Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

78. Memorandum From the Deputy Chief of the Division of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Keppel) to the Officer in Charge of Polish, Baltic, and Czechoslovak Affairs (Sherer)⁰

Washington, August 7, 1959.

SUBJECT

• The Vice-President’s Trip to Poland

While it is too early to assess the effect, if any, of the Vice-President’s conversations with Party Secretary Gomulka on the future course of United States-Polish relations, some beneficial results of the visit are readily apparent.

1) The visit provided a clear demonstration of United States’ popularity in Poland. While the extent of pro-American sentiment in Poland has been well known to the Department for a long time, the American people were not fully aware of it.

2) The reception accorded the Vice-President in a country behind the iron curtain has been well-noted in Western Europe where it probably provided a useful antidote to the impression produced by his South American tour.

3) While it is not to be expected that Mr. Nixon was able to change Gomulka’s outlook on world affairs, he probably was able to give the Polish leader a better appreciation of the United States position than this somewhat parochial communist had had before.

4) Gomulka’s well-known nationalistic sentiments and his oft-expressed concern for Polish state sovereignty must have received a considerable boost as a result of the visit. The attention accorded him by the United States could be reasonably expected to have modified somewhat his anti-American feelings. While this may not have an appreciable effect on Gomulka’s public pronouncements attacking “American capitalist circles”, it may serve to ease further the steady expansion of United States-Polish contacts.

5) The timing—within two weeks of Nikita Khrushchev’s first state visit to Gomulka’s maverick Poland¹—was of particular significance. With the help of the Polish people, much statecraft on the part of both governments, and some luck, the visit provided exactly the balance needed to offset some of the possible detrimental effects of Khrushchev’s visit on Polish sovereignty.

6) Without constituting a United States endorsement of a communist regime, the visit did show American appreciation of the distinctive characteristics of the Gomulka regime which render it the most liberal—and relatively the most popular—of the iron curtain dictatorships.

7) The careful programming—which provided no occasion for major public speeches but did afford an opportunity for public sentiment to manifest itself and paid honor to the religious sentiments of the Polish people without provocation to the Polish government—resulted in a visit which pleased the population without offending the government, and without rendering its position vis-à-vis the USSR more difficult. Indeed the visit probably improved the regime’s position in this respect.

8) American recognition of Polish uniqueness, coming immediately after Soviet endorsement of Polish deviationism, could not have been lost on the leaders of satellite countries. Obviously, Gomulka’s relative responsiveness to public sentiment has gained him greater prestige in the world than their disregard of it. It may give some of the Eastern European communist leaders food for thought.

0. Source: Department of State, Polish Desk Files: Lot 64 D 152, Vice President’s Trip to Warsaw. Confidential. Drafted by Irene Jaffe of INR and initialed by Keppel and Sherer.
1. Khrushchev visited Poland July 14–23, 1959. A copy of Intelligence Report No. 8066, dated August 3, entitled “Khrushchev’s Trip to Poland 14–23 July 1959: Polish Domestic Autonomy Recognized,” which analyzes the importance of this visit, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSS–INR Reports.