Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

414. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, October 7, 1960¹

October 7, 1960

SUBJECT

• King Hussein’s Call on the President

PARTICIPANTS

• The United States
  • The President
  • The Acting Secretary (Mr. Dillon)
  • Brig. Gen. A. J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary
  • Mr. Parker T. Hart, Deputy Assistant
  • Secretary, NEA
• Jordan
  • King Hussein of Jordan
  • Mr. Bahjat Talhouni, Prime Minister
  • Mr. Musa Nasir, Foreign Minister
  • Dr. Yusuf Haikal, Ambassador of Jordan

The President opened by expressing his pleasure at seeing His Majesty again and voiced particular appreciation for the support given to the Free World principles by His Majesty in the latter’s address before the General Assembly. King Hussein replied that this was “from the heart” and “how we really feel.” The President referred to the maneuverings of Khrushchev in the General Assembly and his impression that the Soviet leader had succeeded in antagonizing a large part of the African representation, in addition to much of the rest of the Assembly. Now that the Five-Power Resolution gambit was over the Assembly still had all of its work ahead of it—nothing had really been done. The King concurred. The President asked whether the King had been ill recently as he had heard. The King replied in the negative (subsequently the President again averted to this matter and the King said that perhaps the President was referring to a brief illness which he had suffered following his return to Jordan after visiting the United States in 1959).

The President expressed his satisfaction that the King had escaped the incident which caused the death of the Prime Minister of Jordan. The King responded that this incident had greatly shocked the people of Jordan at a time when they were united behind the government, were making progress and were willing and able to defend the country’s independence. He had discussed the question with Secretary General Hammarskjold in New York and entertained some hope that the Secretary General might be able to take measures which would enhance the prospect of peace in “our part of the world.” He was not sure how much Hammarskjold could do, but perhaps something could be accomplished in the direction of handling political refugees who conspired to promote disorder.

The President remarked that the problem of refugees (referring to the Arab refugees from Israel) was giving the American Congress a good deal of trouble. Some $23 or $24 million a year was being spent by the United States to help support them and while this yearly sum was not great in itself, it had been accumulating now for so many years that the taxpayers were restive over a situation which seemed to have no end.

The President wished King Hussein to know about his conversation with President Nasser. He had taken up with Nasser the matter of Jordan and Nasser of course had flatly denied that he had anything to do with the assassination of Jordan’s Prime Minister. The King smiled faintly. The President went on to state that he and Nasser had had a very pleasant meeting; that Nasser was very personable, but that he had noted that subsequently when Nasser spoke before the General Assembly, he had to some extent taken the Khrushchev line. During the course of their conversation they had discussed the question of free passage through the Suez Canal, particularly the Israeli cargoes. Nasser had said that this depended on the refugee question and had insisted that all the refugees wanted was to return to what is now Israel. This, of course, presented a rather impossible requirement and was not, according to our information, really demanded by all refugees. The King did not comment. The President continued that Nasser had stated emphatically that he was not one of those who insisted that Israel be eliminated and the Israelis pushed into the sea. At this point, the King’s face brightened into a broad grin and he, his Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Ambassador, all exchanged amused smiles for some moments. The President continued that Nasser had indicated that if the refugee problem could be taken care of this would make a considerable difference in the atmosphere of the Near East and promote the possibilities of stability and peace. The President had mentioned the Johnston Plan² but Nasser showed no interest in it. The President remarked that technicians of countries involved had all agreed to the Plan. The King confirmed this and commented it was a “good Plan”.

The President indicated that he had had a talk with only one other Middle East leader, the Prime Minister of Lebanon, but this had been a courtesy call without special substantive content.

The President expressed his appreciation of this opportunity to see the King again. He had decided that he could not make a third trip to New York as this was very fatiguing, particularly in view of the crowds that delayed his journeys from Idlewild into the city. He had, therefore, indicated his desire to see leaders in Washington in order to have an exchange of views with them, and he was particularly happy that the King was free to come down. He again expressed his appreciation for the King’s General Assembly remarks and commented further that while countries had a right to be neutral if they wished, it was a satisfaction to see small countries speak up for principle. He was irritated at times with the manner in which some leaders of small countries (he referred to Nkrumah as illustrative) professed neutralism without stating what they were neutral about. Were they really neutral between freedom at home and Communist slavery? Or did they just want to fish into the pockets of one side or the other of the two main power blocs. The King felt the issue was between slavery and freedom regardless of the size of states.

The President asked how long the King would remain in this country. The King replied that he planned to leave tomorrow evening (Saturday, October 8). The President expressed his satisfaction over the report he had received that the relations between Jordan and Iraq were improved. The King confirmed that conversations had led to the re-establishment of relations. He had taken the view that the Hashemites were a people ready to die for Arab causes and demanded nothing for themselves, no expansion or control over others. This opened the way to talks which would be resumed in New York the morning of October 8, covering details of the re-establishment of relations.

At this point, General Goodpaster indicated to the President that photographers were waiting whenever he wished and the President asked whether the King had objections to the taking of a group picture. The King assented, and the photographers entered, closing the meeting at approximately 11:00 a.m.

The King received the press in the White House lobby and outside the northwest entrance.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Hart on October 10. Hussein, who was head of the Jordanian Delegation to the General Assembly, exchanged courtesy visits with Herter in New York on October 3 and October 6 before coming to Washington to meet with Eisenhower. (Memoranda of conversation, October 3 and 6; Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199; both included in the microfiche supplement)
2. Reference is to a plan developed by Ambassador Eric Johnston in 1955, as President Eisenhower’s Special Representative, for an equitable regional division of the waters of the Jordan River. Extensive documentation concerning the plan and negotiations among the several concerned states is printed in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, volume XIV.