Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

370. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State⁰

Ankara, July 13, 1960, 5 p.m.

84. Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, Thurston, Finn. When FonOff telephoned July 12 re desire Pres Gursel see me (Embtel 78 July 13¹ para 2 under comments), it asked me be at PriMin 1100 hours with capable interpreter and Gen Morin. Last named being absent I proceeded Gursel’s office with Lt Col Fred Haynes Asst Naval Attaché as interpreter and Col Tate JUSMMAT as rep Gen Morin. FonMin Sarper joined us at Ministry. Gen Gursel received us all. He had as interpreter Col Turkes, member CNU. However Sarper frequently assisted with interpretation.

(FonMin had told me by telephone he had informed Gursel of our conversation reported Embtel 78.)

Gen Gursel opened conf by explaining that serious overage of senior officers exists in Turk Armed Forces and that it necessary, if armed forces to be revitalized, eliminate as much overage as possible. Gursel used pyramid by way illustration and stated that to have an effective officer corps, it must resemble pyramid, being broad at base and ending in point at top. He said that case of Turk Armed Forces was opposite, i.e., pyramid upside down. He proposed that to rid services of this unhealthy situation approximately 10 percent to 15 percent of the Colonels and above be compulsorily retired. In order effect this retirement 100,000,000 TL will be necessary. Money will be used make up difference between present income of officers to be retired and income they would expect to receive, if allowed to continue service until normal retirement.

Gursel emphasized point that no past government had been willing face this problem and no future government could be expected take action. He sees present as opportunity accomplish badly needed reform, in order produce effective Turkish fighting force. As he put it, the “vote hunters” would simply never touch problem, that his government could solve it, and that we would lose opportunity forever if we did not take advantage of present pol setting.

In course of conf Gursel made several other points:

A. That compulsory retirement of so many officers (he mentioned specifically 2,900 Colonels and Navy Captains) had absolutely no connection with today’s pol affairs.

B. That those selected for retirement would be selected without ref to pol affiliations.

C. That, somehow, rumors of proposed compulsory retirement had already leaked and that he very concerned over morale of armed services as result. He used this point as indicator of urgent requirement for action.

D. That forced retirement of so large a group older officers could be accomplished with minimum dissatisfaction on part of officers retired only if GOT could offer these men their families same money and benefits they would have gotten through the course of a routine military career.

E. That armed forces had not fought a war in 30 years and that, having been left alone, touched neither by wars nor politics it had grown fat, top heavy, badly needing, as he put it “a surgical operation”.

F. That US trained Turk officers retired under the proposed program would be held to a bare minimum.

I expressed my concern over problem as presented by Gen Gursel and told him of deep interest US had in Turkey’s position as part of the Western bastion against Communism. I stated that I would make every effort present case properly to USA Govt. In this regard I raised following points:

A. That we were concerned over fact that Turk Armed Forces presently have only 60 percent of authorized officer strength. If additional 10 percent to 15 percent were retired, it would appear to weaken the structure. I asked Gen Gursel if compulsory retirement were accomplished, “would the Turk Armed Forces be able to fight and maintain themselves in full scale war?” Gursel replied that retirement program would increase rather than decrease fighting capability by getting rid dead wood at top.

B. That we were not sure we could legally contribute funds for use in retirement scheme. I also pointed out that supply of USA money for foreign aid not inexhaustible, and that, at any rate, approval of Congress required in foreign aid. I further stated that trend of Congressional thinking of late has been to reduce foreign aid.

C. That base of officer pyramid at present is relatively weak. I asked Gen. Gursel what his intentions were with regard to increasing input and retention of junior officers, so as produce sound structure from bottom to top. Gen. Gursel replied that it was his intention change law as follows:

1) To have all men eligible for military service enter armed services as enlisted men.

2) Through selection process, to pick officer candidates for various branches armed services and then send officers schools for final training.

3) That graduates technical high schools and the like would either be commissioned as technicians or kept in enlisted ranks as special fields technicians.

Gursel pointed out this would immediately provide an increase in qualified officers for various branches of service and at same time would increase the technical personnel base, both officer and enlisted. Gen Gursel said he hoped have input of 600 more officers this year, 800 next year and an excess of 1000 following year. (Gursel did not make clear source from which these officers would come.)

D. In concluding my comments on problem I said I would like discuss matter with Gen. Morin; and if there were further questions involved, I might ask for additional conference with Gursel.

I further stated that I would report conference immediately to Washington and would outline Turk views in manner Gen. Gursel had presented them.

Colonel Tate asked if Gen. Gursel cared expand his ideas broadening officer base, increase of technicians and increasing services authorized strength. This opened entirely new facet, to which Gen. Gursel addressed himself as follows:

A. He stated past GOT had been hoodwinking NATO, that Turk armed forces cannot possibly meet MC-70 goals and he personally wishes explain situation to Gen. Norstad.

B. He said that if MC–70 goals are reached in 1963, total of 7 billion TL would be required just maintain Turk armed forces. He pointed out that present national budget is 7 billion TL and this is a tremendous burden. If budget of 7 billion TL for armed services alone were contemplated, Turkey would end up being army without country.

C. Gursel dealt some length with the unrealistic goals that [garble] the Turk Armed Forces and how Menderes government had carefully hidden truth from NATO and other friends of Turkey.

In conclusion, Colonel Turkes stated that within two days he would furnish me with approximate figures on number officers proposed be retired from each of three services.

The meeting ended with an expression of mutual friendship between the US and Turkey. Both Gen. Gursel and I expressed hope that this problem could be solved. I again indicated I would do my best present case properly to Washington.

Comments: I believe all three us Americans were impressed by Gen. Gursel’s simplicity, sincerity, stubborness of purpose. I doubted deeply whether he understands political implications and possibilities his proposed action.

After consultation with Gen. Morin, JUSMMAT and USOM, Embassy will submit third message containing further comments.²

Warren

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5/7–1360. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Istanbul, Izmir, Iskenderun, and Paris.
1. Telegram 78 reported on Warren’s discussions with Sarper on the proposed reductions in the Turkish officer corps and on public support for the new provisional government. (Ibid.)
2. In telegram 90 from Ankara, July 14, Warren commented on the implications for the United States of a decision to provide assistance to the Gursel government in its efforts to streamline the Turkish Army, warning that it “would have to share whatever opprobrium results” from the forced retirements of so many officers. (Ibid., 782.5/7–1460)