360. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon1
1696. Embtels 2019 and 1993.2 We share Embassy view that investment USG has made in Lebanon, as well as political significance US-Lebanese relationship, requires substantial continuing US interest in that country. From political viewpoint, however, Dept coming to conclusion that while we should maintain attitude helpful friendliness to Lebanon, it is not to either Government’s interest seek to make more intimate our already close association. From financial viewpoint funds available to USG heavily committed.
Thus, while recognizing military and security aspects of problem as thoughtfully outlined in Embtel 2019, Dept and Defense do not favor our involvement in program for reorganization and re-equipping Lebanese armed forces. We would be taking on responsibility which would not only involve conclusion military mission agreement and assignment US military personnel to Lebanon but would also entail heavy cost.
[Page 621]On other hand Dept sees much merit in recommendation for arranging visits and training programs for Lebanese officers. Although process slower and indirect, such projects could have some influence on Lebanese military thinking while at same time strengthening ties with US on part of individuals involved. Preliminary reaction this proposal is favorable and while specific approval being sought would appreciate Embassy’s estimate number of personnel involved, and suggestion re types and duration of training. Defense concurs.
With reference MAP assistance, Department would welcome Embassy’s specific recommendations on: 1) Maintenance and ammunition requirements (final para Section 1 Embtel 1993); 2) Consolidated list Lebanese requirements and country team recommendations mentioned USARMA’s CX 332;3 3) “Shopping lists desired equipment” (para 2, Embtel 2019).
Defense planning to date has been limited to earlier Lebanese lists screened by JCS, which show priority deficiencies of perhaps $3 or $4 million in artillery, prime movers, general purpose vehicles, communications, electronics equipment, and ammunition. As indicated Deptel 1556,4 MAP funding problems might be limiting factor here as well.
Re equipment program for Lebanese Internal Security Forces (last para First Section Embtel 1993) ICA Washington thinks FY 1959 program should not exceed reasonable amount of demonstration and training equipment in addition to technicians and some US training for participants. This project currently under study here.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.5–MSP/10–2058. Secret. Drafted in NEA/NE by Hamilton, Meyer, and Rockwell and cleared by Rountree and, in draft, with NR, W/MSC, Defense, and ICA.↩
- In telegram 1993 from Beirut, October 17, McClintock stated that he had not intended to convey the impression to Under Secretary Dillon that the Lebanese Government preferred equipment for ground forces to delivery of the anticipated Hawker–Hunter aircraft. Rather, they wanted the aircraft and hoped for substantial military assistance for ground forces as well. (Ibid., 783A.5–MSP/10–1758) On October 20, McClintock continued his assessment of Lebanon’s military requirements in telegram 2019 from Beirut. He noted that the Lebanese forces were imbued with a Maginot line mentality, and added that he, Admiral Holloway, and General Adams felt that the United States should respond to future requests for military assistance by recommending a reorganization of Lebanese forces along more flexible lines. If Chehab responded to that suggestion, the United States could offer to provide a military training mission to facilitate the change. (Ibid., 783A.5–MSP/10–2058) Both telegrams are included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- Not found.↩
- Dated October 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.5–MSP/10–1458; included in the microfiche supplement)↩