Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

102. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, June 22, 1958, 5 p.m.¹

Washington, June 22, 1958, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Lebanon

The Secretary observed that the fact of outside intervention in the Lebanese crisis was demonstrable and recalled that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its consideration of the Atlantic Treaty had stated insurrection stimulated from without was aggression. The Secretary said that if there were no protection against this kind of thing the Communists would indeed have developed a technique which was invincible. The question of our possible intervention posed a difficult problem from a juridical standpoint and would be difficult in the United Nations. Yet the only thing worse than intervening if requested to do so by the Lebanese Government would be not to go in. Our intervention would probably result in the Governments of Jordan and Iraq being swept away and the Lebanese Government itself probably would not survive our withdrawal. The situation would of course be better if we went in under United Nations auspices. On the other hand if we were called upon and did not respond, the Governments of Jordan and Iraq would also be overthrown. In this respect there was little difference either way. The real difference lay with the peripheral countries. If we did not respond, it would gravely shake the confidence of the peripheral countries and in that case the consequences of our failure to act would not be limited to the Arab countries alone but would undermine the Northern Tier, Sudan and Libya. Obviously the best thing would be for Chamoun to work out a solution himself. Accordingly, our first priority should be to step up United Nations help but the United Nations should not get in a position between the government and the rebels. The eventual government which would emerge from such a resolution of the problem would not be a Chamoun government since its term was ending and he had privately said he would not run again for office. The new government would not be as pro-Western as Chamoun but might hold the balance between the West on the one hand and Nasser and Soviet influence on the other.

With reference to the language of the Middle East resolution, Mr. Quarles asked what was meant by the “independence” of Lebanon, to which the Secretary replied it meant independence from the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Lodge commented that our intervention would have very serious consequences and he wondered whether we had been sufficiently ruthless in our efforts to get a political compromise or to get Nasser to call this thing off. He noted that “fomenting civil strife” was part of the Essentials of Peace Resolution² but he thought that sending in troops was not the way to deal with this problem. We should rather seek to outmaneuver and outsubvert the other side. However, if this matter should be raised in the United Nations, it would require very vigorous action. He would have to have all useful intelligence bearing on the case declassified so that he could undertake a comprehensive recitation of all the facts which might take up a whole afternoon session. This was a case in which we would have to speak to the smaller nations and endeavor to make this ambiguous Communist challenge appear unambiguous. Mr. Lodge stressed the importance of his having hard facts. At this point the available intelligence material was examined and it was agreed that as much as possible should be declassified and provided Mr. Lodge as a matter of urgency.

The Secretary observed that what was at stake here was the whole periphery of the Soviet Union. Our failure to respond to the Lebanese request for intervention might be technically justified since the conditions we attached to such intervention have not and will not be met. Yet the basic fact is that Lebanon is the most pro-Western Arab government in the area. It accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine. Our failure to respond would destroy the confidence in us of all the countries on the Soviet periphery throughout the Middle and Far East.

Mr. Quarles observed that Nasser and his associates were clearly offenders against international law in this case and that we were in the position of having to take the law into our own hands. What was needed was to create a situation in the United Nations in which action could be taken in the name of international law. Mr. Quarles also pointed out that in the meeting presided over by Governor Herter a few days earlier general agreement had been reached that full recourse to the United Nations should be had, including both the Security Council and the General Assembly.

The Secretary observed that as far as the United Nations was concerned, a great deal would depend on the evidence which the United Nations observers would send back and finally he stressed the importance in any intervention of having the participation of such non-European powers as Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan.

The meeting was attended by the Secretary, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Quarles, Mr. Rountree, Mr. Wilcox, Mr. Reinhardt, [Mr. Lodge].

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–2258. Top Secret. Drafted by Reinhardt, cleared by Rountree and Wilcox. The source text indicates the conversation took place in the Secretary’s residence on Sunday afternoon. The participants are listed at the end of the memorandum.
2. U.N. doc. A/RES/290(IV), December 1, 1949.