314. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State 1

812. Reference Embassy telegram 776.2 In accordance previous arrangements Prime Minister Rifai in 3-hour briefing tonight provided detailed account result UNSYG visit.

A.
SYG originally believed some form UN police force and/or UNOGIL type organization required establish “UN presence” Jordan. Subsequently changed mind agreed high-ranking personal representative with small staff stationed Amman/Cairo/Damascus/Beirut/Baghdad act as watchdog facilitate implementation GA resolution.3
B.
Although Iraq Government was co-sponsor GA resolution it considers participation limited to area general Arab unity. Re Jordan specific complaint GOI takes position noninvolvement therefore sees no justification UN representative Baghdad. SYG agrees, HKJ concurs.
C.
SYG told Rifai in view vague nature resolution he had two alternatives (1) point out this weakness GA request more definitive resolution; (2) make his own definitions. SYG decided on latter course but postponed formulating definitions until after discussion governments involved.
D.

Two principal aims SYG Cairo were:

1.
Impress on Nasser resolution not mere scrap paper.
2.
Secure agreement Nasser/UAR willing/able facilitate necessary arrangements its full implementation.

SYG had stormy session Nasser at which he presented evidence vicious anti-Hashemite radio broadcasts calling on people overthrow Hussein regime. Ultimately Nasser in SYG presence directed Ali Sabri (close political advisor) take necessary steps put stop extremists type broadcasts yet reserve rights political coverage. SYG specifically took Nasser to task for statement that Hussein request UK troops act treason said if Nasser belief he had no right make public statements which caused repercussions beyond UAR borders. As result lengthy discussion SYG secured Nasser agreement 6-point program outlined reference telegram which he proposed use as definition implementation Section 1 GA resolution.4

E.
SYG considers in light Arab League sponsorship resolution it together other Arab states must shoulder primary responsibility implementation. He sees UN in assist role only therefore decision as to degree/nature any UN participation rests exclusively with SYG.
F.
Nasser indicated he would agree facilitate early removal obstacles land/air communications through UAR territory. However, said it cannot be accomplished before September 24 when President Chehab assumes office Lebanon otherwise Nasser would suffer loss of face which might produce unfavorable political repercussions Egypt.
G.
Nasser rejected stationing UN representative Cairo. Pointed out any investigation made by UN representatives could only be done with cooperation GOE. He suggested if Jordan felt needed “UN presence” SYG could station someone Amman but nowhere else. SYG argued UN representative Amman would need network outside Jordan assist him tracking down alleged violations otherwise HKJ might [Page 559] just as well make direct appeal UN. Ultimately SYG/Nasser agreed to following formula in order insure uninterrupted communications across UAR territory.
1.
Very senior UN official with rank Ambassador to be stationed Amman with small staff responsible implementation GA resolution.
2.
Liaison officer with broad terms reference be stationed Damascus on definite understanding he is subordinate to/works under direction UN representative Amman. (Principal task will be observing compliance agreement re transit communications.)
3.
UN representative to be assigned Lebanon with broad terms reference reporting directly UNSYG except matters pertaining Jordan when he may contact UN representative Amman direct. Rifai agreed this proposal as did King Hussein.
H.
SYG said he has no idea what he can accomplish Lebanon or even who he will talk with there. He emphasized Lebanese very different Jordan because of UNOGIL hopes Chehab will take forthright action restore law and order after assumption Presidency September 24. SYG indicated if any attempt made catch him in “cross fire” internal political conflict he would make no effort “force himself” into situation, however, planned give extensive coverage Lebanon his upcoming report.
I.
SYG put forward name Lieutenant General Von Horn Chief UNTSO as candidate UN representative Amman. Rifai refused on grounds General’s connection UNTSO would give impression Jordan had agreed “observer groups.” Labouisse former UNWRA Chief suggested but SYG agreed his recent position involving refugees might create problem both East-West Banks Jordan. It was agreed SYG would select high caliber person as UN representative Amman meantime will designate temporary representative probably before end September.
J.
SYG opinion stationing UN representatives Amman/Damascus/Beirut in itself does not constitute basis for withdrawal US/UK troops. He takes position until Nasser demonstrates willing/able fulfill spirit/letter GA resolution demand withdrawal not valid. He told Rifai he not optimistic Nasser will fulfill his promises. Therefore SYG will make no recommendations in his report to GA re troop withdrawal. Intends to act only as reporter no personal views. He added this matter something Mr. Dulles, Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Gromyko can speak about but not him.

In summation Rifai said King Hussein like himself pleased with outcome SYG mission, however, they share his view in doubting Nasser’s intention live up his promises.

Wright
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/9–958. Top Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and USUN.
  2. Telegram 776 from Amman, September 6, reported on information forwarded to Amman from Hammarskjöld concerning the results of his meeting with Nasser. Hammarskjöld indicated that Nasser had agreed to the following six-point program: A) Agreed that provisions of the U.N. resolution shall be implemented; B) a reasonable/gradual approach toward elimination from radio broadcasts of anything tending to humiliate and at the same time avoid infringement of expression of political opinion; C) a personal representative of the U.N. Secretary-General to be stationed in Amman to receive and investigate alleged violations of the General Assembly resolution; D) agreed to work toward elimination of obstacles to air travel between Arab States; E) a liaison officer operating under the direction of the U.N. representative in Amman to be stationed in Damascus to facilitate communications transmitting from Syria; and F) reaffirmed intention to continue to establish policy to avoid interference in the affairs of other states. (Ibid., 785.00/9–658)
  3. See Document 287.
  4. Section I of the General Assembly resolution of August 21 reads:

    • “1. Welcomes the renewed assurances given by the Arab States to observe the provision of article 8 of the Pact of the League of Arab States that each member State shall respect the systems of government established in the other member States and regard them as exclusive concerns of these States, and that each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government;
    • “2. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to act strictly in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, of non-aggression, of strict non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, and of equal and mutual benefit, and to ensure that their conduct by word and deed conforms to these principles.” (Cited in Document 287)