Office of the Historian

64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1

Washington, June 9, 1958—2:30 p.m.

3337. We are unwilling to advocate to GOL as coming from ourselves Nasser formula set forth Cairo’s 32442 for reasons set forth in first paragraph Deptel 3022 to Cairo3 and because formula seems to us essentially one-sided in favor of UAR. However we would feel differently were it possible to put forward more balanced formula which might provide greater benefits for GOL as well as larger likelihood of facilitating re-establishment stability in Lebanon. If for example Nasser

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were to agree to enlargement of his present formula of (1) Chamoun to finish term (2) Chehab to become Prime Minister and (3) amnesty for opposition by addition of (4) opposition to undertake to seek its objectives in future by constitutional means only and (5) UAR to undertake make every effort prevent use of UAR territory and facilities for purposes of inciting or supporting insurrection and subversion in Lebanon, we might then be in position advocate this proposal to GOL as one which we believed it should accept as leading to termination current crisis.

Your comments urgently requested as to probable reactions Governments UAR and Lebanon to such proposal.4 Foregoing Noforn.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central files, 783A.00/6–858. Top Secret; Niact; Noforn; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell and cleared by Rountree. Also sent to Beirut and repeated to London, Paris, and USUN.↩
  2. See footnote 6, supra.↩
  3. Document 59.↩
  4. Hare responded from Cairo on June 10 in telegram 3255: “Additional points suggested reference telegram are so obviously reasonable that Nasser would be hard put to refuse if he really serious in avowed desire promote peaceful and constructive solution of Lebanese crisis. If Beirut agrees, I should favor putting amended formula to him and placing him in position of showing his colors. Judging by my last talk with him I believe there is fair chance he would accept.” (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–1058)

    McClintock also concurred with the proposed expanded agenda. In telegram 4577 from Beirut, June 10, he stated that he felt Chamoun would react favorably to the five-point proposal although he might be inclined to balk at offering the Prime Ministership again to Chehab. (Ibid.)

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