Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

376. Letter From the Ambassador to Turkey (Warren) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jones)⁰

Ankara, August 11, 1960.

Dear Lewis: This is the letter to you which I mentioned in my communication of August 4, 1960.¹

The Provisional Government of Turkey has been in power almost two and a half months. It has been an important and critical period for Turkey and for her allies. At first, no one in Turkey, outside a small esoteric group, realized the relationships between the Committee of National Union, which staged the coup, General Gursel, who was called to head up the Government, the Cabinet and the Turkish Military. Particularly we diplomats did not know who were the principal figures in the Committee of National Union. We were not sure whether Gursel was a stooge, a disgruntled military man, or a patriotic Turk whom unusual forces had brought to the head of the Government. We did not have worries regarding the international policies which the Provisional Government said it had in mind following. For this fact I think we can thank Selim Sarper, the Secretary General of the Foreign Office who became the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. We did wonder about the ultimate acceptance by the Turkish population of the new Government. I knew that the coup was the most successful, the most efficient of the many I had seen in my service (if my memory serves me rightly, I saw seven presidents in thirteen months in Paraguay).²

This morning, August 10, 1960, many facts and much information regarding the PGOT are known to us. For instance, in the Embassy I believe it is the consensus that Gursel is a real leader. He is learning fast. He acts like a Chief of State. He conducts himself very well. He considers carefully, speaks slowly, and makes decisions that stick. He is nobody’s stooge. Sarper told me on May 29, two days after the coup d’etat, that Gursel was not a great brain. I am sure Sarper has had to revise upward his estimate of this man. I do not particularly like him but I respect him, consider him to be an intelligent, loyal, patriotic Turk. But he is a Turk, in everything that the word implies.

Gursel is very much the Head of State and Head of Government. He is the leader, in my opinion, of the Committee of National Union, although he may not have been a prime mover in bringing the CNU to the successful action of May 27, 1960. I believe he is able to make his desire prevail in the CNU on any matter which he thinks of prime importance. The CNU doubtless has schisms and varying opinions. The group is too inexperienced, too young, too impressed with its mission for it to be otherwise. Next to Gursel I would rank Colonel Turkes as the most important CNU member. He is the man with the fanatical zeal, the inferiority complex, the rankling feelings that will supply energy and motivation for much that the CNU will do or want done. He is my choice for runner-up to Gursel. Should there ever be a serious split in the CNU or if Gursel’s course is over seriously challenged, I would expect Turkes to be the man doing the maneuvering. In the CNU there are General Madanoglu and one or two Colonels who come to our attention from time to time. One of our current jobs is to try to ferret out information that will enable us to determine the principal figures in the CNU. Thus far it seems to me that, considering the manner in which the CNU came into being and the herculean task which it has assumed, it has done remarkably well in what it has accomplished and in maintaining unity in its councils.

Turning to the Cabinet, I believe most Americans of experience in Ankara are impressed with the loyalty, the patriotism, the technical and professional qualifications of the individual members of the Cabinet. It is a Cabinet above the average, I would say. It contains some good friends of the United States. There are no doubt a few weak sisters, but they will be eliminated as the months go by. One matter of concern is that two of the best men in the Cabinet, Iren and Koper, strong friends and admirers of the United States, are already under fire from within the Government. They may be able to weather the storm. If they do not, it will be a cause for concern on the part of the Americans. This Cabinet does not, I think, have the power of the preceding Cabinet because it has been made clear that the Cabinet is the instrument of the Committee of National Union. For instance, the Foreign Office under Sarper does not have the power it exercised under Zorlu.

It might be well to recall here that the CNU has taken the place of the Grand National Assembly of the Turkish Republic and that as such it is the repository of the sovereignty and all the powers of the Turkish people. Every other office and institution of the Turkish Government is subordinate to the CNU. This means that Gursel can only be the true leader and dominate the situation if he is the master of the CNU. If he cannot impose his will on that body, he will not be able to command the situation.

