Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

333. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

BeirutSeptember 25, 1958—7 p.m.

1703. Admiral Holloway and I called this afternoon on President Chehab and made an extensive tour d’horizon with following results.

(1) Chehab said recent disturbances in Beirut ostensibly inspired by Phalange following abduction of Haddad² had served to confirm his suspicions that there was an important political element in Lebanon which sought deliberately to continue state of conflict and in particular to destroy Lebanese army. Although Chehab did not say so straight out, it was clear he suspected Chamoun hoped by maintaining continuing turmoil to find an opportunity once more to step back into power.

Thus, said Chehab, it had become clear in recent days that Phalange itself had been infiltrated with more extremist elements who took their orders from Moghabghab Chamoun’s henchman and hatchetman. President said Gemayel had been much more moderate and had sought in fact to restrain his more fanatic followers. (We have independent confirmation of this fact from other sources.)

(2) Despite these maneuverings President felt confident of his ability promptly to restore order in Beirut. He realized that now Christian fanatics had violated law and disturbed the peace he was in a position impartially to strike at any malefactors whether Moslem or Christian and this he intended to do.

Chehab said that although new government which had its first meeting with him today had proposed final clean-up measures be deferred in deference to Prophet’s birthday tomorrow he, Chehab, had given orders for security forces to proceed forthwith in removing barricades throughout Beirut including the Basta. Chehab predicted that by Saturday or at latest Sunday all of Beirut would be open and order restored. He has been much helped in this by fact Beirut Moslem leadership is cooperating with Karame; by restraining influence now being imposed on Phalange by Gemayel; by salutary deployment of CINCSPECOMME’s forces; and by no nonsense application of military rule any unauthorized person found with arms will be shot. Chehab said once Beirut was open and order restored he would institute a period of grace for rendition of weapons without punishment to be followed later by more rigorous measures for collecting clandestine arms. With dispersion of present irregular forces however President was certain military would be in complete domination of situation everywhere.

(3) Asked re new Karame Cabinet (Embtel 1700)³ President said he had been faced with choice of trying to assemble a coalition of antagonistic leaders who would carry on civil war in Cabinet or trying to find a group of men representing all confessional sects who could work together in harmony. He had even tried to appoint ministers who would be pleasing to Chamoun; but was now convinced Chamoun did not want harmony as he thought his own interests could be best furthered by continuance of discord. It was for a similar reason that Chehab had decided against creating a government made of parliamentarians or those deputies left out would refuse their support until other cabinets were formed permitting their participation. Every politician wanted his piece of cheese; and Chehab’s low opinion of “the fromagistes” had in no way altered.

(4) Chehab said Phalange and other card-carrying Christians were making dire statements of controlling sufficient votes to forestall a vote of confidence for Karame government when Parliament meets (he thought) next week. Although a vote of confidence is not constitutionally mandatory it is customary in Lebanese parliamentary practice. New Karame cabinet was assured of support of former opposition deputies and of middle bloc such as Raymond Edde’s national front. How Chamoun deputies would vote yet remained in doubt. However Chehab was determined to go straight ahead. If Parliament did not like government he had just appointed it could say so and he would dissolve this Parliament and call for new elections. General said if he gave in on this point it would merely mean commencement of an unending parliamentary squabble as factions vied for temporary advantage. He implied that this would be part of Chamoun’s over-all plan. Chehab said he preferred to meet these issues straight on without fear or favor and to let the deputies draw their own conclusions. He seemed confident of popular support for such a line of conduct.

(5) On withdrawal of US forces Chehab was categoric in saying he thought we should adhere to our phased plan of operations. He saw no objection to retraction of Third Marine BLT on or before September 30; and he thought all our forces could safely be removed by end of October. General volunteered suggestion an agreed communiqué of some sort would be useful. We said without any reference to Deptel 1328⁴ our thoughts trended on similar lines and we would pass his suggestion to Washington. Somewhat to our surprise Chehab said he thought it would have a better effect in Moslem sector of population if communiqué could come from the American side but with suitable reference to joint agreement and planning between Lebanon and US Governments. Admiral Holloway will comment directly to JCS on further details of withdrawal. Meanwhile request Department pass this telegram to DOD and JCS.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/9–2558. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Cairo, London, and USUN.
2. On September 19, Fuad Haddad, an editorial writer with the Phalange newspaper Al Amal was kidnapped and subsequently murdered. (Telegram 1648 from Beirut, September 21; ibid., 783A.00/9–2158) The kidnapping increased tensions between contending factions in Beirut, but the Embassy reported on September 23 that tensions abated following the arrest of men believed guilty of the kidnapping and murder. (Telegram 1670 from Beirut; ibid., 783A.00/9–2358)
3. In telegram 1700 from Beirut, September 25, the Embassy provided an assessment of the Karame Cabinet, which was described as an “opposition-third force-neutral coalition whose ministers are either all anti-Chamoun or have not recently been pro-Chamoun.” (Ibid., 783A.13/9–2558)
4. Telegram 1328 to Beirut, September 22, transmitted the text of a draft U.S.-Lebanese communiqué concerning the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon for Embassy comment. (Ibid., 783A.00/9–2258)