154. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State1
473. For the Secretary from Murphy. You might be interested to know that the AF Boeing 707 took us from Westover non-stop to Beirut in exactly 11 hours averaging close to 500 miles an hour at an altitude of about 40, 000 feet. Pilot said it was minus 70 degrees Fahrenheit outside.
Temperature in Beirut fortunately considerably warmer. Immediately after arrival McClintock and I met with Holloway. I find a very satisfactory working relationship and understanding between them. They deserve credit for the skillful manner in which incidents with Lebanese forces were avoided yesterday, due to fact that Chehab had failed to persuade his military entourage of the necessity and wisdom of US military intervention.
Accompanied by McClintock I called this afternoon on President Chamoun. He gave me lengthy account of events preceding present outbreak of civil strife in Lebanon attributing his principal difficulties to enmity of Nasser for his refusal to reject British and French diplomatic representation after Suez. In larger field he felt Nasser was following Soviet policy objectives in ME, and although he “hoped Nasser might reform” he had frank doubts.
Chamoun said so long as Syria was in Nasser’s hands, there could be no lasting peace in ME. However for immediate crisis he thought if situation could be restored in Iraq, Government of Jordan stoutly maintained and Lebanese assisted in preserving its integrity, there would be a good chance for maintenance of general peace. If anything were to be done against Syria militarily, it should be done with secrecy and speed. He emphasized latter as being an essential element if Russians were to stay out.
Most of our conversation naturally dwelt with situation in Lebanon. Chamoun was warm in his expression of thanks to President Eisenhower and yourself for swift and effective action by US forces.
President was frank in admitting we had been very close to an ugly incident yesterday and was equally candid in saying that unless Lebanese Army could be divested of a small group of disloyal officers, our military and political enterprise here would be placed in jeopardy. He said he could not give a final answer as to extent to which Lebanese [Page 263] Army would be effective in putting down revolt until he had settled this problem. He said he would instruct General Chehab tomorrow morning to remove disloyal officers in the general staff. McClintock will check with President after his talk with General who is calling on me at 1 p.m. tomorrow.
In response to my query whether elections could be held July 24, Chamoun said answer must wait on development of events particularly purging of higher army staff. He said it was already clear, however, many deputies now would be reluctant to vote for Chehab as President because of yesterday’s near-miss between Lebanese Army and Marines.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.13–MU/7–1758. Secret; Niact. Received at 5 p.m. and passed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Murphy arrived in Beirut on July 17 and remained until July 30. He traveled thereafter throughout the Middle East and left Athens for Washington, via Paris and London, on August 10.↩