Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon¹

Washington, July 25, 1958—10:38 p.m.

102. For Murphy. Realize it difficult for us from this distance give useful guidance to you who are so capably dealing on ground with complex fast moving situation. Set forth below, however, are number of considerations which have occurred to us.

1. Believe it desirable you avoid if feasible being in country at time election takes place. This connection, we have had in mind possibility your visiting other NE states prior returning Washington. We thinking along lines of confidential message from you to Chiefs State UAR, Iraq, Jordan stating you shortly returning US to report to President and you would be grateful for opportunity exchange views re situation ME. Would appreciate your views.

2. Agree with you it might be unwise for USG make known it favors any particular presidential candidate. We believe it preferable you proceed along lines pressing Chamoun to make his suggestions. It seems to us President should be elected before September 23 even if US forces still in Lebanon.

3. Appreciate need prevent Salam from intimidating from Basta stronghold those opposition leaders who have shown some willingness work toward internal political settlement. At same time seems to us initiation by army of military action, unless clearly necessary, might prejudice efforts being made to promote political settlement.

4. We doing utmost assist UNSYG in quickly strengthening UN presence in Lebanon. You may wish use this fact appropriately in your discussions with Lebanese, pointing out we facilitating UN process which could with fullest cooperation all parties lead to situation where Leb independence integrity assured and US forces could withdraw. In addition to this, strengthened UN presence Lebanon will, in our view, attract considerable sympathy in international community for efforts Lebanon making preserve its traditions of freedom.

5. Would be useful if means could be found identify US forces Lebanon with some sort of humanitarian activity (relief food, medical care, and the like) for Lebanese people. You may wish ask Admiral Holloway explore his capabilities in this regard.²

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.13–MU/7–2558. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Bergus and cleared by Rockwell, Rountree, Sisco, Walmsley, and Dulles. Repeated to USUN.
2. Murphy responded, in telegram 747 from Beirut, July 27, that the Department’s ideas with respect to the direction his efforts should take corresponded with his own thinking. He felt that he and the Embassy staff should continue to press for presidential elections to be held on July 31. That would allow him to leave Beirut on July 30, and he suggested an itinerary which would take him to Amman, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Baghdad, Ankara, Beirut, Cairo, and London before returning to Washington. Turning to the Department’s other observations concerning Lebanon, Murphy noted that there was no intention to initiate U.S. military action against insurgents in the Basta. Such action would only occur in the event of extreme provocation endangering the security of U.S. forces. Murphy added that he and the Embassy staff had been “plugging” the line of strengthening U.N. forces in Lebanon as a future guaranty of Lebanese independence, but the response had been mixed: “from extreme cynicism in case of Chamoun to approval in case of others.” (Ibid., 110.13–MU/7–2758; included in the microfiche supplement)