Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

395. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 24, 1959¹

Washington, March 24, 1959

SUBJECT

• Exchange of Views with King Hussein and Prime Minister Rifa’i on Current Situation in the Near East

PARTICIPANTS

• Jordanian Participants
  • His Majesty King Hussein
  • H.E. Samir el-Rifa’i, Prime Minister
  • H.E. Midhet Juma, Jordanian Ambassador
  • H.E. Hazza’ el-Majali, Court Minister
  • H.E. Bahjat Talhouni, Chief of the Royal Cabinet
  • H.E. Abdul Moneim el-Rifa’i, Chief of National Guidance
• American Participants
  • The Acting Secretary
  • Hon. Robert Murphy
  • Hon. William M. Rountree
  • Hon. Sheldon T.Mills
  • Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell
  • Mr. William C. Lakeland

King Hussein reviewed the situation in the Near East as seen from his point of view, stressing that Jordan’s difficulties stemmed principally from its refusal to follow blindly in Nasser’s footsteps and accept without question Nasser’s domination of the Arab World. The King expressed gratitude for US support and assistance without which he said Jordan could not have survived. He said that Jordan is fighting a battle against international Communism not for the sake of the West but because of its own convictions. The King emphasized Nasser’s role in helping to bring the Soviets into the area in the first place and giving them the chance to achieve respectability in the eyes of the Arab people. He reviewed Nasser’s efforts in the past to subvert Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia. The King asserted Syria had been an easy target because of internal dissension. Nasser had succeeded in taking it over through bribery and political manipulation. The King asserted that Nasser was attacking Iraq not because of Communism but because the Iraqi Government had failed to fall into line. Nasser was indirectly responsible for the Communists’ gaining control in Iraq, because Qasim had been forced to turn to the Communists for support against Nasser.

The King rejected the idea of neutrality for the Arab World as being unrealistic in view of the relative weakness of the area. He asserted that a Nasser victory in Iraq would be extremely dangerous, opening the way for subversion of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, after which Jordan would be an easy target. Finally, Hussein asserted the situation in Syria was worsening for Nasser and warned that Nasser could only maintain himself if he got outside support at this juncture when he was “practically collapsed”. On the other hand, now is the time for Jordan and like-minded countries to take the initiative with US help in order to defeat Nasser and the Communists.

Prime Minister Rifa’i followed up the King’s remarks with a more detailed discussion of events in the last two years. The Prime Minister asserted Jordan was motivated by two principles a) anti-Communism and b) non-intervention by one state in the internal affairs of another. Mr. Rifa’i conceded that after two years Nasser had come to the same position as that held by Jordan on Communism but said the UAR still had not accepted a principle of non-intervention. He ridiculed Nasser’s attempt to differentiate between the USSR and Communism, alleging this was analogous to trying to differentiate between Israel and Zionism. Prime Minister Rifa’i stressed the non-Arab nature of Egypt and the fact that Arab nationalism was a “sacred” doctrine long ante-dating Nasser. Mr. Rifa’i, finally, carried the King’s remark about the danger of a Nasser victory in Iraq one step further, asserting that Jordan was not too much concerned about Communism in Iraq since even if the Communists were successful there, the other Arab states were not likely to be infected but would in fact fight Communism all the harder. A Nasser victory in Iraq, however, would open the way to his domination of the whole area.

Mr. Rountree said that the US had been greatly concerned over two aspects of UAR (and formerly Egyptian) policy. One was the respectability which it had lent to the Soviets in the Arab world, and the other was the nature of UAR relationships to other countries in the area. He cited the Lebanese and Jordanian cases as two occasions when the US had helped small nations of the area to defend themselves against UAR subversion. Mr. Rountree stated, however, that recent developments had had an important effect in two respects: a) without going into the question of motivation, we considered the conflict over Iraq had brought about a completely new situation as a result of which there was a much wider appreciation among Arabs of the real nature of the relationships between the Soviets and local Communists; b) again leaving aside the question of motives, it was obvious there had been an improvement in relations between the UAR and other Arab states. Perhaps this had occurred because Nasser’s efforts in countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Sudan had failed—but whatever the reason, these two factors added up to a notable improvement in the Free World position, except in Iraq. It was our hope that if the Iraqi situation could be contained, the improvement brought about partly by UN actions would present an opportunity for a period of peace and tranquility in which solutions to underlying area problems, such as Jordan’s relations with UAR, could be sought.

Mr. Rountree took exception to Mr. Rifa’i’s view that a Nasser victory in Iraq would be more dangerous than a Communist take-over, asserting that the Free World would retain a good deal more maneuverability in the former case than in the latter. He also made the point that, in our view, although the Communists were making great headway in Iraq, important elements in that country desire to maintain freedom from domination by the Communists or any other element.

Prime Minister Rifa’i agreed the situation in Iraq was dangerous but said it would not be remedied by Nasser’s methods. He averred that Nasser in attacking Iraq really was fighting a battle to hold Syria. Mr. Rifa’i concluded by remarking that Jordan wished to see Nasser go on fighting the USSR since the more he did so the weaker he became. He cautioned, however, that Nasser should not be saved at the very moment when he had weakened himself in his battle against the Soviets.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/3–2459. Secret. Drafted by Lakeland and approved as accurate by Herter on April 15.