Afghanistan, could be based immediately upon (a) the use of local currencies now held by the U.S. in certain of these countries; (b)collaboration in urgent and effective new programs; and (c) other measures to reduce the cost of an Afghan shift from dependence on the U.S.S.R.

IV. Afghanistan Action Group

Expeditious and concerted action would be assisted by the establishment of a temporary working group to be known as the Afghanistan Action Group, chaired by the Assistant Secretary for NEA. Members of the Group would include representatives of Departmental offices concerned, and of ICA, DLF, Defense and CIA. This Group would be charged with the task of reviewing, coordinating and perfecting the present and planned U.S. programs and recommending modifications as warranted by future events and circumstances. The existence of this group should be kept secret. Knowledge of its existence would not only prejudice its effectiveness but would seriously embarrass the U.S. in relations with other countries.

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize the establishment of an Afghanistan Action Group, including representatives of NEA (Mr. Jones, Chairman), U/CEA, U/MSC, E, CU, ICA, DLF, and Defense, the existence of this group not to be made public.

2. That you request the Afghanistan Action Group to submit urgently specific recommendations to implement the line of action proposed above.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 889.00–Five Year/9–1259. Secret. Drafted by Robert P. Terrill and J. Robert Fluker of U/CEA and by Robert W. Adams and Leon B. Poullada of SOA.
2. No tabs were attached to the source text.
3. Section 104 (d) of P.L. 480 concerned the use of counterpart funds.
4. Foreign Minister Naim was scheduled to be in Washington October 12–14 for a series of discussion with U.S. officials; see Documents 138–144.
5. Dillon initialed his approval of both these recommendations on September 18. He modified the second recommendation by crossing out the phrase that reads: “to implement the line of action proposed above.”