When the PGOT came to power, the press, the intellectuals, the teachers, the students and the Army hailed the accomplishment of the coup d’etat. There was nothing but admiration for the thirty-eight members that made up the CNU. They were all heroes, patriots. We were unable to discern among these admirers any trepidation with respect to the CNU or to the new situation which it brought to hand. The military, in particular, looked upon the CNU members as splendid examples of Turkish manhood who had the courage and the bravery to risk their lives to accomplish what needed to be done. It wasn’t long, however, before the military realized that the members of the CNU who had been given a hero’s welcome could not return to the barracks and their commands. Captains, majors, lieutenant colonels and generals who, as members of the CNU, were giving orders to the old pashas, to the entire military establishment, to the nation of Turkey, could not return to their former jobs. Since this realization began to emerge there has been a widening separation between the CNU and the military as an institution. Today, the military is still supporting the CNU and the PGOT but with the realization that the interest of the CNU and the military are not identical. This is an important realization not only for Turkey but for the Western World.

When the coup d’etat was a successful accomplishment at 8 o’clock on May 27 this year, the CNU and its admirers thought that in a short time it would be possible to turn over the reins of authority to a new Government. There is some indication that the CNU thought it would not be necessary to organize a provisional government because the reins of authority within a few days could be turned over to a new civilian government. The revolutionists soon found this was impossible. They then set up the Provisional Government of Turkey. It was the publicized intent of this Provisional Government to turn over power to the civilians at the earliest possible moment. However, in order to turn over power to a civilian government, it was necessary to hold free elections. Free elections meant participation by more than one party in those elections. The principal parties were the DPs and the RPPs. Participation by the DPs without leadership was impossible. Their leaders, however, were and are all cooped up on Yassi Ada. They could not be released until they had been tried. In order for them to be tried there had to be investigations, selection of judges, establishment of the rules for the trial, etc. All this meant weeks and months of hard work. Furthermore, in order to justify the coup d’etat, the DP leaders and assemblymen had to be proven guilty. This raised the question of whether or not they had violated the Constitution. Inspection of the Constitution, in the light of a conviction that already existed, made it necessary that one of the first projects of the Provisional Government of Turkey must be the drafting of a new constitution. As of August 10 that work has not been completed and the exact date of its completion is yet unknown. All of this meant that the PGOT, after looking forward to turning over the reins of government in a few days has found that a few weeks or a few months are not enough. General Gursel in an Istanbul speech on August 8th said that the target date for the new elections is May 27, 1961, the anniversary of the coup d’etat. We already hear that in circles most friendly to the Government there exists the feeling that even May 27 will be too soon. One report reaching the Embassy is to the effect that perhaps it will take ten to fifteen years for the PGOT to bring up a new generation that will be capable of taking over the affairs of state and managing them in keeping with the spirit and the purposes of the revolution.

I believe it is not too much to say that the PGOT has now reached the point in its thinking where it will be disposed to continue in office as long as necessary to insure that what it considers to be the aims of the revolution are safeguarded or accomplished. In stating this, it must be kept in mind that many of the aims of the revolution have been developed since the PGOT came to power. This is not to say that Gursel is not sincere in stating that the target date for elections is May 27, 1961. The PGOT has been both pragmatic and empirical in its actions. It must continue to be until it has reached a plane of stability.

The PGOT will not reach a plane of stability until it has justified in its own mind the revolution. This can only be done by proving the leaders of the Menderes Regime a bunch of scoundrels, scalawags, thieves and traitors. Furthermore, the PGOT will not reach stability until an assured future is found for all the members of the CNU (for instance, they are toying with the idea of making themselves members of the new Senate, the tenureship to be for one, or two terms, or even life). This stability would require the Military to be brought completely under control. This the CNU is endeavoring to accomplish by a system of compulsory retirements. Such retirements would give the Military the much desired pyramidal structure. Incidentally, it will enable the CNU to get rid of every officer whose loyalty to the regime may be in doubt. Another factor in insuring stability will be the conversions of the Turk peasantry and labor classes to supporters of the present regime. Finally, the CNU members must be sure when the elections are held that the RPPs do not win. In the thinking of many members of the CNU and the PGOT, the RPP is just a little less bad than the DP.

As of today the new Constitution, the investigations for the trials, the trials, and the future of the CNU members remain the “musts” of the present Government. Since the accomplishment of these “musts” is requiring much more time than the perpetrators of the coup foresaw, they are becoming habituated to a new life with new privileges, perquisites, prerogatives and powers. I doubt if they would return to their former positions even though there were no difficulty. As this habituation has taken place they have found many other attractive projects that can be undertaken, each one of which can be tied to the aims of the revolution and justified as being in the patriotic interest of their country. We now hear talk of agrarian reform, reform of the civil ministries, the Economic Planning Committee, the indoctrination and education of the peasantry and the illiterate, and other undertakings. Naturally as the PGOT enters a new field that field inevitably broadens and invites to other projects. Consequently, in the thinking of the members of the Government the need for the elections becomes less pressing and the desire of the members of the CNU to find security for themselves is even more exigent. For these reasons we may not soon see elections in Turkey.

