Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

397. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, March 25, 1959¹

Washington, March 25, 1959

SUBJECT

• Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

• The United States
  • The President
  • Mr. Christian A. Herter, Acting Secretary
  • Major John Eisenhower
  • Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA
• Jordan
  • King Hussein I
  • Prime Minister Samir el-Rifa’i
  • Ambassador Midhet Juma

The President noted that King Hussein was scheduled to visit the Pentagon during the afternoon and assumed that in his briefing he would be told about recent scientific developments. The President then discussed several outer space experiments and their importance to scientific progress. The King obviously was greatly impressed.

Responding to the President’s query, King Hussein said he planned, following his tour of the United States, to visit England for about ten days before returning to Jordan. He anticipated that he would be in Amman by the end of next month. Prime Minister Rifa’i said he would return to Amman very shortly and would endeavor to keep things under control while His Majesty was away.

The President made complimentary remarks concerning King Hussein’s courageous attitude and leadership. He noted the similarity of views between Jordan and the United States on many questions and expressed the hope that we would continue to work together toward the resolution of problems which confront us. King Hussein acknowledged with gratitude the President’s comments and assured him that he and his government would work closely with us on common objectives. He noted that recent efforts had been made to bring about an Arab League meeting in Baghdad to reconcile the UAR and Iraq. The meeting was scheduled to be held at the Foreign Minister level at the end of this month. The President noted that it would be a fine thing if the Arab League could resolve this problem satisfactorily. Prime Minister Rifa’i agreed, but noted that when Jordan had great difficulty with the UAR no suggestion was made by the Arab League that it meet to resolve the dispute. In discussing the leadership of the Arab League, Mr. Rifa’i said the former Secretary-General, Azzam Pasha, talked too much, while the present head, Mr. Hassouna, “doesn’t talk”. He said the Arab League was not serving the purpose for which it was organized, in that it reflected merely the policies of one of the member states.

The President expressed the hope that agreement could be achieved so that neither Nasser nor Qassim would push each other too far. He feared that if Qassim was pushed too hard there would be no place for him to go except to the Soviets.

The President inquired what might be a proper, specific program for rapprochement between the UAR and Iraq. He said that, for example, the occasion might present itself whereby he could make comments or suggestions if he felt they would be useful. King Hussein replied that the best formula would be full implementation of the Arab Resolution passed by the United Nations last year. However, that Resolution had been disregarded to the extent that it was now obsolete. What was needed was, in effect, another such resolution. In agreeing with the King, Prime Minister Rifa’i said the Arab League should support respect for the independence and integrity of the member states, non-interference in the internal affairs of each other, and joint efforts to promote the welfare of all Arab peoples.

The President referred to a speech which he had made in the UN expressing the willingness of the United States to give assistance to an Arab plan for Middle East development.² He felt that cooperative efforts along these lines might lead to a greater readiness among the Arab states to pull together against communism. He realized that the Arabs were concerned also with Israel, but the real danger to the Middle East was communist imperialism. He referred to his talk with King Saud in which he had stressed the danger of communism. King Saud had replied that while he recognized that danger, Israel was a more immediate threat. That was before the recent developments in Iraq, and before the strength of communism in Iraq had become evident. The President hoped that present preoccupations with Israel would not be permitted to disrupt defense against communism.

Prime Minister Rifa’i agreed and said that the smaller evils should be sacrificed if necessary to cope with larger ones.

The President commented that our actions in the Middle East had demonstrated clearly our interest in helping the area. We had come to the assistance of Jordan when it needed our help. A particularly difficult aspect was presented, however, when our friends fought among themselves, as in the case of Israel and the Arab states.

Prime Minister Rifa’i, in discussing the UAR and Nasser, criticized the latter for using “Arab nationalism” to achieve his personal ambitions. He felt that Nasser’s policies had been detrimental and had upset peace and tranquility in the area which are urgently needed if the problems there were to be solved.

The President commented upon the importance of making as much progress as possible in education, public health, etc. He asked what was being achieved in Jordan in these fields. The Prime Minister replied that Jordan had the highest percentage of literacy among the Arab states, except Lebanon. Seventy percent of the people could read and write. A number of hospitals had been constructed throughout the country in every district, and even in many villages.

