Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

404. Despatch From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

No. 95

Amman, September 5, 1959.

REF

• Department’s Circular Telegram 149 of August 19, 1959²

SUBJECT

• Objectives of the United States in Jordan and How to Achieve Them

Reference is made to the Department’s Circular Telegram No. 149 of August 19, 1959, which notes my responsibility and authority with respect to the mutual security and related programs of the United States in Jordan, and requests my analysis of the objectives of the United States in Jordan and the role of both US and non-US programs in achieving them in Fiscal Year 1961.

The Department, and other interested governmental agencies in Washington, have voluminous background on developments in Jordan since 1956–57 when the Jordanian Government dismissed Glubb Pasha

and terminated the 1946 Treaty with the United Kingdom (under which Transjordan had achieved full sovereignty) with the result that shortly thereafter the subsidy which the UK annually had paid Transjordan (and later Jordan) in ever increasing volume was withdrawn. Jordan went from crisis to crisis from 1956 to the current year, and, just as it had done in Greece and Turkey as well as in numerous other parts of the world, the US stepped in financially to prevent collapse and perhaps chaos in Jordan which could have brought on an area-wide crisis the consequences of which could well have been disastrous not only for Jordan but for the region as a whole. Our hope that Iraq might take on some of the financial burden of supporting Jordan, which was high when the Arab Union of Jordan and Iraq was established early in 1958, was dashed to the ground when the Union fell apart with the July 14, 1958 Iraqi Revolution. To date no possibility of finding another solution to the problem of assistance to Jordan has presented itself, nor have we been able to think up an alternative to the present arrangement towards which we can gradually work.

Absorption of Jordan into the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria is not a practical possibility at the present time; it would be resisted by the dominant elements in Jordan, and probably is not currently desired by President Nasser since one consequence probably would be that large scale assistance from the US and the UK to Jordan would be withdrawn or greatly diminished. In fact from the standpoint of the US the reduction in such assistance would be about the only recommendation of such a development. The Egyptians no doubt realize that in these circumstances their absorption of Jordan would rapidly bring on the economic collapse of the country, and Egypt would be faced with having on its hands a million persons (a million and a half including the Arab refugees) expecting better, not worse, times, with Egypt quite incapable of satisfying such aspirations.

Even should the Egyptians revert to the ambition they had in 1957–58 of absorbing Jordan, it could not be accomplished except by military force or subversion, and either course could quite easily be taken by Israel as a signal to achieve the long-held Zionist ambition of grabbing the part of Palestine now in Jordan and perhaps old Transjordan as well. (This was what the more extreme Zionists demanded in 1919 and still demand.) Since Israel would wish the land without the people, in order that it could be populated by Jews from Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia, such a step by Israel would undoubtedly lead to war with the whole Arab world and perhaps part of the Muslim non-Arab world as well. None of the Arab states are in a mood or position to absorb into their economic life the million Arab refugees now living largely in Jordan, UAR, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip upon the bounty of UNRWA. To have half of them, as well as a million more Jordanians (half Palestinians and half Transjordanians), or even

50 percent of this number if the Transjordanians were not disturbed, uprooted would be a major tragedy which the rest of the Arab world simply could not tolerate. If the Free World did not prevent such a tragedy the Arab countries could be expected to seek the support of the Communist World.

To Summarize:

• 1. A partial solution of the problem presented by Jordan by the establishment of the Arab Union of Jordan and Iraq failed and there is no chance that it can be revived in the foreseeable future. As conditions are now in Iraq few Jordanians could be found who would favor such a union.
• 2. Union with the UAR of Egypt and Syria is not believed to be desired by Egypt because of the dire economic consequences and because, if forced by subversion or invasion, it could easily lead Israel to make a grab at the West Bank (Arab Palestine) if not at all of Jordan. If Israel succeeded the proportions of the Arab refugee problem could be doubled, that is, to the half million Arab refugees outside Jordan would be added up to all the population of Jordan of a million and a half, most of whom would prefer becoming refugees to living as a partly disenfranchised alien element in Israel, and Israel would not want them. Such an aggression by Israel, however, probably would set off an Arab–Israel war (and perhaps a Muslim–Israel war) which might lead to a Third World War.

