70. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1

3367. Cairo’s 32412 and subsequent. Ambassador should seek earliest opportunity make following known to Nasser:

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We have discussed with Chamoun possibility of amnesty for opposition leaders. We believe that if violence directed against GOL were promptly to cease and order were restored, GOL would not act in punitive spirit against opposition leaders and USG would be prepared strongly to counsel this.
Re proposal Chehab assume Prime Ministership; we do not believe it would be appropriate for any foreign government to press GOL regarding specific individual for public office. This question solely for Lebanese to decide. However, we note speaker Lebanese Chamber has summoned Parliament to convene July 24 to elect new President. When new President comes in, presumably changes in Lebanese Government will also occur.
In light of above considerations as well as arrival UN observers in Lebanon we believe new atmosphere can be established which gives hope for ending of crisis which otherwise might have broad ramifications. We urge that Nasser contribute to this possibility by using his influence with opposition on behalf restoration of tranquility. We believe that all of the governments of the Near East should make it clear, not only by word but by acts, that they do not countenance civil disturbance as a means to achieve political results. Otherwise we feel that the entire area of the Near East faces a prolonged period of great distress.3
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–758. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dulles and cleared by Rockwell. Repeated to Beirut, London, Paris, and USUN.
  2. Document 63.
  3. Hare responded on June 17, in telegram 3364 from Cairo, that he had attempted for 3 days to schedule a meeting with Nasser to convey the substance of telegram 3367. On June 16, having failed to secure an interview, Hare authorized an Embassy officer to convey the gist of the message to Haikal for transmission to Nasser. He also authorized the officer to add that Hare had reason to know that Nasser’s proposals had been given serious consideration. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–1758; included in the microfiche supplement)