Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

83. Operations Coordinating Board Report⁰

Washington, September 23, 1959.

OPERATIONS PLAN FOR POLAND

I. Introduction

A. Special Operating Guidance

1. Short-Term Objectives

a. Conditions in Poland enabling, through Western influence, the promotion of peaceful evolution toward internal freedom and national independence, the reduction of the Polish contribution to Soviet strength, and the weakening of the monolithic front and internal cohesiveness of the Soviet bloc.

b. Greater political, economic and social orientation of Poland toward the West, and diminution of Soviet influence in Poland.

2. Long-Term Objectives

Eventual fulfillment of the right of the Polish people to live under a government of their own choosing, which maintains peaceful and stable relations with neighboring states, and participates fully in the Free World community.

3. U.S. Interest in Poland

a. The Communist nature of the Gomulka regime, and its close association with the USSR for ideological and geopolitical reasons (including membership in the Warsaw Pact), prevent achievement of a really independent Poland in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the limited independence gained by Poland since the establishment of the Gomulka regime in October, 1956, serves U.S. interests by tending to weaken the monolithic character of the Soviet Bloc; impugning the alleged universality of certain aspects of Soviet Communism, contributing to ferment in Eastern Europe; and providing new opportunities to project Western influences in Poland.

b. Because of the influence which its example exerts on other Communist countries in Eastern Europe, Poland’s ability to maintain its present semi-independence will be a key factor affecting future political developments in that area.

c. The United States wishes to avoid any situation which might lead to retrogression in Poland, harsher Soviet policies in the Soviet-dominated countries of Eastern Europe, or serious risk of general war. Consequently, U.S. interests currently are best served by a semi-independent Poland with a potential for evolving toward full independence by gradual means not jeopardizing the gains already made.

d. Experience has shown that U.S. policy toward Poland can be pursued effectively through the Polish government, as well as directly with the Polish people, through such means as aid, trade, and information programs. The Polish bureaucracy still contains numerous non-Communists.

4. Special Treatment for Poland. All government agencies should recognize that U.S. interests require a distinction in certain cases between the treatment accorded Poland and that accorded Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Poland is considered as having gained limited independence, whereas the other countries mentioned are regarded as Soviet-dominated.

5. Attitude Toward Gomulka Regime. All feasible steps should be taken to promote and encourage in Poland an evolution toward greater internal freedoms and national independence. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Actions should be avoided which might be interpreted as encouraging attempts to overthrow the regime by violence or which would be likely to provoke retrogression within Poland or the use of force by the USSR. Actions should also be avoided which could be interpreted as unreserved endorsement of the Gomulka regime. Good working relations with Polish officials should be cultivated, and Polish Government channels should be exploited to the maximum extent feasible when taking U.S. actions designed to benefit the Polish people.

6. Delicate Balance of the Polish International Position. Because of the delicate balance of the Polish international position, care should be taken both in action and publicity to avoid placing the Polish Government in positions where it would feel compelled to affirm solidarity with the USSR. This is particularly true regarding the objective of reducing Soviet influence in Poland, as present circumstances prohibit the Polish Government from accepting without comment public statements to the effect that U.S. policies are designed to wean Poland away from the USSR. At the same time, it must be recognized that the Polish Government, in order to maintain its delicate balance vis-à-vis the USSR, and influenced by ideological prejudice as well as genuine fears of a resurgent Germany supported by the United States, will make critical statements about the United States and its policies. Reasoned refutation of Polish statements and unpublicized representations against extravagant language will advance U.S. interests without the likelihood of prejudice to Poland’s relations with the USSR.

7. U.S. Aid. The United States should be prepared, at Polish request, to furnish economic and technical aid to Poland at approximately current program levels for the purpose of encouraging Poland to pursue policies which would contribute to the attainment of U.S. objectives. During the course of the FY 1959 economic discussions, the Polish representatives formally submitted a request for expanded technical cooperation between the United States and Poland as part of any dollar loan program which might be agreed upon.¹ The Poles have been assured that their request is being given careful consideration, and the United States has now started preliminary discussions with the Poles on the possibility of a technical cooperation program involving both Polish participants and U.S. technicians. A United States position is currently being developed in consultations among the agencies represented in the economic negotiations with Poland. The United States should also be prepared to increase the level of aid to Poland should significant opportunities arise which would move Poland toward internal freedom and national independence. To the extent possible, without prejudicing the primary purposes outlined above, U.S. aid to Poland should be designed to: (a) reduce Polish economic dependence on the USSR and other countries of the Soviet bloc; (b) reach those sectors of the Polish economy where it is likely to be of the greatest benefit to the Polish people; (c) contribute to the development of free economic forces within Poland; and (d) provide to the Polish people the maximum visible evidence of the source of the aid.

