142. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State1
406. London pass CINCNELM. Department pass Defense. As is to be expected in these affairs there is always an initial SNAFU in command arrangements, but I do wish Department and Defense would urgently clarify to whoever is commanding landing operation here that views of US Ambassador re political matters are paramount.
I am currently engaged in an extremely delicate endeavor to keep Lebanese Army from disintegrating (cf. Embtel 401).2 My recommendations to commander of task force coming into port with most of his men on board were based on political considerations since if Chehab decides to throw in sponge, Lebanese Army will fall apart, and one of essential elements of our intervention (that Lebanese armed forces continue fighting) will have disappeared.
In answer to my oral message set out penultimate paragraph Embtel 401, I have received following message from “Gladwell” (whether brassbound man or ship not indicated) torn straight out of military manual: [Page 249]
“I am operating under orders from Commander Sixth Fleet and Commander-in-Chief Special Forces Mediterranean who in turn are operating under orders US President. All troops have landed and will remain ashore in vicinity airport until further orders.”
Furthermore, subsequent to despatch Embtel 4023 I had a direct oral request from Chamoun on his secret radio channel to send Marines with tanks for defense of palace. I passed this on by messenger to Marine Colonel commanding at airport, thus far without result. This again bears upon my major political responsibilities.
Three times this afternoon General Chehab or his chief of staff have protested that at airport Marines have told Lebanese military to pack up and go home. Chehab says his understanding was we were landing to cooperate with Lebanese security forces, not to take their places. This also is my understanding.
I refer to Deptel 50934 in which it is explicitly stated that:
“In case of difference between CINCAMBRITFOR and local US and UK diplomatic representatives in regard political matters relating exclusively to Lebanon, views of latter shall be controlling.”
Request immediate instructions to whoever is in command of landing forces that he must get in touch with me and likewise take my judgment on matters of vital political importance. I realize local commanders are doing their best but are bound by exceedingly rigid orders. Thus far Lebanese military look to me to interpret actions of our military and I have not yet even been able to establish contact with commanding officer almost four hours after operation began and apparently has been completed.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–1558. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London. Received at 1:13 p.m. and passed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force at 2 p.m.↩
- Supra.↩
- In telegram 402 from Beirut, July 15, McClintock reported that President Chamoun had sent word to him that he had received information through military sources that General Chehab had decided to send an armed force to arrest Chamoun. McClintock responded that he would try to arrange for the despatch of a detachment of marines to help protect the palace, and he called Chehab to express astonishment at the report. Chehab said that he had tried to dissuade his officers from attempting a coup, but he felt his arguments were weakened by the fact that the U.S. forces had come ashore. McClintock stated that he had warned the General “very explicitly” that the United States was undertaking the landing in support of the legitimate government of Lebanon and that if the Lebanese army arrested the chief of state “there would be most disagreeable consequences.” Chehab responded that he would “recommend” that the coup against Chamoun be stopped. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–1558; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- Dated June 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–3058)↩