Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

406. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, July 24, 1959—1:34 p.m.

385. Embtel 279.² Following is for your use with French; also attempts answer questions you have asked.

1. Dept does not understand Amanrich question whether Ambassador has further information for Debré on Tunisian arms. According Embtel 233³ Debre raised two “new” elements: evidence US ammo in hands rebels and Tunisian silence re Norwegian purchase. First item was to be handled in meeting Spaak’s office.⁴ That meeting now cancelled by French and will be replaced by bilateral meeting whose purpose is to give French opportunity present “evidence” on leakage. Not seen possible here how US can be expected provide further information to Debre on its planned arms deliveries to Tunisia until two elements Debre raised have been dealt with.

2. On second point “fact Tunisians had remained mum re Norwegian purchase” it becoming increasingly clear that this is highly complicated matter of which we just beginning see outlines. Embassy Paris has been receiving of course all information on this subject available to Dept.

3. Fact that knowledge of order has become public as result Norwegian press story (Oslo’s 89)⁵ complicates situation. Story notes that identity purchaser is in question. In view this story now seems appropriate tell French that we have been extensively checking this matter and it by no means certain that Tunisians behind order and that in fact Tunisian Govt not only denies any govt orders placed in Norway but welcomes all available info in order to get to root of matter. Reference could also be made to press story that Norwegian Govt considers it necessary to investigate circumstances more clearly. Moreover French Chargé stated today recent info “cleared” Tunisian Govt.⁶ Admittedly French reply may be that this information increases necessity for study of procurement by FLN. World-wide procurement arms by FLN or other intermediaries for account of FLN is basically French problem in which it virtually impossible for US to become embroiled, especially as result might be attempt involve US in French activities aimed at preventing such deals or delivery arms to FLN. US can of course take steps prevent US arms and ammo going to FLN. As French have been assured on several occasions, it does just that. US export controls prevent such shipments; US arms agreements with sovereign nations such as Tunisia contain clauses guaranteeing non-diversion and non-transferability of arms supplied.

4. Embassy will recall US Government suit against United Auto Parts Company as example of rigor with which we police surplus arms sales. This particular case involved sale in 1956 of 350 armored cars by company to French Government for use in Algeria in which company failed to demilitarize equipment as required by law.

5. French have suggested that US suspend shipments until there has been “thorough investigation as to whether rebels are getting US arms and how”. US cannot accept this. Investigation would obviously be lengthy and inconclusive affair inasmuch as FLN sources supply varied and not completely known. It would be another matter of course if there were valid proof that Tunisian govt had violated guarantees on non-transferability which it has given us. No evidence available to US that such has happened.

6. We cannot dispute fact that FLN has equipment and ammo of US origin. This presumably available to FLN through variety of sources including US arms captured North Korea or obtained by Chinese Communists in China. We are unaware however whether FLN negotiations with Chinese Communists have culminated in any actual deliveries to FLN in North Africa and would be interested in any positive evidence French might have on this question. US arms have of course been supplied many countries under aid programs. France has been a major recipient. France additionally has purchased for dollars considerable quantity arms in US for use in Algeria. (See Deptel 327 on 57 mm recoilless rifles)⁷FLN has stated and probably accurately that French forces in Algeria are a major source of supply for FLN. In recent years French have not discussed with US matter of losses to FLN. In January 1957 French military mission headed by Brigadier General Michel Gouraud, commander of 27th Alpine Division and including Col. Paul Ducournau came to Washington to give official briefing on military situation in Algeria to US authorities. During briefing here General Gouraud stated that up to June 17, 1956 French had lost to FLN 4,000 weapons including 50 machine guns and 4 mortars. During any French presentation French evidence on diversion arms to FLN, Embassy should make point that official French mission gave above-cited facts to US in 1957 and that US would be interested in knowing of similar losses in three succeeding years particularly since MAP equipment may be included in losses.

7. Dept realizes it may be awkward tell French their forces in Algeria rather than US Govt responsible to certain degree for armament in hands of FLN. Therefore in addition making point noted in 6 above, Embassy should re-emphasize US policy which is one of maintaining tightest possible control on movement of arms, ammunition and explosives from US abroad. While always ready strengthen controls, US convinced they serving to prevent arms or ammo going from US to FLN, directly or indirectly. US does not believe US arms and ammo in hands FLN have come from Tunisian Govt and, instead believes Tunisia has honored its commitments on non-transferability. Relative weakness of Tunisian forces confronted by FLN bands on own territory reinforces our belief there no reason Tunisians would divert to FLN from their own very limited stores. Furthermore it is our belief Bourguiba would not menace his position with US or UK, to whom he looks for international support, by diverting arms to FLN, knowledge of which action he must know would eventually come to attention US and UK. Also quite doubtful Bourguiba would serve as intermediary between Iraq and FLN, as implied by Debre, because there no need for him do so. Iraqi support of FLN seems direct one, as noted Tunis 85.⁸ Believe it essential Embassy emphasize above evaluation in discussion with French. Embassy should also suggest it obviously impossible for US to make survey of armaments of rebel forces as proposed by Debre (para 10 Embtel 233) since US not only does not recognize FLN but at request of Debre is avoiding contact with FLN.

