Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

362. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 31, 1958¹

Washington, October 31, 1958

SUBJECT

• Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
• Lord Hood, Minister, British Embassy
• Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, EUR
• Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA
• Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

The Secretary stated that apparently the UAR really believes that something will happen in the area of the Middle East and possibly that Israel will take over the West bank of the Jordan now that British troops have departed.² Israel was probably being used as a pretext by the UAR. He noted that we had no information from Israel indicating that they were planning any move. He expressed gratification that the opening of the Syrian-Jordan border had been announced.

Ambassador Caccia expressed the view that the absence of the King of Jordan at the present time was unfortunate. The Secretary said that the planned vacation of King Hussein also gave us cause for concern. Ambassador Caccia said that this was causing anxiety in the UK but that no action had been contemplated to the best of his knowledge. He thought that the Foreign Office was considering some move to try to make sure that at least some member of the Royal Family returned to Jordan. The Secretary noted that the King of course might conceivably never return to Jordan.

Mr. Rountree stated that there was no evidence of an Israeli military build up but that Israeli forces in being were sufficient to take over the West bank should they so desire. Moreover, the Israelis could mobilize very quickly. Therefore the UAR was particularly sensitive in this respect. The UAR was making a great deal of US–UK–French alleged arms programs for Israel. They had also noted with concern Ben Gurion’s statement on the West bank.

Ambassador Caccia asked if our anxiety was confined to Jordan. Mr. Rountree said that at the present time the UAR is stating that it wishes peace in Jordan and that we think there will probably not be any UAR move at the present time. The Secretary noted that the departure of US troops and the King’s leaving on vacation created a situation where a coup might occur.

The Secretary said that the compelling considerations in this situation are basic and that it was probably desirable to have a discussion of the problem with the King.

The Secretary added that the situation would be extremely worrying should the King not return. Mr. Rountree noted that a peaceful evolution was possible in this case but that it seemed that serious problems would be raised if King Hussein did not return. Mr. Rountree thought that if the evolution in Jordan were peaceful, Israel might not take over the West bank of the Jordan but that Israel certainly would act to occupy the West bank should there be an uprising in Jordan. He thought it was fairly unlikely that the King would not return, particularly in the light of his recent conduct.

The Secretary said that we would send a message to our Embassy in Amman proposing that we should discuss the situation there with the British Embassy and that we should consider a talk with King Hussein asking for his evaluation of the situation. Apparently, if he believed it was prudent for him to depart on vacation now his estimate of the situation might differ somewhat from ours, because we had certain doubts over the situation and were interested to know on what basis his estimate might differ from ours. The Secretary stressed that he believed it would be more desirable for us to probe the King’s views rather than to issue some form of warning against his departure.³ He also stressed that we should proceed in concert with the UK.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/10–3158. Confidential. Drafted by McBride.
2. The last of the British paratroopers left Jordan on October 29. The remaining Cameroonian regiment was scheduled to depart by sea from Aqaba on November 2. (Telegram 1202 from Amman, October 28; ibid., 785.00/10–2858)
3. In telegram 1234 from Amman, October 31, the Embassy expressed the opinion that King Hussein definitely planned to return to Jordan after approximately a month of vacation in Europe. (Ibid., 785.11/10–3158) Wright confirmed this opinion in a conversation with Prime Minister Rifai on October 31. Rifai dismissed the rumor that the King might not return as “vicious gossip.” (Telegram 1236 from Amman; ibid., 985.7286B/10–3158)