I have said that the Americans in Turkey are, almost without exception, favorably disposed toward this new Government. Embassy Ankara has reported to Washington that this is a friendly Government. We know that there are important Cabinet members who are drawn to the United States by education, commercial, ideological ties. This is not to say that the PGOT is as close to the United States Government and people as was the Menderes Regime. Contrariwise, it must be stated that there is in this Government an inclination to be suspicious of the United States because relations between Turkey and the United States have been so satisfactory. The Turk is oriental enough to be naturally suspicious of a close relationship between someone he doesn’t like and someone that he does like. This tendency of the CNU members and others to suspect the relationship between the United States and Turkey during the Menderes Regime was partially engendered and successfully played upon by Inonu and his supporters during their campaign after the elections of 1957 until the coup. I think the record will show that Embassy Ankara reported to the Department that Inonu and his supporters were not playing fair in that criticism of the United States. We considered that the RPPs thought that once they were elected they would make their peace with the United States. Embassy Ankara also believed that after a period of readjustment the United States Government would be able to work successfully with a new Inonu government. Today, I see results of the Inonu tactics reflected in the attitude of the Provisional Government of Turkey. This results in the PGOT, more properly the GNU, being determined that the PGOT will not be too close to the United States. The Provisional Government intends to maintain a reserve that will prevent PGOT being a stooge of the United States. This attitude has found expression to such an extent that I do not consider that the PGOT is presently cooperative with the USG. There is an Ankara telegram in the Department which lists 12 instances of the lack of cooperation on the part of Gursel Government.³ I think this state of affairs is likely to continue. We will have many more frustrations, difficulties, questionings of our actions during the Gursel Regime than we ever encountered under the Menderes Government.

What is said in the preceding paragraph does not mean that the leaders of the Gursel Government have decided against American assistance. On the contrary, General Gursel has publicly stated that PGOT looks to the United States and other allies for assistance and that the United States could and should help Turkey more than it does. At the same time, Gursel and some of his Cabinet members have emphasized that they expect in the long run to ask us for less assistance than did the Menderes Government. Thus far, proportionately, I should say they have asked for more in the short time they have been in office. This, too, is understandable because the Gursel Government has more and pressing problems than the previous Government of Turkey. However, there is without doubt a spirit of aloofness in their determination to accept the least possible aid from the United States. This means frustration, obstacles, reservations in our future dealings with Gursel and his assistants.

I have said that the PGOT has more and more pressing problems than did the Menderes Regime. These problems call for outside assistance—that is, foreign assistance. In today’s unhappy world that signifies for the most part assistance from the United States. We have been helpful without precedent to the Menderes Government, to the Gursel Government and intend to continue to assist in any way we can. However, our assistance must be within appropriated funds given us by the American Congress and in the light of our world-wide commitments and obligations. From my experiences since 1956, I would say that this fact means we will not be able to supply to Turkey all the assistance which she will really require. I am sure we will do our best. However, I am afraid that our best will not be sufficient to enable this Provisional Government to hold the line. In saying this I am not forgetful of the declared and sincere determination of the PGOT to live within its national budget.

Turkey does not yet have a balanced economy, a balance of imports and exports. It might be said that Menderes was following the Franklin Roosevelt method of meeting this problem. The Menderes method had much reminiscent of our own WPA days. PGOT is more orthodox in its economic thinking. It is somewhere between Herbert Hoover and Dwight Eisenhower. The PGOT is sincere in its thinking and in its endeavor to do conventionally what Menderes was trying to do by his method. The PGOT has embarked on this economic course with conviction and determination. I am not sure it realizes the tremendous effect which this course may have on the people of Turkey. It has been reviewing intensively investment projects of government ministries and State Enterprises, making reductions wherever feasible. In general, new government projects will await the time when the budget is balanced, exports and imports are in balance and the economic state of the nation warrants new investments. This undertaking almost certainly means less persons on the government payroll, less persons employed by contractors, what might be called collateral unemployment, and a contributory effect on agriculture and the peasantry. Of course, one salutary effect will be a reduction in inflationary pressures and in the demand for imports. One wonders whether, under such conditions, the revenues of the state will be as large as estimated. The payments gap will continue. It can only be closed by greater sacrifices on the part of the people in general and particularly the peasantry (who have lost their great friend, Menderes). Will the Turkish people endure such additional sacrifices from a Government from which they expected so much?

