Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

232. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, July 25, 1958—5 p.m.

698. Pass JCS and DOD from Admiral Holloway. Joint message, Holloway, Murphy, McClintock. We called on President Chamoun this morning at his instance to consult with him and Chehab regarding the proposition that Chamoun made yesterday that it is essential that there be some sort of military success by Lebanese forces.² This would be designed to improve chances of a favorable political solution on July 31, to augment the authority of the Lebanese Government and would be in the interest of the prestige of the US forces in Lebanon.

Chehab made lengthy “appreciation of situation” pointing out there were in his military opinion two alternatives before us:

1. There could be a widely stepped-up military action against rebels which would have to be accomplished largely by US forces as in Chehab’s opinion Lebanon army would break up and certainly would not cooperate in such a wide-scale operation. Chehab predicted that any energetic movement against rebels either in Basta or elsewhere would provide a nationwide reaction among insurrectionists and predicted within 24 hours after such an operation were mounted, there would be vigorous rebel response in Tripoli, the Hermel, the Bekaa and the Chouf.

2. Second alternative was for Lebanon army by its own means to conduct a modest plan of operations helped by presence in Beirut area of very important American forces. Chehab said instructions had been given to commence operations seeking to reduce area of the Basta commencing at 1400 today. (The Basta is a central, Moslem district in the heart of Beirut. Its control by insurgents is perhaps one of the most humiliating features of the present government situation.) His plan calls for a sort of nibbling action employing not more than a company and a half of troops at any given point (he says he has a battalion and a half in Beirut) with object of pushing insurrectionists back upon themselves, of preventing harassment at present by rifle and grenade fire on government buildings, and of making it impossible for rebels in Basta to continue their present threat to public security in the city.

Chehab was very firm in stating he could not with his own means contemplate a reduction of the Basta. This was true not only because of insufficient forces but more particularly because his hybrid army of Christians and Moslems would break apart. He said repeatedly, “I have a very brittle instrument in my hand. If I strike too hard, it will break”.

Admiral Holloway inquired if it might not be possible for Chehab to augment his very scant striking force in Beirut if US forces should relieve Lebanese troops now in static lines. Although at first he seemed dubious, Chehab finally agreed this should be possible and mentioned what a help it would be if 40 or 50 troops now maintaining guard on Tapline terminal could be brought to Beirut, being replaced by US forces.

On general plan of campaign in civil war, Chehab said he had initially been faced with two alternatives:

(a) To deploy his six battalions (550 men each) along Lebanon frontier in hope of preventing infiltration from Syria.

(b) Deploying his forces on internal lines, which he had done, and which had pegged them in fixed positions.

It was agreed by Chamoun, Chehab and ourselves that contemplated plan of operations initiated today against Basta, even though it did not contemplate taking entire area, would have salutary political effect prior to elections scheduled July 31. We also agreed it essential that such action be taken at once if position of our own forces in respect to public opinion here and elsewhere were not to be jeopardized as well as for need to reinforce respect for authority of Lebanon Government.

Upshot of a two-hour interview in which President Chamoun took minutes of the meeting were following three conclusions:

1. Starting at 1400 today, Lebanon army would commence its operation to curtail size of Basta but not to take Basta.

2. US forces would so far as possible replace Lebanese forces in static positions. Lebanese troops thus relieved would be used in Chehab’s striking force to be used against the Basta or elsewhere.

3. US to respond affirmatively for Lebanon military request for matériel. This would include equipment for psy war, such as loudspeaker trucks, teargas, and other necessary arms or munition.

Secretary Murphy added a fourth point that as this was a police action, there should be cooperation to improve psychological warfare efficacy.

Chehab was emphatic that a joint operation by American and Lebanon troops would bring about the immediate dissolution of his army as an effective instrument.

It was finally agreed Admiral Holloway would in person at 10 am tomorrow present General Adams to Chehab, who in turn would give instructions to his staff for immediate cooperation in setting forth above program. Murphy and McClintock will call at 11 am tomorrow on Chamoun to assess political auspices thereof.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–2558. Secret; Niact. Holloway sent a separate report on this meeting to Admiral Burke in CINCSPECOMME telegram 6238 to CNO, July 25. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files: CCS Lebanon (5–13–58) Sec. 4; included in the microfiche supplement)
2. See Document 229.