92. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to Secretary of State Herter0

SUBJECT

  • Intelligence Note: Polish Developments

The Polish Government, on October 27, announced a series of changes in its economic set-up which restored three exponents of economic centralization and discipline (Szyr, Tokarski, and Gede)1 to positions of responsibility. Edward Ochab was also removed from the position of Minister of Agriculture apparently in order to enable him to devote more time to a broadened range of Party responsibilities.

The economic shakeup, which clearly portended a tightening of discipline and central control, was the consequence of imbalances in the economy, dramatized by but not restricted to a serious meat shortage. Wage levels, for example, rose by 43.1 percent during the first 3-1/2 years of the current five year plan as against about 30 percent envisaged for the entire period. The resultant inflationary pressure compounded planning errors in meat production and price relationships and led to the current shortage. It now appears to be the regime’s intention to hold the line on current wage levels, cut back overtime and bonus payments and, in some cases, pare padded payrolls. Some adjustment of work norms will also be made in selected sectors, such as construction and engineering, where present work norms are so obsolete as to permit excessive premium payments. However, a general upward revision of work norms is not expected until 1961–62 when it will be tied to a general revision of the wage structure. This pattern appears to be in line with authoritative statements, both public and private, of responsible Polish officials that the present measures have been designed to tidy up the economic situation but do not represent a retreat from policies pursued since 1956.

Despite the economic imbalances, the industrial sector in 1959 scored substantial advances over the previous year. In agriculture, however, production declined slightly and fall sowing difficulties due to drought have prompted the regime to anticipate a grain and fodder deficit of between 1.8 and 2.2 million tons in 1960 as against 1.0 to 1.2 [Page 263] million tons in recent years. The USSR has so far agreed to cover only 800,000 tons of the anticipated deficit. In any event, the increased requirements impose a further strain on Poland’s balance of payments position.

Reported shifts in Party personnel and responsibilities which followed the October governmental changes suggested that Gomulka has decided that the general tightening of economic controls must be accompanied by greater discipline in other aspects of Polish life as well. These changes, most of which have not been officially confirmed, include the removal of Jerry Morawski from both the Politburo and Party Secretariat, where he exercised—but apparently not to Gomulka’s satisfaction—control over the recalcitrant and Western-oriented Polish intellectuals.

Reports have already been received of growing worker dissatisfaction with the regime’s restrictive economic measures. However, while this dissatisfaction might well adversely affect regime hopes of realizing its 1960 planned production advance through increased productivity, the revolutionary fervor of 1955 and 1956 is lacking both on the part of workers and Polish intellectuals. On the basis of present indications, therefore, and assuming the government’s restrictive economic measures and tightening up in the cultural sphere go no further than presently envisaged, resistance of a magnitude which would threaten internal stability appears unlikely. However, this prognosis could be reversed if the regime should decide to move against either the Church or the peasantry. There is no evidence that any such steps are contemplated, and several recent developments such as the permission granted to three Polish bishops to visit the Vatican and the apparently diminished pressure on peasants to join agricultural circles, suggest the contrary. Further, Gomulka’s proven ability to judge the temper of the populace militates against any moves likely to worsen an already disturbed situation.2

  1. Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Intelligence Notes 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Edward W. Burgess of INR and initialed by Cumming and Herter.
  2. Eugeniusz Szyr and Julian Tokarski were appointed as Vice Premiers and Tadeusz Gede was appointed as First Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission.
  3. At the 424th meeting of the National Security Council on November 11, Allen Dulles warned that events in Poland should be watched carefully. Dulles reported: “In any event, Poland will continue to have serious economic problems, including a serious food shortage. For the present, the Gomulka government will continue to control the country without definitely committing itself to the Moscow line.” (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)