Office of the Historian

99. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles), Washington, June 20, 1958, 5:47 p.m.1

Washington, June 20, 1958, 5:47 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM ALLEN DULLES

A is going back to Quantico and has been looking over the Lebanon situation. The military reports are not particularly good but are not dramatic. Re North Syria2—A does not think the individuals mentioned have the potential to do this. The Sec said our people have the impression this has not much solid foundation. The Sec is worried about it—he thinks it is slowly disintegrating. A agreed and also they agreed Hammarskjold is not bucking it up very much. A said he is just stopping the fighting while there and he may have taken some of the morale away from our side. The Sec said they fear he is going to produce a Munich and the Sec thinks the fear is not without justification. The Sec referred to Ben Gurion’s anxiety and read from the paper.3 They agreed the situation is slipping down the drain and the Sec does not see any point where we can grab it and stop it. By the time Chamoun asks, if he does, for armed intervention the situation would have deteriorated to the point where it will be difficult to do it. It will take time to clear with the SC and then he probably will have gone. The interval between the request and going to the UN—during this he will have made himself quite a target. The Sec said we have a secret message to which he thinks we are making no reply.4 A knew about it. They talked with him. It is difficult and extremely dangerous to reply. A agreed with that and said we should keep in touch. He does not know the potential these people have. It looks as though the [Page 164] General turned them down. He takes a dim view of it but does not say he won’t go along if they succeeded. That is not very much. It is puzzling and at the request of Quarles he and Chris gave an innocuous briefing this a.m. A can come back at any moment and will be in touch with the office. He will be at the Sec’s with Lodge 5 p.m. Sunday.

A mentioned seeing reports of the possibility of a truce and an election. A thinks there might be something in that. There would be a truce until a new man is elected and then … .5 Neither knows whom you would elect. The Sec said it might be a possibility. A saw that in the press as coming from there. He will check. The Sec indicated looking into it.6

  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed in the Secretary’s office by Phyllis D. Bernau.↩
  2. The reference is unclear.↩
  3. Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban conveyed this anxiety in a conversation with Rountree on June 19. Eban referred to a report received by his government to the effect that U.N. observers in Lebanon were seeking to act as mediators. Israel felt that it was critical that the United Nations should not confer any status on the rebels in Lebanon. Under the Charter, the United Nations was only authorized to treat with governments. To do otherwise, Eban emphasized, would compromise the entire affair. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–1958)↩
  4. In a June 20 memorandum to the Ambassador, an Embassy official reported on a June 19 meeting with Colonel Adel Chehab in which Chehab discussed plans for a coup d’etat against President Chamoun. Chehab spoke for a group of military officers who, he said, had a pledge from General Chehab not to oppose the coup. According to Colonel Chehab, the General said that if there was a 1 per cent chance of such a coup succeeding, he would have directed it himself, but he was convinced that the western powers would prevent Chamoun from being deposed. Accordingly, Colonel Chehab approached the Embassy with the question: “Will there or will there not be intervention if their coup against President Chamoun takes place, and/or if it succeeds?” (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Beirut Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, June 16, 1958–June 20, 1958)↩
  5. Ellipsis in the source text.↩
  6. A marginal notation next to this paragraph, in an unknown hand, reads: “Rockwell does not believe this needs to be followed up.”↩