Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

48. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State⁰

Warsaw, July 8, 1958, 5 p.m.

34. In call on Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz on other matters I referred to press reports of Soviet pressures on Poland to impose conformity and invited his appraisal.

Winiewicz gave discursive and general reply. Said bases Polish policy were development domestic socialism and maintenance alliance with USSR. Press reports which speculated on Polish-Soviet relations could only be harmful. Poland’s basic position on Hungarian revolution well known and defined some time ago. Latest events in Hungary¹ had come as surprise shock but had to be treated as internal affair as stated by Gomulka in Gdansk speech.² Present intention is not to change either Poland’s domestic or foreign policies. Polish leaders disagreed ideologically with Tito but wished state relations to remain same. Winiewicz mentioned however Poland had declined send delegation to Yugoslav freedom celebration on July 4 for fear of involvement in compromising political statements by Yugoslavs. Since Winiewicz mentioned in passing Naszkowski’s observations on President’s press conference (Embtel 1832 June 20),³ I said Prime Minister had made similar remarks to me which had given me opportunity to say we had also right to take exception to certain references to US in Polish public statements (Embtel 23 July 5).⁴ Winiewicz replied these were in part due to disappointment with rejection Rapacki Plan⁵ and were consequence of sharpening of cold war. Said we must read between the lines. I answered American public not be so adept at this practice and had cause for affront. Explained our programs and policies toward Poland did not depend on conformity between our two systems but assumed US and Poland countries friendly to each other. He said this was certainly the purpose of the exchanges we had been discussing and corresponded to his government’s wish to develop relations further.

In conclusion Winiewicz said that just as he hoped he could count on me to transmit his government’s views to our authorities, I could count on him to make known our views to his country’s leaders.

While skeptical of results it may produce on hard core party leadership, we believe it would do no harm if Department could make similar point with added emphasis with Polish Embassy in connection with talks latter apparently intends to initiate in connection with new economic program.⁶

Beam

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.48/7–858. Confidential.
1. On June 16, the Hungarian Government announced the execution of ex-Premier Imre Nagy and three of his chief associates during the revolt of October and November, 1956.
2. In a speech at Gdansk on June 28, Gomulka condemned Nagy as a “revisionist” but avoided labeling him a traitor. At the 371st NSC meeting on July 3, Allen Dulles noted that Gomulka’s speech “was the result of tremendous pressure applied by Khrushchev.” (Memorandum of discussion, July 3; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
3. In telegram 1832 from Warsaw, June 20, Beam reported that Acting Foreign Minister Naszkowski had expressed to him “deep shock” at the President’s June 18 press conference. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/6–2058) At that conference, the President made the following statement: “I would give aid to anything that I would think would help to weaken the solidarity of the Communist bloc.” For the complete transcript, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, pp. 478–488.
4. In telegram 23 from Warsaw, July 5, Beam reported that Prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz had deplored the President’s June 18 press statement and hoped such statements could be avoided in the future. The Ambassador said he replied that all official U.S. statements were motivated by good will for Poland. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.48/7–558)
5. The Rapacki Plan called for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and the Federal Republic of Germany; see Part 1, Documents 1 ff. Foreign Minister Rapacki first proposed the plan to the U.N. General Assembly on October 2, 1957; see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. II, pp. 889–892.
6. See Document 52.