113. Despatch From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- American and Pakistani Policy Towards Afghanistan in the Light of the Iraqi Coup2
The fall through murder of the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq and the establishment of a republic under a largely military Junta is believed to have profoundly disturbed the Afghan Royal Family and to have created among at least some of the Afghan intelligentsia (who are synonymous with the Afghan bureaucracy) an expectation that other dynasties, including the Pahlevi dynasty in Iran, may soon fall, and that under the impact of these events a coup in Afghanistan might easily occur and overthrow the Yahya Khel branch of the Mohammedzai tribe which today is the Royal Family of Afghanistan.
The Pakistan Ambassador in Kabul appears to be almost jittery in anticipating this development. He has stated to me that it might happen tomorrow. At the same time he recognizes that it might not occur for ten years, if then. He is nervous because he feels that his Government looks to him to be prepared, should the Afghan Royal Family be overthrown, to see to it that the succeeding government is not a tool of the USSR and is as friendly as possible to Pakistan. He visualizes the possibility of the USSR seizing such a development to take over Afghanistan or a part of it, or to install a pro-Soviet puppet government. Pakistan, he logically argues, must be prepared to prevent such a development. The best way to do so, he argues is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to [2 lines of source text not declassified] form a republican government which would oppose Soviet domination and, if possible, be friendly to Pakistan. The alternative is the likelihood, as he sees it, of having the Soviets threatening Pakistan from the Durand Line3 rather than from the Oxus.
I and my closest advisers are not able to evaluate the likelihood of such an unfortunate sequence of events taking place. We fully realize that the present regime enjoys very little, if any, popularity among [Page 238] either the masses or the elite, except for those closely related by blood or marriage or whose destinies are closely linked with it. If there were a means to consult the wishes of the people, the verdict against the regime probably would be overwhelming. At the same time it should be noted that no regime in Afghanistan has enjoyed popularity after it has been in power for a few years and it is doubted that any new regime of whatever character would long enjoy popular favor. Although a republic might be established on paper, it is doubtful it could long remain in power unless it resorted to repression much as does the present regime. With the overthrow of the monarchy and the disappearance of the central control which it exercises, Afghanistan might descend into chaos or fall apart, with Pakistan attempting to extend her influence to the Hindu Kush, the USSR occupying the northern regions of the country with a puppet government, and Iran reviving her ancient claim to the western portions of the country. It is, of course, possible that some new, unknown military leader might overthrow the Royal Family and through a military dictatorship keep the country together for a time. All we can do is speculate. We come to the conclusion, however, that, unpopular as it presently is, the present regime is preferable to any alternative in sight, and a continuation of the status-quo presents far fewer risks of domination of Afghanistan by the USSR.
If these considerations are valid then the policy of the Government of the United States must remain that of supporting the present regime as we have done through, for example, the transit project and the invitation to Prince Daud to visit the United States.
Should this regime be overthrown, it is likely at least initially that a cult of hate would sweep the country which would engulf all those who had aided the present regime. Such hatred without doubt would also attach to the United States. If the new regime were Soviet dominated or manipulated, there would be no prospect of the United States gaining any influence with it. If, on the other hand, the revolt were purely indigenous, it is probable that it would seek to continue United States assistance in economic development and the initial animosity might wear off quickly. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
[3½ lines of source text not declassified] I and other officers of the Embassy will not give potential dissidents any grounds for believing that the United States would welcome an overthrow of the present regime by force, since that is the only way it could be dislodged. This does not mean, however, that our attempts to identify such elements through indirect means and assess their motivation and potential should be abandoned. The degree of confidence which the Royal Family now has in the straightforwardness and the honesty of the United States could fall precipitately and probably would be succeeded by a complete lack of trust and faith in the United States [Page 239] should any indiscreet acts on our part be discovered. Faced with the choice of maintaining faith by the present regime in the United States or trying to curry favor with some conjectural regime which may succeed it, the practical choice is the first.
[2 paragraphs (31 lines of source text) not declassified]
Would it be possible for the Royal Family to increase its popularity? Without doubt the Family’s popularity could at least temporarily be increased by a few bold steps towards the establishment of elementary democratic institutions such as free municipal elections, freer elections to the National Assembly, the establishment of a freer press, and eventually the establishment of a political party which initially might be an official party. The Royal Family is thought to believe that even such first steps towards democracy at the present time would be their undoing. I and my closest advisers are inclined to agree that this is so at least over a few years. Although over one or two generations it is conceivable that Afghanistan might gradually evolve towards a constitutional monarchy, [1½ lines of source text not declassified] if restrictions are lifted soon it will not be long before a demagogue will find it comparatively easy to organize an uprising against the principle of monarchy itself. In other words it is probably true that the present Royal Family can continue in power only by the continuation of the highly centralized control and repression which currently characterize the system of government.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 789.00/7–3058. Secret.↩
- On July 14, an Army revolt broke out in Iraq. King Faisal, Crown Prince Abdul Ilah, and General Nuri al-Said were assassinated and a republican regime was proclaimed.↩
- The Durand Line was the boundary line between British India and Afghanistan, drawn by a British mission under Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and agreed to by Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan on November 12, 1893.↩
- According to a handwritten note on the source text, the last paragraph of this despatch was deleted “per INR—Mr. Arneson 8/24/58.” R. Gordon Arneson was Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.↩