8. Embtel 279 raises question other sources of arms open to Tunisia. So far as Yugoslav shipments concerned French are aware such purchases have been made in past. To be recalled that in November 1958 Bourguiba made public speech stating Tunisia seeking arms from Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Finland in view difficulties obtaining needed arms elsewhere. This speech presumably carried by AFP and certainly reported by French Embassy Tunis. (See also Tunis 734) Other Tunis messages on this subject are 980 of January 15 and 1078 of February 3.⁹ Latter notes arrival ship with Yugoslav arms in Tunisia of which French undoubtedly aware. Debre should therefore be fully aware of fact Tunisia sought arms elsewhere at certain period in arms history and that Yugoslav shipment arrived. Unavailable at this moment are precise details Yugoslav shipment but it was modest and consisted World War II type of equipment. In view wide extent French intelligence activities in Tunisia French undoubtedly have complete details. Dept will provide you with further information on subject soonest.

9. Finally we are convinced that there are considerable dangers in course of action which French are currently pursuing. In this analysis we tend concur with assessment French Ambassador to Tunisia (Deptel 278).¹⁰ We believe Embassy Paris should point out to French possible dangers for both US and French interests in North Africa of leaks, unilateral declarations and possible public controversy. As we see it, public discussion of French contention that Tunisian Govt acting as intermediary for FLN or diverting to FLN arms purchased under guarantees from US or UK could only lead to very adverse reaction by Tunisian govt. Bizerte may well become intertwined. Although French appear be determined hold on to Bizerte no matter what, Tunisian complaint to UNGA would make their task most complicated one. Such a complaint would present other members UN with dilemma. It is not inconceivable that Tunisian demand in UN that foreign troops leave its soil could generate something similar from Morocco. This is possibility we would not want to face. We earnestly hope therefore that France will not oppose US shipments to Tunisia which will take place in accordance with signed contract (although ammunition portion of that contract will be phased in time) in the same spirit in which French concurred delivery last year when, as Embassy will recall, Louis Joxe said Bourguiba should be strengthened.

10. FYI. We realize that all of above is rather hard line. We believe this is only course to take. In Geneva French do not seem too emotional on this subject;¹¹ temperature in Paris appears considerably higher. Important therefore take direct action in Paris, attempting keep record straight and meet in advance new points raised by Debre and others. Only way to do this is to face squarely up to allegations made and refute them. It does not seem advisable to leave French with any impression that we will not carry out commitments to Tunisia so long as French continue merely to introduce new charges or “evidence”, unrelated or only faintly related to matter at issue. End FYI.

11. Embassy should use with French paras 3, 4, and 5, appropriate sections of paras 6 and 7, para 8 only if raised by French and para 9.

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/7–2159. Secret; Priority. Drafted by L. Dean Brown; cleared by White, Calhoun, Bovey, Fessenden, and BNA; and approved and signed for Dillon by Murphy. Repeated to Tunis, London, Oslo, Rabat, and to Herter in Geneva.
2. Telegram 279, July 21, requested clarification of Tunisian Government denials of having ordered arms in Norway and asked for further details about Tunisian arms purchases in Yugoslavia. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 233, July 17, reported on Houghton’s presentation to Debré regarding the Norwegian arms order and U.S.-French discussions about Tunisia’s desire to buy U.S. arms. Alleging that U.S. arms sent to Tunisia were being diverted to Algerian rebels, Debre urged the United States to discontinue arms shipments to Tunisia until these charges were investigated. (Ibid., 772.56/7–1759)
4. Polto 136 from Paris, July 17, reported that France had requested a meeting with Spaak and the United States regarding diversion of U.S. arms from Tunisia to the Algerian rebels. (Ibid.)
5. Dated July 22. (Ibid., 472.578/7–2259)
6. Telegrams 66 and 68 from Tunis, July 18 and 19, respectively, reported Ladgham’s July 18 denial of any official Tunisian efforts to buy Norwegian arms. (Ibid., 772.56/7–1859 and 772.56/7–1959) Mokaddem reiterated Ladgham’s statements July 23. (Telegram 97 from Tunis; ibid., 772.56/7–2359) No record of the conversation with the French Chargé has been found.
7. Telegram 327, July 21, transmitted the text of a memorandum stating that, contrary to French allegations, the United States had never sold weapons or ammunition of this caliber to either Tunisia or Iraq, but had sold and given such ammunition to France. (Ibid., 772.56/7–2159)
8. Telegram 85, July 21, analyzed sources of arms and ammunition for the Algerian rebels. (Ibid.)
9. Regarding Bourguiba’s November 13, 1958, radio address, see footnote 2, Document 402. Telegram 734, November 13, 1958, reported highlights of the speech. (Department of State, Central Files, 772.56/11–1358) Telegram 980 reported Bourguiba had told Radio Luxembourg the Yugoslav arms contract could not be cancelled. (Ibid., 772.56/1–1559) Telegram 1078 noted Tunisian newspaper reports of the arrival of a Yugoslav ship with arms and ammunition. (Ibid., 772.56/2–359)
10. Telegram 278, July 17, reported the French Counselor had read a telegram from Gorse to Couve de Murville emphasizing the danger public knowledge of the U.S.-French disagreement over Tunisian arms would pose to French-Tunisian relations. (Ibid., 772.56/7–1759)
11. Herter discussed Tunisian arms with Couve de Murville and Alphand on July 21. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64D 199)