This boils down to the fact that for the time being there is no real alternative to a continuation of the maintenance of Jordan as it is and this is possible only with continued assistance from the US and the UK.

In the meantime the US should continue to do what it can, with whatever help can be given by others such as the UK, UN technical assistance, and West Germany, to assist the Jordanians in developing their economic and human resources in order that the growing population can be provided with at least a tolerable life. Without this there could easily be chaos, intervention and disaster. With luck over a period of time such assistance could mean that Jordan could absorb some of its half million Arab refugees in its gradually expanded economy. Whether the rate of such absorption of refugees can equal or exceed the rate of natural increase among them is an open question. There are no industrial projects in sight which could absorb refugee or other labor on a large scale. Small scale undertakings certainly help by preventing the situation from becoming worse and should be encouraged. But it is not possible to have great optimism that half a million refugees who fled from their homes in what is now Israel eleven years ago, and their children, can be absorbed by Jordan to any significant extent at least in anything other than the very long run.

If Israel could be induced to apply a major portion or at least some of the compensation payments it is receiving from West Germany, as well as other resources, to recompensing the Arab refugees in Jordan for their properties in Israel, many of which are providing incomes and amenities such as housing for Israeli citizens, then some of the refugees could use such stakes to try to make a new life for themselves, either in Jordan or elsewhere. There has been little indication that Israel intends to make such reparation now or in the future. Yet without it the refugees in Jordan (and elsewhere) remain a millstone around the necks of the UN and Jordan. They form an excessive supply of labor which forces down wages in Jordan; they form a viper’s nest of discontent and hatred which, because of their susceptibility to extremists, is a constant danger to the security of the Jordanian Government.

Past events have shown that as long as this one-third of the citizens of Jordan remain in their current miserable and hopeless state, Jordan must maintain very strong security forces to keep on top of the situation. Similarly the Jordanians are convinced that their regular military forces must be strong enough, as at present, to deter an aggression from Israel for up to five days to permit international machinery to operate and stop an aggression. In the past what Israel has seized it has held (regardless of UN resolutions); at least this was the case with respect to Israeli seizures of Arab occupied and allotted Palestinian territory during the period between the two armistices of 1948 and 1949. Jordan cannot hope to have military forces which could be a serious threat to Israel or to the UAR. It insists, however, on having forces sufficient to hold up an invasion from Israel (or the UAR) for a few days until the UN can act. If it were too weak to do this, Jordanians are convinced that sooner or later Israel, flouting the UN, would move to seize more of Arab Palestine which now is part of Jordan.

Such a situation could be greatly relaxed if Israel would abandon its policy of the “ingathering of the Diaspora” under which it invites persons of the Jewish faith from all over the world to come to Israel as immigrants. Jordanians, and many others, are convinced that the absorptive capacity for immigrants of the present territory of Israel must be reaching the saturation point, even if the figure quoted by the Hammarskjold Report³ of an $8, 000 investment in creating each immigrant job is increased; as Jordanians see it, this inevitably will mean that Israel eventually will try to seize more territory, and the territory most coveted by Israel is that of Arab Palestine now in Jordan.⁴ So Jordan must maintain security and military forces of at least an insurance character. That is what they, and we, believe Jordan now has. We have made it perfectly clear that the Jordanian military and security forces cannot be expanded beyond the present level without greater budgetary support which will not come from us. The Jordanians reluctantly are attempting to reduce their military forces, having no choice in the matter; but they insist that the efficiency of their insurance military force must be improved if this can be accomplished without increasing the cost of such forces to the operating budget.

