Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

353. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 15, 1958¹

Washington, October 15, 1958

SUBJECT

• Situation in Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Rifai, Chief Jordanian Delegate to UN General Assembly
• NE—Stuart W. Rockwell
• NE—William C. Lakeland

Ambassador Rifai expressed his Government’s gratitude for the decisive stand which the United States, under the leadership of President Eisenhower and the Secretary, had taken in the recent Middle East crisis. He said people in the Near East tend to believe in what they see and to “follow the prevailing wind.” When United States policy was translated into action by our support of Lebanon and Jordan, people realized in a tangible way the value of cooperation and friendship with the United States and felt confidence that they could rely on the United States in the future. The Ambassador felt that Jordan had come out of the recent crisis very successfully; the Arab resolution had been a good development and there had been no criticism of Jordan by the other Arab states during the present session of the UN General Assembly.

The Secretary, in replying to the Ambassador, said that he wished to express his thanks for the words of appreciation for our efforts which the Ambassador had spoken. He said that our response to the appeals of Lebanon and Jordan for help against indirect aggression was evidence of the sincerity of our concern for the independence and integrity of small nations and of our great respect for the efforts of the King and the Government to preserve Jordan’s independence. We were gratified that the situation appeared somewhat more stable for the future than it was at one time in the past.

The Secretary, turning to the subject of Jordan’s more long-range prospects, observed that it would not be sound or practical for the United States to continue financial support to Jordan at the present level indefinitely. The long-range problem for Jordan was one of developing the country’s own resources so as to permit it to exist independent of outside help. This would require austerity—which admittedly was not easy when there was some prospect of a need for even greater military expenditures.

When asked later if he had specific advice which the Ambassador might carry back to Jordan, the Secretary replied that he didn’t feel qualified to offer advice but asked the Ambassador to express the great admiration which the President, he himself, and the American people generally felt for the courage and vigor which the King and the Jordan Government had shown. He observed that in the dangerous world in which we live people can’t be safe unless they are prepared to be bold and courageous, as witnessed by the recent example of the crisis over Quemoy and Matsu. He added that people who are disposed to stand up for themselves, even though they are small, attract support, while people who give in only isolate themselves.

In Jordan’s case, the Secretary said there was still the long-range problem arising out of the fact that Jordan was essentially an artificial state carved out of the old Palestine Mandate by the British to serve as a strategic base in the area. This concept was now outmoded and the British were no longer in a position to support Jordan. The long-range solution of this problem would appear to require that Jordan at some time reach an honorable understanding with its neighbors which would permit it to enjoy a greater measure of economic well-being. This was not easy. The Arab Union would have been a sound step had it been possible to carry it through, but it was doubtful whether union with Iraq would be a sound step today since the situation in Iraq was not yet stabilized. However, something might prove possible in the future.

Ambassador Rifai agreed that Jordan must seek an understanding with its neighbors. He observed that Jordan does not believe that the union of Syria and Egypt will necessarily prove permanent. He believed that there might be as much chance for Jordan in combination with Syria and with Iraq, particularly in view of King Hussein’s special qualifications. Events in the Middle East often take place suddenly, and anything is possible.

The Ambassador thanked the Secretary for receiving him and said that he expected to be stopping briefly in London on his way back to Jordan. He would be leaving New York in a few days and was happy to be able to carry back to his Government the Secretary’s comments.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/10–1558. Confidential. Drafted by Lakeland. The conversation took place at the request of Ambassador Rifai, who came from New York to meet with Dulles. The conversation was recorded in three memoranda. In addition to the memorandum of conversation printed infra, a third memorandum of conversation was prepared covering the question of a proposed visit to the United States by King Hussein. (Ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199; included in the microfiche supplement)