215. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in Washington and the Permanent Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) in New York, July 22, 1958, 5:54 p.m.1

They exchanged amenities. Hammarskjold did make his statement.2 The Lebanese made a statement today3 but it did not upset the applecart. The Soviet4 clearly made no motion though he huffed and puffed. He threatened to call the GA but we are on top of that said L. The vote on the Jap res was 10–1. L replied Hammarskjold will start moving right away. The Sec asked if he has money. L said he had emergency fund on a reimbursable basis. We don’t want him to feel cramped for money to do the necessary things, said the Sec, but he does not know if we can provide him with money.5 L said the SYG has had unfair criticism in the newspapers re not being cooperative with us and L has sent a telegram6 showing what he has done and maybe the Sec could write. The Sec said call7 or write. L mentioned going away for a few days quietly and he can be back in a few hours. The Sec brought him up to date re the Br proposal etc. Also he is [Page 369]giving the Amb a note8 a few minutes from now—and also re the tip-off K would come. It could be next week but the French are opposed and we don’t know what De Gaulle will do. L said the SYG has a suggested formula—call the SC and Chiang and Hussein don’t have to be there. The Sec said you can’t keep them from coming. L said it is possible though to arrange ahead of time with the Russians and then call in India etc. to sit depending on the question. The Sec’s impression had been they would not come but he has a feeling they are afraid a general war may originate here—he thinks they are scared of the Turks. L said Sobolev practically said to the SYG this a.m. he was going to have to talk in a fierce way but in effect he wanted him to intensify his effort in Lebanon because they are worried and the best info L has is Sobolev talks with Gromyko who is not well regarded by Khrushchev. The Sec said for L to go—he will be going to London this weekend.

  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed in the Secretary’s office by Phyllis D. Bernau. The source text indicates that Lodge placed the call.
  2. The Security Council voted on July 22 on the Japanese resolution of July 18 to authorize the Secretary-General to take additional measures to insure the integrity and independence of Lebanon. The resolution failed of adoption owing to a Soviet veto, despite a 10–1 vote in favor. Following the vote, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld made a statement in the Council indicating that, in light of the failure of the Council to take additional action in the crisis in the Middle East, he intended to expand the activities of the Observation Group in Lebanon and take such other action, under the provisions of the Charter and the resolution adopted on June 11, as he considered necessary “to prevent a further deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and to assist in finding a road away from the dangerous point at which we now find ourselves.” (Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Vol. 4: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1958–1960, pp. 144–145) The Security Council then adjourned sine die.
  3. For the statement of the Lebanese Representative in the Security Council on July 22, see U.N. doc. S/PV. 836.
  4. Soviet Representative Sobolev.
  5. In a subsequent memorandum to Dulles on July 22, Assistant Secretary Wilcox addressed the question of financing expanded U.N. operations in Lebanon and proposed that up to $8 million be authorized from Mutual Security funds to meet such financing. Dulles approved the recommendation. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.5783A/7–2258; included in the microfiche supplement)
  6. In telegram 117 from USUN, July 22, Lodge stated: “Secretary and Dept should know that Hammarskjold has given me fullest possible cooperation during recent concluded SC phase of Lebanese problem.” He added: “He has done this in spite of his apparent grave doubts wisdom our decision.” (Department of State, Central Files, 315/7–2258; included in the microfiche supplement)
  7. The word “call” is underscored in the source text and a marginal notation on the source text at this point, in an unknown hand, reads: “he did”.
  8. See Document 217.