Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

372. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State⁰

Ankara, July 25, 1960, 2 p.m.

157. Paris for USRO—Thurston and Finn. I saw General Gursel for one hour at 1600 hours July 24. I obtained appointment through Secretary General Kuneralp who accompanied me. Colonel Turkes also present and acted as interpreter. I had prepared talking paper covering Deptel 127.¹ Three us went over paper carefully. General Gursel heard me out attentively but with about as much expression as Hittite idol. He did not interrupt. When I had read portion regarding “an effective, modest plan” I asked him if he understood. He nodded assent but it later proved he had not. He again nodded when I finally mentioned MC 70 and General Norstad visit.²

When I had finished my paper I inquired whether there were any questions or comments. He then said in effect: I asked USG for 100 million TL. Do we or do we not get money? Whereupon I went back to my seventh paragraph regarding “an effective, modest plan”. We went over it again. Kuneralp helped Turkes at one point with interpretation. When we had completed, I believe Gursel understood. I also believe Kuneralp and Turkes comprehended first time. During second try Turkes stated “But we need the money quickly; we have an election next year”. To which I responded: “And we have one this year”.

Following second run Gursel said: “I have no comments”.

I then spoke along these lines: USG had been helpful as it could with previous GOT. It wanted be just as helpful PGOT. Message which I had transmitted was an expression that desire be helpful. He could see every point which he had raised our previous meeting had been considered. We had not been able accede his request for 100 million liras but Washington had indicated possible method procedure. Kuneralp attempted explain Turkish language what I had twice said and, when Turkes pressed urgency, asked whether carefully phased program could be completed one year. I said I thought process could not be completed one year since Washington spoke in terms carefully phased and timed personnel program. However Washington did appreciate urgency matter and no doubt had considered carefully Turkey’s need in overall demands on USG. Gursel animadverted “Turkey is far away from USA. Perhaps USG does not understand.” I responded that in 1960 Turkey just as close USA as Mexico. Her strengths and weaknesses were same concern for UGS as strengths weaknesses any part American union. Strengths weaknesses one ally is concern all allies. I was sure Joint Chiefs Staff and US [National] Security Council considered Turkey needs as carefully conscientiously as it did our own. I was equally certain our common opponent (USSR) considered that any military attack it might make against Turkey would be considered an attack against Turkey’s allies.

General Gursel then decided what I said was very important and that loss Turkey could also mean loss Arab world. I agreed.

I proposed that General Gursel have my talking paper translated, studied by his experts, and be followed by plan which I could submit Washington. He did not promise. I said he had asked for one lump sum liras which USG unable supply but it had suggested plan which might be helpful. Turkes commented money needed now and “We shall find that money somewhere”. I then stated that my earlier answer to Kuneralp may have been made too quickly. I was thinking one year was too short a time for a feasible plan to work out. Perhaps I was wrong. That could be determined when a Gursel plan is submitted for USG consideration.

I again suggested PGOT try working out plan which I could submit. Also said I ready try answer any additional questions or seek replies from Washington. Gursel did not say he would submit such a plan neither did he refuse do so. I asked that he let me know if he needed me further about plan or otherwise. He said he would. As I arose to go I said “Let’s try find way get funds you need.” He smiled.

Comment: Gursel could not have been more [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] unyielding [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] more provincial in his interest get money as he had requested. I could detect no flexibility his attitude or understanding US position. He certainly left me understand he is going ahead as PGOT had planned. I would not be surprised by any move he might make.

Turkes, who rumor says is PGOT’s strongest man and replacement Gursel some day, showed more emotion and as much determination as Gursel. He is giving no thought position USG or its commitments. He only sees need which PGOT has and US failure supply funds. I am sure any course action which he recommends will be solely unilateral its consideration.

Kuneralp was watching his P’s and Q’s and seemed slightly embarrassed throughout meeting. I am sure he will take or recommend no course action which he foresees will get him into trouble with Gursel, Turkes or CNU.

Query: Can Department advise quickly whether it considers that any such plan could be encompassed within one year?³

Warren

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5/7–2560. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Istanbul, Izmir, Iskenderun, and Paris.
1. Telegram 127, July 19, outlined a suggested reply to the Turkish program for forced retirements and suggested that a carefully timed program “might well minimize potentially damaging effects of a widespread reaction that PGOT engaged in a political purge.” The telegram further informed Warren that the United States “would not in any event wish to finance and thus become identified with any such program.” (Ibid., 782.5/7–1460)
2. July 25. For Norstad’s report on the visit, see Document 374.
3. In telegram 174 to Ankara, July 27, the Department of State replied that it would withhold comment on Warren’s request pending discussions with Norstad. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.5/7–2560) Regarding the meeting between Norstad and Department of State and other U.S. Government officials on August 2, see Document 374.