8. Increased Trade. Trade with Poland in non-strategic goods should be encouraged to the maximum extent consistent with the established policy of maintaining a distinction between the treatment accorded Poland and that accorded other Eastern European countries. Strategically-rated goods, including embargo-type items, may be made available to Poland from Western countries on a case-by-case basis as such goods are shown to be reasonable and necessary to the Polish civilian economy (as determined in each case by reference to the stated civilian uses, and with due consideration to the strategic risk involved).

9. Possible Polish Membership in IMF and World Bank. The United States should oppose Polish membership in the International Bank and International Monetary Fund. The Poles are being advised that the United States will not support any application from them for readmission to the Bank or Fund.

10. Increased Contacts and Exchanges. Subject to security safeguards, an especial effort should be made through official and non-official channels to increase scientific, economic, academic, and cultural contacts and exchanges between the United States and Poland. In some instances it will be desirable to include known Polish Communists in the exchange program in cases of individuals known to be influential and whose exposure to life here would be in the best interests of the United States. In view of the favorable trend under present informal arrangements, initiation by the United States of negotiations leading to an overall formal exchange agreement with Poland is not recommended at this time. As part of the official exchange program, Polish leaders should be invited to the United States and the United States should be prepared to send U.S. leaders to Poland. Invitations to Polish leaders should be extended in such a manner that they may be refused without publicity or embarrassment.

11. Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Opportunities should be utilized for cooperation in the unclassified, peaceful uses of atomic energy, including, under appropriate safeguards, the training in the United States of Polish scientists in non-sensitive fields.

12. Information Program. The goals of the U.S. information and cultural program in Poland are to provide Poles with information useful to them, over a period of time, in their efforts to achieve a greater degree of independent authority and popular control in the direction of their own affairs, and to give the Polish people a sound and sympathetic understanding of United States policy and the American people. The official U.S. information and cultural program in Poland (currently conducted largely on an informal basis) should be strengthened to the extent feasible. The activities of private U.S. individuals and organizations should also be encouraged to the extent that the activities contribute to the achievement of the goals set forth above. It is important to plan and conduct information activities so that the above objectives are furthered without incurring the suppression of these activities either because of Soviet pressure or because of the Polish regime’s concern that USIA activities, because of their nature or scope, would tend to frustrate the attainment of the regime’s internal goals. It must be recognized that the number of personnel that can be assigned the Embassy in Warsaw for the information and cultural work is limited, while the demand among the Poles for more information materials about the United States is practically unlimited.

13. Defectors and Escapees. In general, current policy on defectors, escapees, and refugees continues to apply to Polish nationals. [3 lines of source text not declassified] Publicity concerning Polish defectors, escapees, and refugees should be avoided unless it is the view of the Department of State and other agencies concerned that such publicity would produce a net advantage to the United States.

14. Oder-Neisse Line. The Western Allies have taken the position that the Oder-Neisse line is temporary and that the final boundaries of Germany should be fixed in a peace settlement with the agreement of an all-German government. They have taken no position on where the boundary should be. The German Federal Republic has from time to time hinted at the desirability of finding some compromise solution of the border question. However, it would be unwise for the United States to take a position on the boundary, at least until prospects for a settlement are more promising, because to do so would incur the ill will of either the Poles or the Germans, or both.

[Here follow Section B, “Selected U.S. Agreements With or Pertaining to Poland,” and Part II, “Current and Projected Programs and Courses of Action.”]

0. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Poland Documents. Secret. A cover sheet and a statement entitled “Purpose and Use of the Operations Plan” are not printed. This plan, originally drafted on August 6, 1958, was revised on September 23, 1959. In an undated memorandum, which was revised October 8 and attached to the plan, Bromley Smith, Executive Officer of the OCB, summarized the actions taken by the OCB at its meeting of August 26; see Document 80. A footnote in Smith’s memorandum states that revisions of paragraphs 9 and 40 developed by the Departments of State and the Treasury were concurred in by the agencies on September 21 and that the Board noted this concurrence at its meeting on September 23; see footnote 2, Document 80. A handwritten note on the cover sheet states that this Operations Plan for Poland was superseded by the Operations Plan of February 26, 1960; see Document 95.
1. This Polish request for expanded technical cooperation was made on March 4; see Document 67.