If the Gursel Government finds, as I am afraid it will, that it must have more aid than we are prepared to give, what can it do? We know that the Soviet Government is ready to supply and is urging the Gursel Government to accept as much as 500 million dollars at three percent interest per year. How long can a Provisional Government whose origin is a coup d’etat, a Government feeling the stresses and strains that exist in the Turkish economy today, resist the tempting offer of the Soviets. We know from experience that, once it does accept such aid, the bars will be down. The United States and the Western World will have suffered a major and tragic defeat.

But the danger from the Soviets is not the only one that faces Turkey today. Heretofore, Turkey’s main qualification as an ally in NATO and in CENTO was her stability deriving from the character of the Turkish people and the reliability of the Turkish Army. By the coup d’etat the Military, at one stroke, demolished the record the Turkish Military had made since the time of Ataturk. Turks had been proud of the fact that the Turkish Military supported duly constituted authority. Every man in the CNU broke his oath when he took part in the coup d’etat. I believe that the psychological result of breaking that oath has had an unbelievable effect on the members of the CNU and the Army in general. At any rate, once the Army has stooped to revolt, there is no way to convince dissident groups that the Military would not be justified in staging another revolt. I have indicated above the problem which the PGOT has in reaching a plane of stability. It is retiring, compulsorily, 90% of the Generals, 55% of the Colonels, 40% of the Lieutenant Colonels, 5% of the Majors. If this body of former officers becomes disgruntled, there is no mental bar to their overthrowing the PGOT. Turkey now has a coup d’etat Army.

Another danger for the PGOT has been mentioned but should be explained a bit. I have in mind the need which the press, the intellectuals, the educators, the students and the Military feel to justify the coup d’etat. Evidently they are not finding the crimes which they expected to uncover. We now hear that one of the crimes which they hope to be able to prove is treasonable activities on the part of the Menderes leaders during the riots of September 5–6, 1955,⁴ a date more than two years before the last elections at which the Menderes Government was returned to power. It is hard for an American to understand the overpowering need which the mentioned Turks have to justify the revolution but it is a fact. In all my service I have not found elsewhere the hate which there is among the intelligentsia and the Military today for Menderes and his leaders. People, who in another country would be the ones expected to stand up for impartial trials, leniency, moderation, today in Turkey are calling for the execution, the hanging, of Bayar, Koraltan, Menderes, Zorlu, Polatkan. This is frightening and it lends a new light on the ferocity of the riots of ’55. This feeling is behind the revolutionary zeal, the post facto changing of the law to permit the execution of Bayar, the procedures and methods set up for the trial, the mass imprisonment of an entire party representation in the National Assembly. It makes possible the mass trial of members of the Grand National Assembly and probably others. But I do not want to get too deeply into the question of the trials. They will speak for themselves when they are held. It is sufficient for me to say here that one wonders how reliable an ally is a country whose Government is motivated by hate and can only see the trial of the culprits of the previous regime in the light of that hate.

There is another danger which causes me much concern. I have hinted at it already. I am thinking of the situation that could confront this Government if the retired military officers, the peasantry, the laboring classes, the small businessmen and all those who may be disaffected for whatever reasons, should get together. Immediately it is said, but this Government has the Army with it; with the Army and a determined Government matters should be kept in hand. In view of which I cannot but recall that Menderes and Bayar thought the same thing. The Army is no longer what it was.

There is another danger: that the Turkish Military as a result of the tremendous changes arising from compulsory retirements does not have sufficient qualified and tested men to fill the vacancies which have been created. It is entirely possible that the Army in time will become what both General Gursel and American officers want it to become but, pending the development of capable officers, there is a void that could be tragic for Turkey and the allies depending upon her.

