147. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State1
428. London for CINCNELM. Following Embtel 423,2Chamoun asked me to join him and General Chehab. General repeated his objections to US deployment in Beirut but finally agreed to consider a gradual movement by small detachments. Chehab said he feared his army might resist if such precautions were not taken.
I told General that President had learned from General Wade that Lebanese artillery and tanks had taken up positions along airport road subsequent to Wade’s call on President. Chehab professed to be in complete ignorance of these dispositions.
In consequence in Chamoun’s presence I suggested General accompany me to these new positions in order personally to make arrangements for safe passage of marine battalion. Chehab had no option but to go along with this request. I then took General in my car out toward airport where we met entire column stopped by Lebanese military who had meanwhile lined up every available tank and recoilless rifle in Beirut with guns trained on US column.3
Fortunately at this juncture I met Admiral Holloway and Admiral Yeager who had just arrived and together with General Chehab we proceeded to nearby command school where General got in touch with his headquarters staff and countermanded orders which had set up Lebanese tanks and artillery in a hostile posture.
Chehab went through an extensive telephone arrangement ostensibly to provide escort jeeps manned by Lebanese army to bring column into harbor area in platoons of three vehicles with a ten-minute interval between each segment. Whether by design or accident a small [Page 255] burst of firing near command school gave Chehab further pretext to hold up movement of column on grounds he wished to prevent “incidents”.
By this time Admiral Holloway and I had impression Chehab was stalling. In consequence I said we would now move with General Chehab and Admiral Holloway to escort first segment of column to port area. With some reluctance Chehab went along. We got first column well on way to port and then found main body was stalled near airport. By this time all pretense of Lebanese military escort had evaporated. Admirals Holloway and Yaeger and I have since been doing operation “sheep dog” herding our column along Corniche to port area. We expect entire column to be in port by 1530 local and will then go about our rounds of calls on President, Prime Minister and Chehab … who, characteristically, is taking the afternoon off at Junieh.4
Admiral Holloway request pass to JCS and DOD.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–1658. Secret; Niact. Also sent to USUN. Repeated to Paris, Rome, and London. Received at 11:26 a.m. and passed on to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force at 12:30 p.m. Admiral Holloway reported to Admiral Burke on the incident described in this telegram in telegrams 161156Z and 162056Z from CINCSPECOMME to CNO, both July 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files: CCS 381 Lebanon (5–13–58) Sec. 3; included in the microfiche supplement) Ambassador McClintock subsequently published an account of the incident in United States Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1962, p. 71.↩
- Supra.↩
- According to a memorandum prepared for McClintock on July 17 by Embassy Political Officer Robert L. Funseth, who had accompanied General Wade to monitor the advance of the Marine column from the airport to the harbor, the Lebanese Army units deployed along the road were under orders to fire on the Marine column if it advanced to their positions. General Wade learned of these orders only after discovering the Lebanese tanks deployed along the road and halting the Marine column. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Beirut Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, July 16, 1958–July 31, 1958; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- Ellipsis in the source text. McClintock reported, in telegram 433 from Beirut, July 16, that the Marine battalion was fully positioned in the harbor area by afternoon, without any further opposition from the Lebanese military. President Chamoun and Prime Minister Solh each offered personal and official thanks for the rapid and effective landing of the Marine force. Chamoun also agreed to make certain that the necessary orders were issued to insure complete cooperation by the Lebanese military with U.S. forces in Lebanon. Chehab confirmed this offer in a separate meeting with McClintock and Holloway. McClintock noted, however, that he and Holloway were “agreed that we can no longer submit to subtle sabotage by Lebanese high command including its general and its senior staff officers.” He added: “If we find further evidence of such sabotage or unwillingness to cooperate, I intend to suggest to Chamoun to relieve these officers immediately.” (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–1658; included in the microfiche supplement)↩