Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

393. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, March 14, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Policy Line and Tactics in Discussions during Visit of King Hussein of Jordan (March 23–26)²

Although the forthcoming visit of King Hussein of Jordan is to be unofficial and we have made it clear to the Jordanians that we shall not expect to engage in formal negotiations on this occasion, the King and his Prime Minister, Samir Rifa’i, have been assured that there would be an opportunity for discussions with the President, you and other officials of the Department while they are in Washington. The schedule for these discussions is the subject of a separate memorandum,³ and individual briefing papers on specific topics are being prepared. The coming visit may well have a crucial effect on U.S.-Jordan relations, however, inasmuch as we can anticipate a concerted effort by King Hussein and his adroit Prime Minister to extract from the U.S. assurances that we are firmly committed to the proposition that the continued existence of Jordan as presently constituted is vital to the maintenance of the Western position in the Near East. Prime Minister Rifa’i has on several occasions asserted to our Charge in Amman that he views such an assurance from the U.S. Government as essential if he is to continue at the head of the Government, and has made it clear that in his mind such an assurance would mean a continuing commitment to Jordan of military and financial assistance significantly above the present substantial level, as well as political and diplomatic support for the present regime in its self-envisaged role as the leader of an anti-Communist and anti-Nasser Arab nationalism.

It is not possible for us to satisfy the desires and ambitions of the King and Rifa’i, and it is important that we obviate any possible misunderstanding on that score, while at the same time avoiding too great a disappointment to our visitors (with a possibility of highly undesirable repercussions). NEA therefore considers it of the utmost importance that there be clear understanding within the Government of the line of policy to be followed and agreement on the tactics to be pursued in the forthcoming talks with the Jordanians. To this end, the following recommendations are offered for your urgent consideration.

Recommendations:

1. Our general objective in discussions with King Hussein and Samir Rifa’i should be to encourage the ending of Jordan’s isolation from its Arab neighbors and cautiously to explore possible means of lessening its almost total financial and political dependence on the U.S. (and, to some degree, the U.K.).

2. Our tactics (to be reflected in position papers) should be designed to further our general objective without provoking a reaction of desperation or despair, which could possibly lead to the King’s abdicating without making provision for an orderly change of regime, or, alternatively, to his embarking on military adventures in Syria.

3. In keeping with the foregoing, we should be prepared to employ the following tactical line vis-à-vis Hussein and Rifa’i:⁴

a. We should stress our continuing interest in the welfare of Jordan and its people, pointing to the considerable aid we have already extended as evidence of this.

b. We should point out the legislative and constitutional situation which prevents our making long-term aid commitments or giving indefinite political undertakings. We are making a special and unique⁵ exception to established USG practice by telling Jordan what we plan to provide in aid for FY 1960, prior to Congressional authorization of the necessary funds. This reveals our intention to continue to be helpful to Jordan.

c. We should firmly make clear that in our thinking about future assistance to Jordan we do not envisage the U.S. contribution as being substantially above the present level.* In U.S. FY 1959 this is expected to amount to $38.23 million direct budgetary support, $1.9 million technical assistance, $5 million emergency assistance for procurement and delivery of petroleum products and related equipment, and $5.3 million PL 480 commodities (at market value). For U.S. FY 60 aid $40.5 million for budgetary support and up to $5 million in PL 480 commodities for drought relief have already been offered HKJ. In addition we plan to carry out a program of economic development and technical assistance in an amount to be determined following Congressional action on the U.S. FY 60 MSA program. We consider the level of U.S. FY 60 budget, development and technical assistance generous, given our expectations of the likely level of U.S. FY 60 MSP funds and world-wide demands upon these funds. It should be indicated to the Jordanians that in view of the magnitude of U.S. assistance it is important that prior consultations with U.S. representatives take place concerning Jordan’s annual budget levels. We would also expect to be consulted about any contemplated activities by the HKJ which might materially affect the budget level.

Note: Figures given herein are for U.S. fiscal years. In detailed discussion with the Jordanians it is necessary to talk in terms of the Jordan fiscal year, which is from April 1 to March 31.

d. We should say that, while we do not envisage any increase in our FY 60 planned special assistance to Jordan for budget support and economic development, we are prepared to give sympathetic consideration to additional PL 480 assistance, above that to which we are already committed, if Jordan’s drought situation so requires. We should also be prepared to be somewhat flexible, in view of Jordan’s acute budget problems, as regards the division of available special assistance funds between direct budget support and economic development (e.g., we have already promised $40.5 million for budget assistance and would be willing to consider making available an additional amount for this purpose by transferring a portion of such economic development funds as might be allocated to Jordan following Congressional appropriations). We cannot, of course, specify the amount of development assistance nor of additional budget aid which may be anticipated.

e. As our past aid activities indicate, we are interested in furthering Jordan’s economic development. In this regard, the DLF has received additional technical data which it requested on the Jordan Phosphate Mines Co., and we hope that this project⁷ will be ready for consideration by the DLF Board of Directors in the very near future. The DLF is prepared to consider other applications which meet DLF criteria.

f. We should state that we are prepared to implement the recommendation of the Risden report, phasing the program over a period of three years.⁸ (The Risden report recommended a $12.8 million program of military aid, largely in the form of new military equipment to be procured principally in the U.K.) Our willingness to do this, would depend upon Jordan’s willingness to accept the Risden assumptions regarding the limitation of force levels and other measures, such as the elimination of obsolete equipment, designed to hold recurring costs to a minimum.

g. As the discussions develop, we should seek to implant and cultivate in the King’s mind the concept of a gradual and orderly rapprochement with the UAR and other Arab neighbors, making it clear that the U.S. is not thinking of abandoning Jordan to Nasser’s tender mercies but would be prepared to help explore the possibilities for an understanding with the UAR which would serve Jordan’s interests.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1223. Secret. Drafted in NEA/NE by Lakeland and Rockwell and cleared with E, W/MSC, H, Defense, and ICA. Sent to Herter through Dillon and Murphy.
2. Following a State visit to Taiwan, Hussein planned to spend 5 days in Hawaii (March 17–21) and then proceed via San Francisco to Washington, where he would remain from March 23 through 28. No official functions were planned for the King after March 26. Thereafter he planned to tour the United States for 3 weeks, departing from New York on April 17 for a brief visit to England and the continent before returning to Jordan.
3. Dated March 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.11/3–1159)
4. Herter initialed his approval of recommendations 3a–g on March 17.
5. Herter inserted by hand the words “and unique.”
7. The text of Rountree’s memorandum read at this point: “can be given sympathetic.” Herter crossed out those words and wrote in: “will be ready for.”
8. A marginal notation at this point, in Herter’s hand, reads: “beginning in FY ’60”.