76. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State0
220. We consider objectives envisaged for VP’s visit were fully achieved, some beyond expectation.
VP’s appearance gave population tremendous morale lift, dramatically rekindling sentimental ties between US-Polish peoples and conveying feeling US has not abandoned Poland. We get sense result viewed with certain ambiguity by Polish regime. Latter had anticipated pro-American demonstrations but probably not to extent where it was exploited by Western press as evidence division between people and government. On other hand official remarks to my colleagues indicate regime quite pleased with confirmation of international identity for Poland. In his public remarks VP handled dichotomy with just the right touch, thanking Polish people first for their warm receptions and then thanking government for its hospitality.
In VP’s exposition US stand on world affairs, believe we may even have made some progress in correcting Polish view of our German policy [Page 220] which we had considered almost impossible task. Apparent that Polish leaders sincerely impressed by VP’s unequivocal statements and examples demonstrating we do not and never would condone aggression from any quarter.1 This is one assertion they did not attempt refute.
VP’s expressed desire for continued normalization of relations and cooperative association with Poland taken at face value and well received. May be shortly put to the test in pending claims question which we did not have opportunity to develop fully but did not try to evade. Evident that Poles remain interested in maintaining and expanding economic relations with West, difficult as this may be technically. In his public remarks VP quite rightly mentioned differences between American and Polish systems. Both Soviet Ambassador and myself congratulated Prime Minister on his speech at our reception and he seemed enigmatically pleased.
In official talks Polish leaders were cool, aggressive, yielding very little except perhaps recognition US good intentions as distinct from policies. Nothing in turn yielded by US side beyond friendliness and sympathetic interest in Polish welfare and largest feasible measure of independence. Easy to see Polish leaders deeply resented as being too close to the truth Western reports representing mass reaction in light Polish people still not yet free. On “captive nations resolution”2 Polish officials simply pressed too far through recurrent mention even in social conversations. On other hand there were no planted questions nor snide remarks deprecating US achievements as was apparently case in USSR.
To VP’s apt characterization of Gomulka published in this morning’s Radio Bulletin I would add impression, based on performance, that Gomulka is comparatively humane, relying on argumentation rather than force or “administrative measures” carry conviction. Would also give him more credit than deemed possible in past for ability to influence Soviets.
All Americans in Warsaw with whom Embassy has talked are immensely proud of success achieved by VP and Mrs. Nixon. There was not a single false note in quite difficult and delicate situation. Besides lending added distinction Drs. Eisenhower and Elliott, Admiral Rick-over and George Allen engaged in very useful talks with Polish counterparts which have been recorded and will be transmitted by mail.3
[Page 221]Further implications visit deserving of study both in Washington and Warsaw and will be well worth considering how widened channel to Polish people and government can best be kept open and used.
Department pass internally and externally as desired.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–NI/8–659. Confidential.↩
- Reference is to Nixon’s departure statement made in Warsaw on August 5. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1959, pp. 271–272.↩
- footnote 1, Document 74.↩
- Embassy reports on these conversations are in Department of State, Central File 033.1100–NI.↩