There is a great danger, just now being sensed by some Turks, which could make inevitable international trouble. The Turkish people do like a strong dictating, not to say dictatorial, Government. When the coup came the classes that had wanted a change could not have been happier. They accepted gladly from the new Government restrictions which would have been denounced to high heaven had they been imposed by the Menderes Regime. Those restrictions today I believe to be as bad as anything the Menderes Government imposed. I would say that in two months and a half the PGOT has reached the point in repression that it took the Menderes Regime ten years to attain. I know that the American press would immediately call attention to the freedom of the press. I think, however, that an impartial observation of what took place in the Menderes Regime and of what is taking place in Turkey today would find that there is little difference. Thus far the PGOT has achieved its control of the press by talking to its members. However, under this system of freedom the PGOT has locked up fourteen or fifteen Democratic newspapermen because they were Democratic. The other day some seventy students wanted to demonstrate in behalf of Havadis, the only important DP newspaper attempting to publish today. The demonstration was broken up and six or seven of the students were jailed. So, by and large, the PGOT is just as repressive as was the Menderes Government. Sooner or later the Turkish people will come to realize the present state of affairs and then, with a coup d’etat as a precedent, I am afraid they will do something about it.

There is a danger not quite so evident but one concerning which some observers, among whom I am included, have fear. That is, that party activities in Turkey are going to be radically changed. The RPP welcomed the coup d’etat because it felt that it certainly would come to power as soon as elections were held. Now, I am pretty sure that the principal leaders of the RPP, from Inonu down, are beginning to have much doubt as to where their party stands and for its future activities. There is talk that what Turkey needs is not political parties but an absence of parties so that the people could vote their desires uninfluenced by party activity. This would mean, of course, candidates supplied by the Government. What is more likely, I would think, is the emergence of a National Union Party, or some other such organization to which the present CNU members and other Government officials can flock in-order to insure their future security. Almost certainly such a development would mean that those in power are going to make sure that the RPP does not become strong enough to win the election.

I have tried to set forth above the concern which developments since the coup are causing me. Embassy Ankara will watch all future developments in an endeavor to assess accurately what is taking place. My concern, I believe, is shared by some of my colleagues but I must use the greatest care in what I say to anyone, diplomatic or not, lest it unfavorably affect this Government. The people of the United States is a friend of the people of Turkey. Each people needs the other. With the USSR acting up today we need Turkey more than ever before. The people of Turkey gave us the Menderes Government to work with. We worked with it faithfully and loyally. We were as helpful to the Turkish people, through the Menderes Government as we were able to be. Now we can say, by a stretch of the imagination, that the Turkish people has given us the Gursel Government with which to work. We intend to work with it just as loyally and faithfully as we did with the Menderes Regime. We intend to be just as helpful to the Gursel Government as we were to the Menderes Government. It might be said in parenthesis that, when the Gursel Government goes, we shall endeavor to be in a position to work in the same friendly, cooperative way with the succeeding government (if it is not Commie). I do not like the course of events in Turkey today. I am afraid that Gursel cannot see the forest for the trees any better than could Adnan Menderes. The Turkish official doesn’t seem to be able to gauge the response of his own people. Nevertheless, so far as we can see, there is no alternative to the PGOT. If this Government is overthrown, no one can foresee what we would get. One thing is certain, and that is that the Soviets are better able to cash in on a state of confusion and political disaffection than is the Western World. The interests of the United States and the Western World demand that we be as considerate, as helpful to the Gursel Government as we can be. We will have to try to be even more perceptive and understanding of what is taking place in Turkey than is the Government itself. In doing this we must not forget that the attitude toward the United States is being determined by a group of inexperienced men (members of the CNU) who basically feel that they should pull away from the United States as much as possible. We must bear with this Government, try to see that it doesn’t succumb to Commie blandishments and that it remains loyal to the United States, to CENTO, to NATO.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

Fletcher Warren⁵

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Confidential; Official–Informal. A copy was sent to Goodpaster by Secretary Herter with the suggestion that Warren’s comments be made known to the President. (Memorandum from Stoessel to Goodpaster, September 7; Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/8–1160)
1. Not further identified.
2. Warren served as Ambassador in Paraguay 1947–1950.
3. In telegram 255 from Ankara, August 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.82/8–960)
4. Reference is to anti-Greek rioting at Istanbul and Izmir set off by a bomb attack on the birthplace of Ataturk.
5. Printed from copy that bears this typed signature.