The President observed that doctors, who had the confidence of their patients not only in medical matters but generally in political affairs, could play an extremely important role in the development of healthy public attitudes. He asked where Jordanian doctors had been educated and what their political orientation generally was. The Prime Minister replied that most Jordanian doctors were educated at the American University in Beirut and in universities in Damascus and Cairo. He said that when the Jordanian Government was forced to suppress the communists, they found it necessary to arrest a large number of doctors. His government was trying now to keep to a minimum the number of Jordanians trained in the UAR.

The President said he had always felt that the Arabs’ religion was so incompatible with atheistic communism that the communists could never get hold of the common people in Arab lands. He had thus been astonished at the strong support which communists seemed to have in such places as Baghdad and Damascus. He wondered how this was possible. He recalled that in Turkey communism was so unpopular that any single communist would receive very severe treatment if he were uncovered.

Prime Minister Rifa’i replied that in general communism was extremely unpopular in Arab countries. Communists had, however, been able to capitalize on special situations. For example, in Iraq there had been a tremendous gap between the top and the bottom, with the masses of the people living in utter poverty but with some few in extreme wealth. He recalled that the Iraqis, during the discussion of the Iraq–Jordan union, had said that it would take twenty years at the present rate of progress in Iraq for the average villager in that country to reach the level of the average villager in Jordan. In Jordan there was virtually no class distinction, and thus communism had far less to work on.

The President said he understood that the King and the Prime Minister had had discussions in the State Department of detailed problems, and thus he had not planned to go into details himself. The Prime Minister responded that he had had excellent talks in the Department, and he merely wished to say that he would welcome the President’s support with respect to the various matters which the Jordanian representatives had raised.

The President emphasized again that we had a great and special interest in the Middle East and wished to be helpful in resolving problems which the nations there had. At the same time, we had a broad responsibility which came from our firm belief in freedom and our knowledge that the destruction of freedom anywhere would affect our own. Thus our obligations were world-wide, and it was not always possible for us to do in any particular country or area everything we would like to do. The Prime Minister expressed appreciation for this situation, and said what he would like was to have in Jordan a “showcase” to demonstrate the advantages of cooperating with the free world with the United States as its leader.

King Hussein said that it was his hope that he and his government would be able to do something for their people. He needed help but wished to be of minimum trouble to Jordan’s friends. He wanted to show all what friendship with the United States meant. He wanted to show stability, peace, and progress. He did not wish to live only for Jordan but wanted to do more for the area as a whole, which was facing communism and must adopt policies and programs to combat it. He would do the best he could. One of his greatest needs was with respect to his army. In two out of five regiments, for example, he now had pre-war tanks and other equipment. This was a bad situation, particularly since other states in the area had Joseph Stalin tanks “against us”.

Without committing himself, the President said we would have to look into that situation.

The Prime Minister observed that communist supporters had their friends, and Jordan had its friends. The people were observing what the communists were doing for those cooperating with them, and would naturally draw comparisons with Jordan. He thought it would be unfortunate if the comparison should show that Jordan did not fare nearly so well.

The President thought the Prime Minister had raised a very important question. The communists were undertaking an aggressive program designed to achieve international revolution, with domination from Moscow. In this program they could proceed as the attacker, others as the defenders. Our help and assistance must be given throughout the world. By their tactics the Soviets can be selective, as they were in Egypt and later in Iraq. Through these means they can take one-tenth of the resources which we use and can have tremendous effect since it takes far more to defend than to attack in isolated and selected places. However, the free world countries which oppose communism have a bond of a common dedication to spiritual values. The Soviets do not have that. In this field they are extremely weak. We value human dignity and freedom, and are not slaves of a dictator of any kind. Thus we must present a common defense against communism.

King Hussein again expressed his warm appreciation for his reception in the United States and the friendly conversations which he had had.

(Note: Following the meeting the President spoke privately to Mr. Rountree, referring to the King’s comments regarding Jordan’s obsolete tanks. He mentioned the possibility of making some M–47’s available to Jordan, perhaps by writing down their value to a nominal sum. Mr. Rountree told the President that the Defense Department had prepared a list of military items, including twelve M–47 tanks, that we were prepared to give Jordan over a three-year period. The Jordanians were told generally what was on the list, a copy of which soon would be given them. They no doubt were not satisfied that twelve tanks were enough, and could be expected to raise the question again. The President thought that, if they did, we should give further thought to the matter.)

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.
2. See Document 269.