Approximately half the budgetary expenditures of the Kingdom of Jordan come from the budget support accorded by the US and, to a much lesser extent, by the UK. By coincidence this is approximately the figure of the cost of the security and military forces of Jordan. Jordan, the US and Britain cannot be happy over this situation. It is, however, justified as peace insurance. In essence the very large sums the US contributes to such countries as Pakistan, Iran, and Laos can be and probably are justified also as peace insurance. It is unlikely that the forces of any of those countries would play any important part in a Third World War. Yet they are justified as war deterrents. At very much smaller cost the US similarly is paying a war deterrent insurance premium in the form of its budgetary support to Jordan. The length of time such peace insurance will be necessary in Jordan, as in Iran, Pakistan and Laos, depends on forces operating on a much larger stage than the countries themselves. Because two of them (Iran and Laos) have powerful and dynamic Communist states as neighbors, and threats from these neighbors are periodic, whatever assistance is needed can be provided by the US without much complaint on the part of the American taxpayer and Congress. Jordan is in a situation more akin to that of Pakistan. The latter is threatened by the USSR only indirectly, because Afghanistan is still something of a buffer. Also Pakistan has felt the threats of India, in the past, much more than the threat of the USSR, and the US is a friend of India and is helping it on a massive scale. Similarly the threat to Jordan from Communism is not direct, although it is conceivable this situation might change should Iraq fall under Communist sway. Currently the threat to Jordan is from Israel, a country which is friendly to the US and which the US has helped on a massive scale many times as great as the assistance given Jordan. Israel also receives massive assistance from world Jewry, some elements of which try, openly or covertly, to discourage the provision by the US of assistance to the dissatisfied Arab neighbors of Israel, including Jordan. A great deal of indirect assistance is provided to Israel by the US Government by means of the tax-free status that is granted to the United Jewish Appeal.

I believe that the above situation is thoroughly understood by those with accurate knowledge in the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and ICA. I do not believe that the general public in the United States, or most of the Congress, have any idea of the situation in which Jordan finds itself and the need of American assistance to Jordan as peace insurance.

Most of this peace insurance premium for Jordan for the current Jordan Fiscal Year (ending March 31, 1960) consists of $40.5 million in budget support. During the visit to Washington in March, 1959, of King Hussein, his then Prime Minister, and other Ministers (including the present Prime Minister), the Jordanians made an effort to obtain a pledge that budgetary assistance on this (or if possible a greater) scale would be forthcoming for a considerable period of time; they requested such an assurance for a period of seven years. The Secretary of State (then Acting) explained that under the American system financial pledges cannot be made for future periods since the Congress alone has authority to appropriate money and it does so only on an annual basis. The Secretary asked the Jordanians to take what we have and are doing as an earnest that we would continue to assist on about the same level in the future, given the approval of the Congress. The Jordanians consider that this was a conditional pledge, conditional on Congressional appropriations. Since I was present at this meeting, I believe I can speak with some degree of knowledge of the nature of the conditional pledge and how it was understood by the Jordanians.

I consider that a peace insurance premium of approximately the same size will have to be paid to Jordan in its fiscal year starting April 1, 1960. I say this because I do not foresee any fundamental change in the Jordanian or the regional situation in the near future, that is between now and next April, or between next April and April 1961. If there are fundamental changes, then the situation will have to be reappraised. Such a change could conceivably be a final solution of the Palestine problem with a substitution for the uneasy armistices between Israel and its Arab neighbors (UAR, Jordan and Lebanon) of a final peace. As I see the present situation, I do not believe Israel is at present ready to pay the price for peace and I do not believe the US or the UK are willing to bring pressure on Israel to do so.

In my opinion the price Israel would have to pay for peace with its Arab neighbors at a minimum would include the following:

(1) Recognition that Arab refugees have the right to return to Israel and be given back their homes and properties. No Jordanian I have talked with thinks many of the Arab refugees in Jordan would return, and they believe that most who did would leave again as soon as they could sell their properties and arrange for the transfer abroad of these assets.

(2) Fair compensation for the properties of the Arab refugees who do not return.

(3) Abandonment by Israel of the policy of the ingathering of the Diaspora so that its Arab neighbors, particularly Jordan, could breathe freely again and not live night and day under what they believe to be the threat that Israel is just waiting for an opportunity to seize Arab Palestine and drive out the Arabs now fully occupying this area.

(4) Rectification of frontiers so that West Jordan (Palestinian) villagers who still have their homes in Jordan (and so are not technically refugees and thus receive little assistance from UNRWA) would have returned to them their farms adjoining their homes and thus once more have a means of earning their livelihood.

Peace would have many advantages for Israel. Not only would the boycott of the Arab countries be lifted, but Israel could expect to find a market for its agricultural and industrial products in the neighboring Arab countries, particularly unindustrialized (and perhaps unindustrializable) Jordan. Haifa and Jaffa would again become entrepôts for Jordan to the benefit of both Israel and Jordan.

