Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

144. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, July 15, 1958, 5:55 p.m.¹

Washington, July 15, 1958, 5:55 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO THE PRESIDENT

The Sec said Hood is coming in. The British are very naturally exercised about the situation in Iraq and tried yesterday through M’s talk with the Pres² and through cables to get a blank check which the Sec does not think they should do but one suggestion was that Selwyn Lloyd would come over to talk about it and the Sec is inclined to suggest to Hood that if they think that is desirable we would be glad to have him come. The Pres said that is all right. It will show what the difficulties are—we are not a parliamentary govt and they can’t get it through their heads. We can do a good deal on logistic support etc. beyond what we are now doing. All our statements today are full of prudence but we have laid the groundwork for showing the bad ones are in Iraq and Jordan.

The Pres made the statement all right—just under 14 minutes. The Sec praised our technique for 1 minute to a page.

The Sec referring to the above is not clear as to their strategy.³

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. Transcribed in the Secretary’s office by Phyllis D. Bernau.
2. See Document 131.
3. An hour later, Dulles discussed developments in the Middle East with Nixon. Nixon referred to McClintock’s effort to keep the troops from coming ashore, in response to Chehab’s request, and “indicated the need for people who can stand up better than that.” He suggested that Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy might be effective in addressing the political problems involved in the crisis. Nixon added that, having taken the initial military step in the area, he hoped the United States would not vacillate in supporting the British where necessary in Jordan and Iraq. Dulles responded that it was important to avoid getting bogged down as the British had in Suez and have to pull out. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations; included in the microfiche supplement)