119. Letter From the Ambassador in Afghanistan (Mills) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hart)1
Dear Mr. Secretary: In reply to your letter of October 31,2 may I extend my congratulations on your appointment as Deputy Assistant Secretary. Although our paths have seldom crossed, as a veteran of 20 years in the Foreign Service you have built up an enviable “service reputation” which is known to all. All success in your new and important responsibilities. I am sure that Bill Rountree will find your long experience in the Near East, and in the Department, of inestimable assistance.
I would characterize the United States position in Kabul at the present as one of just about holding its own. There is a good feeling towards the United States, I believe, on the part of the King, the Prime Minister (Daud), the Deputy Prime Minister (Ali Mohammed), and the Foreign Minister and Second Deputy Prime Minister (Naim). I think this good feeling is shared by most of the Cabinet and the Deputy Ministers as well as by large numbers of other important officials. Because of its experience from the First Afghan War in 1839 until the end of the Second World War, most Afghans, however, have an almost psychotic suspicion of all foreigners. They also have an only slightly less keen suspicion of all other Afghans. The long history of [Page 251] treachery and perfidy has made such an indelible impression that the all-pervading attitude towards everything and everyone is suspicion. It even colors the most intimate of family relations, that between brother and brother, and the Pushtu word for cousin is the same as that for enemy.
This is the context in which we, and all other foreign missions, operate. I have no doubt that the suspicion of the Soviets is much keener than that of ourselves, for they are a powerful neighbor while we are far away. The Afghans are so conscious of Soviet power that they sometimes seem to casual observers to be in agreement with them. This is too simple an appraisal. The Afghans fear the Soviets, as they feared the Czarist Russians before them. Since government in Afghanistan always has been of an autocratic and perhaps totalitarian kind, on an immemorial Central Asian pattern, the Afghans are not particularly shocked by the totalitarian aspects of the U.S.S.R. Many who have lived abroad might like something different. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] With an elite which has had something resembling higher education numbering less than 3,000, it is not likely that anything even faintly resembling democracy as we know it will emerge for a long time to come. It might be that one of these times the Royal Government will have the courage to organize a sole political party, à la Attaturk. Even this would be an historic step.
The Afghans, of course, hope that the United States will provide them with a counter to play off against the U.S.S.R., just as the British Empire, for a hundred or more years, was a counter to Czarist and then Soviet Russia. They realize that the United States is too distant and is unwilling to play such a role in the security field. Therefore the Afghans play up in an exaggerated form the so-called historic friendship between their country and the U.S.S.R. But this is something like Nehru’s harping on Panch Shila hoping that the Soviets and Communist Chinese, by publicity, can be held to such principles. Since the United States is not a determining factor in the security calculations of Afghanistan, although they might vainly wish it were, their hopes for continuing their independence can only rest on Soviet good will, for they cannot have much faith in what the U.N. could do.
In addition to meeting with considerable success in assisting the Afghans in maintaining what I am convinced their leaders wish, a real neutrality, we seemed to be meeting with fair success in another major political aim, that of relaxing the tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. I put this latter in the past tense because our effort was given a rude shock by recent events in Pakistan and particularly by the assumption of sole power by General Ayub. There is not much we here in Kabul can do unless and until General Ayub in some way shows that he has something of the comprehension of the political relationship with Afghanistan which was developed by General Mirza [Page 252] while he was President. To date General Ayub has not taken any action or made any gesture which would give the Afghans hope that he might be prepared to approach the Pushtunistan issue with flexibility and understanding.
In the economic development field, the rulers of Afghanistan are convinced that they must do something to raise the economic level of the people before they are hopelessly outdistanced by all their neighbors, particularly by the U.S.S.R. and Pakistan. They have no hope of equaling the accomplishments of these two strong neighbors, but they realize that the masses cannot indefinitely be kept in ignorance of the glaring contrasts. They are willing to pay what price they have to to show some economic progress. They claim to be alive to, and on guard against, the possibility of Soviet infiltration and subversion. Our efforts to make them admit they are frightened have not succeeded. At the same time they welcome whatever we are willing to do and also have welcomed any assistance which other Free World countries, such as West Germany and Japan, are willing to give, and of course all help they can get from U.N. They have practically thrown themselves into our arms in the field of education and have pretty effectively excluded the Soviets. On the other hand they permit carefully selected Afghans, representing the press and other cultural activities, to make short visits to the U.S.S.R. and Communist China. Naim claims that such Afghans are so carefully chosen that their visits to the Communist countries do not present a danger.
Our record of achievement in the technical and economic assistance fields has not been very impressive to date, with the sole exception of the field of education. The red tape that must be gone through before ICA can give contracts is most discouraging, not only to the Afghans but to all those of us here. It is of course true that in a period of high employment for all having engineering skill, it is difficult to interest engineering firms in the United States in relatively small projects in distant Afghanistan. A recent case was the withdrawal, after selection, of an engineering firm to do the engineering on the Afghan part of the transit project. This means, I fear, two or three months more before a contract can be signed to cover the engineering. This, of course, is hard to explain to the Afghans. To date we have been unable to provide the Afghans with the advice they have not ceased to request on how they should improve their agriculture, the basic industry of the country. We have simply not been able to recruit agricultural experts with a comprehensive view, although little bits of good have been done by limited agricultural specialists. This is most discouraging.
It is hard to avoid the doleful conclusion that until recently, at least, Afghanistan has been at the end of the line when it comes to the assignment of people with skills by ICA. Just recently ICA has sent a [Page 253] first class Executive Officer, an able chief to head up industry and transportation, and a Deputy Director. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
[Here follows discussion of personnel matters.]
Sincerely,