In my opinion if Israel does not make peace with its Arab neighbors, in the long run, perhaps 50 years, it is doomed as an independent state. It will be no more lasting than the Latin (Crusader) Kingdom of Jerusalem, and perhaps less so. Its Arab neighbors are acquiring skills rapidly, just as the USSR, Communist China, and India are rapidly acquiring skills. Some day the Arab countries, or a considerable number of them, will be united politically. The Arabs for some time to come will be winning the battle of the cradle since their families, even among the educated, are much larger than those of the Israelis, at least those from Europe.

I believe that a very large number of influential Jordanians would be willing to accept the existence of the State of Israel if the latter is willing, or is successfully urged particularly by the US, to pay the price of peace somewhat as outlined above. If this does not occur, the US, as I see it, has little choice but to continue paying the peace insurance premium to Jordan for an indefinite period.

I and other Embassy officers have reviewed with USOM/Jordan officials the proposed USOM/Jordan program for fiscal year 1961 recently sent to ICA. We believe that in Jordan, as in other countries, there have been some false starts in the past. At present the USOM/Jordan Director and his staff are doing their best to rectify any mistakes that have been made. They also are trying to concentrate on projects of the highest priority and eliminate or scale down projects which they, and the Jordanians, consider of lesser utility. They have the full support of myself and other Embassy officers in this endeavor. We have gone over the proposed FY–1961 program and approve it.

There are other things which we can and should do when plans have been worked out. Jordan needs additional help in education. The King, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Education are now considering ways and means of reorienting the educational system so that the high schools of the country will not turn out 5, 000 plus graduates each year whose training is entirely academic while the job openings for people with such training, now and for some years to come, cannot be expected to exceed 500 per year. When plans mature Jordan will ask us for and should receive help in changing the high school curriculum to emphasize practical skills.

In ten years this situation may change as the country develops its resources. Jordan simply cannot afford, however, to build up a backlog of 50, 000 or more academically educated young men (and women) who have no opportunity of earning a living. (These figures do not include the high school graduates from the refugee camps who, at least, have food and shelter while unsuccessfully seeking employment.) This group of educated unemployed dogs the Ministers in charge of many of the projects in which USOM is involved. The Jordanian Ministers cannot close their eyes to this problem. Tremendous pressures are brought on them to give jobs, any jobs. This group is like quicksilver, pushed back here only to push out there. The greatest pressure is brought on the Minister of Public Works and, unless he wishes to see educated young men (non-refugees) starve, or secretly join extremist (perhaps Communist) ranks, he must find something to keep body and soul together for the most persistent. This group may total 10, 000 at present.

The USOM Director and I have been considering this serious problem and on September 1, 1959, we discussed it with His Majesty the King and the Minister of Economy. I told the King that we faced precisely the same problem during the depths of the depression; our Government realized we simply could not let young men from the cities rot morally and physically; so the American Government created the Civilian Conservation Corps and put young men to work, under the Army Engineers, doing useful tasks of conservation and improvement. The greatest result of the CCC, I told him, was saving human beings, and the skills they had acquired, which were of inestimable national benefit when the war came. I told the King that if he wished, some of the experts of USOM would try to come up with some ideas on this subject for his consideration. The King was enthusiastic and stated that the problem of the educated unemployed (mostly at the high school graduate level) worried him greatly both as a human and a political problem; and he had often thought of some kind of a labor corps. We told him that he would have to give such an effort attractiveness by labeling it a “Build Jordan” or “Save Jordan” program or young intellectuals would rebel against doing manual labor. Also for the time being such a corps should be confined to the intellectual unemployed since to mix in illiterate or nearly illiterate peasants, no matter how deserving, would ruin the chances of getting the intellectuals to enroll. The advantage of such a corps in Jordan would lie not only in the useful work they would accomplish, and the saving of human assets, but also in imbuing these young men with a sense of discipline and civic pride. It could only work in my opinion if supervised by the Jordan Army. If such a corps existed, then the temptation of the Ministers to load projects, many of which are cooperative with USOM, with unneeded functionaries could be resisted. Job seekers could be invited to enroll and if they refused the Government could wash its hands of them. Financing should, in our opinion, be separate from the Army budget, although administered by the Army officers because they are the only element with sufficient administrative ability. Probably the funds will have to be allotted from the proceeds of the sale of PL–480 wheat.

