59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1
3302. Embtel 3188.2 We are not averse to consultation with Nasser about Lebanese situation if this will lead to his exerting constructive influence on Lebanese opposition. However we like you cannot[Page 92]take at face value line which Nasser and Haikal putting out re posture of UAR in this crisis. Furthermore it seems to us Nasser trying induce us to join with him in advocating to GOL an arrangement which would be regarded by GOL and Arab friends of US as attempt to facilitate achievement of desires of Lebanese opposition and as whitewashing of intervention which UAR has employed to assist this opposition. We do not wish to accept political repercussions both in NE and in other parts of world which would result from what we believe would be regarded as placing by US of seal of respectablility upon Nasser’s intervention against legally constituted Lebanese authorities. It would also be impossible for us, even if we so desired, to guarantee future conduct of Lebanese Government with regard to domestic opposition.
While we thus cannot envisage a situation where Nasser and USG would join hands in urging upon GOL a detailed solution of what is essentially a Lebanese internal problem, we are anxious to see this problem solved before implications grow any wider. We believe it now clear that Chamoun will make no effort to succeed himself. With this issue out of way and in light UAR acknowledgment of capability clear up matter in 24 hours and of their expressions of concern over implications situation further dragging on, we fail to see good reason why Nasser does not attempt exert moderating influence forthwith. We cannot take at face value his expressed concern for fate of opposition leaders. Realities of internal Lebanese politics and kid glove treatment of opposition leaders during height of insurrection belie such apprehension. In effort to facilitate exertion by Nasser of constructive influence in Lebanon, and in order continue consultation with him and to dispel idea we turning deaf ear to UAR proposals we are willing, if Nasser is agreeable, simply to convey his proposals to Chamoun for latter’s consideration. In causing this attitude to be known to Nasser you should state that we ready take this action in view our desire be helpful in present situation but that in our view problem is basically internal one which must be decided by Lebanese authorities themselves. Specifically we would be unable undertake to guarantee future conduct of GOL toward domestic opposition leaders just as we are unable to guarantee or control action of any sovereign government in world toward its own citizens. If however Chamoun proves receptive to idea of amnesty and offers one covering activities of opposition to date, and should later there be indications effort being made by GOL not to live up to terms of amnesty with respect of acts of opposition prior to date thereof, we would be prepared use our influence in Lebanon against such effort.
[Page 93]We will not take above action until we learn whether Nasser desires us to.3
Thoughtful questions penultimate paragraph reftel4 are as you anticipated being given constant consideration.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–458. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell and cleared by Rountree and Dulles. Repeated to London, Beirut, Paris, and USUN.↩
- In telegram 3188 from Cairo, June 4, Hare reported that, since his talk with Nasser on May 30, he had met three times with Muhammad Hussanein Haikal, editor of Al Ahram and confidant of Nasser whom Nasser used on occasion to communicate with Hare. The purpose of the meetings was to discuss Lebanon. The line taken by Haikal, Hare noted, was identical with Nasser’s position, which was that the Lebanese Government had initiated trouble by making accusations against the UAR, and the UAR was merely responding in kind. Haikal said that the only way to bring the crisis to an end was by agreement between the United States and the UAR on a “third force” plan whereby Chamoun would serve out his term while a neutral government, possibly under Chehab, would be established to assume responsibility and offer amnesty to the opposition. (Ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- Hare reported, in telegram 3228 from Cairo, June 7, that he had seen Haikal that morning, and had passed on the substance of telegram 3302 to Cairo to be conveyed to Nasser. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–758)↩
- The penultimate paragraph of telegram 3188 reads as
follows:
“But most important of all is posture in which we foresee ourselves emerging after Security Council or other action. Do we, for example, envisage possibility of forcing issue to point where we shall be indefinitely committed to maintaining a strongly pro-Western government in Lebanon in face of what appears be general desire for more neutral orientation? Do we anticipate conducting campaign of such vigor in SC as to make it appear that we have abandoned all hope of even modest normalization of relations with UAR? Have we reflected that use of military force (except for immediate purpose of assisting in evacuation of American nationals) could well result in situation where withdrawal could be difficult and, when made, would probably result in collapse of government so supported and advent to power of really hostile opposition? Are we fully bearing in mind possible repercussions of a ‘strong policy’ in Afro-Asian area and opportunity which might be afforded for Soviet exploitation?”
↩