Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

104. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, May 6, 1958—7 p.m.

1273. Re visit of Prince Daud to US.²

1. Pazhwak³ (Afghanistan) called on me today to discuss visit of Prince Daud to US. He told me he was responsible for making arrangements for Prime Minister’s trip.

2. Difficulties had arisen in US-Afghan relationships a few years ago for reasons which he thought we understood. US-Afghan relations were now improving and he hoped visit of Prime Minister would provide opportunity for continued improvement. He said there had been no change in Afghan policy of neutrality. He thought reasons for this policy were now better understood in US as well as basic Afghan motivations and intentions. Visit of Prime Minister would be most useful if it went beyond protocol visit and included discussion and negotiation of important questions with US authorities.

3. As possibility for discussion he mentioned number of economic programs in which he thought US-Afghan cooperation might be further developed as well as some military issues.

4. Economic programs he mentioned were:

(a) A further development of Helmand Valley. He said in spite of large amounts of money that had been poured into Helmand Valley Afghan Government had not been able yet to convince people that project was bearing adequate economic returns. He hoped further investments in area would enable past investments to pay off.

(b) Development of electricity from new dam near Qandahar. Pazhwak thought installation of electrical facilities at this dam would produce two million KW of electricity. This would benefit both Afghanistan and neighboring regions of Pakistan to whom extra electrical power could be sold. There was sufficient immediate value in this project that it could be singled out from general Helmand Valley projects. He also pointed out income resulting from electrical power could be used by Afghanistan for further developments in valley.

(c) Settlement of nomads. He said Afghan Government hoped to provide nomads with land and teach them to engage in agricultural pursuits. This would be of great benefit in country where there are two million such people. He thought we might be able to help them on this.

(d) Agricultural equipment. He said Afghanistan needed considerable new agricultural equipment in order to improve its production.

(e) Baluchistan–Qandahar Railway. He said US people in Afghanistan had originally been favorable toward Afghan interest in building such railway, which would open better transportation routes from Kabul to Pakistan and provide basis ultimately for connections with Iran. He said reactions had in fact been favorable enough to lead to “hope” in Kabul that project could be undertaken. Subsequent engineering survey ended with recommendation against project on economic and engineering grounds. (He implied skepticism on part of Afghan Government as to whether project was really not feasible or whether for some policy reason we had changed our attitude. He seemed to be greatly interested in this project.)

5. On military programs he commented that Afghan Government had in past on several occasions indicated interest in getting arms supplies from US. Inasmuch as we had been unable to provide them they had obtained some arms from Czechoslovakia and other sources. However, they were still interested in more modern non-nuclear armaments from US. They also wanted to improve training of their army officers. They hoped to be able to work out agreements for such training in US.

6. Pazhwak said above items were illustrations of type of thing they hoped would be suitable for discussion with Prime Minister while he was here. They would also be glad, of course, to discuss other issues we might want to take up. He asked for our reactions to be conveyed to him as soon as possible, especially indicating which items productive results might be expected from, and whether there were any which might not be useful to talk about. He stressed that their overriding desire was to make trip as useful as possible in improving US-Afghan relations. They would not want to include items which would only result in father disagreement. While Pazhwak stressed that many of his comments were personal rather than instructed, it was apparent he had clear idea of what Prime Minister wanted to do and that there was hope on Afghans’ side that visit would mark considerable improvement in our relations. (In this connection Pazhwak stated in his opening remarks that his first instruction in connection with becoming Afghanistan’s Representative to UN was to consult with me immediately and seek to maintain close cooperation between Afghan and US Missions.)

7. Department’s instructions requested re reply I should make to Pazhwak on nature of Daud’s visit and items we think would be useful for discussion while he is here.⁴

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 789.11/5–658. Confidential; Priority.
2. Prime Minister Daud was scheduled to arrive in the United States on June 24 for discussions with U.S. officials.
3. Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, Afghan Representative at the United Nations.

4. The Department responded in telegram 782 to USUN, May 8, instructing Lodge to emphasize U.S. expectations that the visit would “consolidate past improvements and facilitate further progress in US-Afghanistan relations.” (Department of State, Central Files, 789.11/5–658)

   Telegram 1327 from USUN, May 16, reported that Lodge had seen Pazhwak on the previous day. “Pazhwak was appreciative of our favorable reaction on Daud trip,” it noted. “He said Afghan Government would be prepared to discuss anything we wanted and on its part would not want to put anything up for discussion on which constructive progress not likely.” (Ibid., 789.11/5–1658)