The Department and ICA will be hearing more of this from Mr. Burns and myself as the idea takes shape. In our opinion it is essential that something be done for the unemployed intellectuals that will develop the country and save their skills, and their loyalties, for Jordan. If it is not done, as stated above, many will be recruited secretly into underground Communist ranks or by other political adventurers equally dangerous to Jordan and to the tranquility of the area. After an enlistment in the CCC of a year or two, during which such young men could be taught manual skills on the reclamation and construction jobs which engaged them, many could find employment, it is hoped, in fields less overcrowded than the clerical work which is about all the purely academically trained can now do. We have no idea at the present time whether assistance, other than the allocation of some of the proceeds of the sale of wheat, will be required from the US. If it is, we hope that Washington can be flexible enough to find a way to provide such limited additional assistance on fairly short notice. Very important political, as well as human, values will be at stake.

In the past we have granted Jordan limited quantities of military assistance in the form of hardware, for example following the emergency of April 1957. We are now about to embark on a three-year program of military assistance, the details of which are still under negotiation with the Jordan Government. The only comment that needs to be made on this program is that it is designed to meet pressing requirements and it has the same aim as the budget support discussed above—that is, peace insurance. The sole problem of coordination between programs entailed in this program of military assistance is that we must be careful that our military assistance does not increase the Jordan Army’s requirements for budget support. We have gained the assurance of the GOJ that an increase in the Armed Forces budget level will not result from our contributions of military hardware, and we shall exert overselves to see that it is held to this understanding.

Last year the US furnished some unplanned assistance, specifically a $5 million fund for emergency procurement of petroleum products, and a Title II, PL 480 program of grains donated for drought relief. No such programs are now planned for FY–1961 since such emergencies are not known in advance.

Coordination of the US program on the operating level has been extremely good in Jordan, and a tradition exists of frequent consultation. I expect such coordination to become even better now that the Embassy and USOM soon will be adequately staffed. The Country Team has shared in the task of preparing the MSP program for FY–1961. I intend to exercise fully my responsibility for coordinating US programs in Jordan to assure that they are well conceived and are being carried out as effectively as possible.

As for non-MSP and non-US aid programs in Jordan, they are of relatively small significance compared with the large MSP program. One important segment of non-MSP US assistance is our contribution to the budget of UNRWA. Jordan’s share of our contribution to UNRWA is about $11 million. This is an absolutely necessary form of US assistance, for without it we could not attain any of the objectives we are aiming at with our MSP assistance; the refugees must be taken care of one way or another for Jordan could not survive if the Palestinian refugees became a sole responsibility of Jordan. There is no problem of coordination in this area, for UNRWA activities are primarily of the direct-relief variety; in the fields of education, health and welfare the refugees are handled separately from other Jordanian citizens by the GOJ. In other words, the refugees are outside the realm of our activities and must remain so for the present.

The Ford Foundation is planning to provide the Jordan Development Board with five economists. We have met several times with the Ford Foundation area representative and are thus coordinated with this effort.

Other non-MSP US assistance encompasses activities by missionary and voluntary agency groups and by private enterprise such as the exploration for oil by the Phillips Petroleum Company, the backstopping of Air Jordan by Transocean Airlines, and royalty payments to the GOJ by TAPLINE. With none of these activities do problems of coordination arise.

Great Britain is the only other country that gives assistance of significant proportions to Jordan, and the level of UK assistance has been greatly reduced since 1957 when we began to assume most of the UK’s financial responsibilities in Jordan. This year the UK’s efforts are directly supplemental to ours, that is, a limited amount of budget support plus an interest-free loan for economic development (earmarked for the Desert Road and Aqaba Port projects). The UK is also assisting Jordan with a small military training mission. Coordination with the UK in the field has been good and whatever problems have arisen have been worked out with the UK Embassy in Amman. We do not know what assistance the UK is planning to give Jordan in the next fiscal year, but it is likely to be in the forms and at the level of the present year. The Aqaba Port project will be completed this year, but an additional loan for the Desert Road will probably be required.

The Federal Republic of Germany is engaged in a small technical assistance program in Jordan, for the time being limited to equipping a vocational school in Irbid and supplying technical advisers to the school. No problems of coordination with the West Germans exist. It would be helpful if West Germany and others of our Western Allies could be induced to undertake assistance programs in Jordan, both governmental and private, to supplement our efforts in the field of economic development.

West German technicians are assisting the Arab Potash Company in developing the extraction of potash from the Dead Sea. Two East German technicians are due to arrive in Jordan soon for the same purpose. Personnel from the Yugoslav trust YUGOMETAL are managing the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company on a contract basis.

An Italian firm will construct Jordan’s petroleum refinery. These projects are business propositions and are therefore not foreign assistance under the usual definition.

One possibility that has not yet been fully exploited is assistance from other Arab states which have a surplus of capital for investment. This idea has been talked of much in the past, but it is hedged in with so many political and economic complications (instability in Jordan in the recent past and greater returns from investments elsewhere) that about all we can do is hope something can be done. An example is the investments a number of Arab states made in the Arab Potash Company. It would be helpful if we could find a means to convince the richer Arab states to invest in Jordanian projects rather than building apartment houses or casinos in Beirut. If Jordan continues to enjoy a period of relative stability, this possibility has more chance of success.

The United Nations Technical Assistance Board engages in technical assistance efforts in Jordan in a variety of fields, mostly concentrated on participant training, furnishing technical advisers, and making basic economic studies. Coordination with our own technical assistance programs is good and is carried out on both the working and planning levels. I recently met with representatives of some of the governments and organizations engaged in assisting Jordan in its economic development for the purpose of informal coordination, and I intend to have more meetings in the future.

The US program of $40.5 million for budget support is a conditional promise which, as I see it, cannot be reduced. We shall do our best to keep it from rising, as we have done up until now. Economic development aid, which has been around $10 million annually, should be maintained approximately at that level. To cut this element of aid would have a disastrous impact in Jordan. A drastic cut would to all intents and purposes put a stop to economic development in Jordan, and, by killing all hope, would contribute to political instability. In his joint television broadcast with the British Prime Minister in London on September 1, President Eisenhower stated that “one billion seven hundred million people today are living without sufficient food, shelter, clothing and health facilities. Now they are not going to remain quiescent.” A million and a half of this vast army of the have-nots live in Jordan. We cannot afford to deprive them of hope. A drastic cut in economic assistance would have precisely this effect.

I do not share the pessimism about Jordan which, with reason, was fairly widespread in certain circles in Washington when I arrived there early in February of this year. In a sense the peace insurance, which our major expenditure on behalf of Jordan is in essence, must continue until peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors can be concluded, or war occurs between them which could well inflame a very wide area if not the whole world. A major portion of our military expenditures in our own country, as well as in some fifty allied countries, is, similarly, essentially peace insurance.

Paying the peace insurance premium in Jordan, and elsewhere, does not absolutely guarantee peace any more than our colossal expenditures for our own defense structure guarantee that war will not occur. But certainly it makes the likelihood of war much less.

In the current and the following fiscal years, I advise that we proceed with our program in Jordan much as we did in Fiscal Year 1959, doing our best to see that we have the wisest order of priorities, and being flexible enough to undertake new or phase out old projects as our best judgment directs. Our overall stance in Jordan is appropriate to the situation as it exists today. It will be kept under constant review by the Country Team, as it is by the Department, ICA and the Department of Defense.

Sheldon T. Mills

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5–MSP/9–559. Confidential.
2. Not printed.
3. On June 15, 1959, U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjold submitted to the General Assembly a report entitled “Proposals for the Continuance of United Nations Assistance to Palestine Refugees.” (U.N. doc. A/4121; printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 1033–1041)
4. A recent American visitor to Jordan told me that some close Jewish friends of his, American citizens (who are reasonable in most things), told him with obvious sincerity that the Jewish people have a covenant with Jehovah under which all of the territory of present day Jordan was promised to the Jews. These otherwise kindly American Jews apparently are totally indifferent to what becomes of the present Arab occupants of Jordan. Palestinian Jordanians have heard such assertions for the last 40 years and know they are believed. [Footnote in the source text.]