351. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower0
OTHERS PRESENT
- President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, Foreign Minister Zorlu, Secretary General Esenbel, Mr. Benler, Mr. Berkol, Secretary Murphy, Ambassador Warren, Mr. Cowles, Mr. Hagerty, Major Eisenhower
President Bayar opened the meeting by welcoming President Eisenhower to this country and inviting him to give his views first.
The President said he sees the problems of our time to be mainly two: the first is the need for disarmament. He holds the conviction there is no change in the basic purpose of the Soviets. A great danger, then, lies in over-optimism. Therefore, for an indeterminate period, we must keep up our level of armaments, even though they are burdensome. Even Khrushchev feels these burdens and recognizes a need for some disarmament. The main difference in approach lies in the fact that Khrushchev wants disarmament on a “trust” basis. He is, however, willing to negotiate even if he accrues no benefits other than a temporary advantage. From this the President concludes that we must still negotiate towards a world disarmament but that we must do so with our eyes open to avoid duplicity.
The second great problem in the world is that of the underdeveloped nations. These nations, since achieving independence, are discovering that they have more problems than they had bargained for. However, despite their difficulties they have attained a vision that people do not have to suffer want. They have seen in other places the potential dignity of man and desire to attain this with every possible speed. The result is an explosive situation which could end up in anarchy or in the underdeveloped nations turning to the Soviets for help. Soviet help in fact turns out often to be an empty promise. Since 1954 the Soviets have promised aid totaling $912 million aggregate to these nations but have actually distributed only some $250 million to $300 million. This aid furthermore is often given in such a way as to be hardly useful. Items are sold at prices set by the Soviets and they often drive a hard bargain in exacting repayment. The significance of this is that the free world must join together now to plan how to raise its overall economic strength. This cannot be done strictly on the basis of financial aid. All countries must work together in their own way. The Turks, for example, contribute by maintaining large military forces. Many countries in Western Europe [Page 821] have developed capital accumulations which can be used for the benefit of all, but the use of these reserves requires coordination. A study is needed to determine how this coordination should be accomplished.
The President concluded by saying that although his trip is labeled as a “good will” trip, he has an important secondary objective of portraying to the nations he visits his views on our great cooperative problem.
Mr. Zorlu then took the floor. He expressed pleasure at the importance the United States attaches to the security and wellbeing of the smaller nations. He feels another significance of the President’s trip is his showing, prior to a summit meeting, that he is desirous of furthering the welfare of the Middle Eastern countries. Mr. Zorlu analyzed Soviet motives in seeking a détente at this time as follows: first, there is the pessimistic approach (from the Soviet viewpoint). Here the Soviets found that they cannot push us further without risking war and they have been unsuccessful in efforts to create dissonance among allies by a series of crises. The optimistic approach concludes that the Soviets have developed more confidence in themselves by economic accomplishments and now feel that by cutting defense expenditures they will attain greater possibilities of challenging the West economically. By so doing they can prove the superiority of communism. Perhaps the Soviets feel that they are ahead of the free world militarily. A relaxation and an end to the arms race will make this lead permanent. Either analysis of Soviet motives produces the same results. The Soviet goal is still domination of the world and the free world must be able to maintain its solidarity. Any dissonance among allies encourages the USSR. Mr. Zorlu cited such examples as the disagreements between the OEEC and the Outer Seven and the French efforts to join the “nuclear club.” He expressed gratitude that U.S. diplomacy, particularly that of the President, has kept solidarity among the allies. He predicted a favorable verdict of history on the President’s trip.
With regard to a summit meeting, with efforts to work toward eventual disarmament, Mr. Zorlu is not against this. He feels it wise to cut back military expenditures so long as disarmament is coupled with guarantees. He fears, however, that a summit alone without bilateral relationships would cause suspicion, not so much in Turkey as in other countries. Some nations might feel abandoned, particularly if a series of conferences were to give the impression of a world directorate. This would make blackmail easy. In this regard he feels that bilateral relations and CENTO will counterbalance the bad efforts of the summit.
Mr. Zorlu then expressed fears regarding the effect of a détente on trade. The “have” countries have a dynamism which will cause them to trade with Communist countries. Particularly harmful to the free world is the extension of long-term credits to the Communists. This deprives [Page 822] underdeveloped nations from aid, gives the USSR a chance to “leap forward,” and gives the Communists a chance through this economic expansion to penetrate underdeveloped countries. He expressed great interest in the President’s idea of coordinated aid. Mr. Zorlu feels that there are two kinds of underdeveloped countries. One is the kind which is “on the line.” These are committed to the West and are located in contact with the USSR. They are in a better position than the uncommitted countries to receive and make use of aid. The Marshall Plan was successful because it was concentrated (like the administering of a drug) in necessary countries where it could help. He made a special plea for Turkey and Greece as areas of concentration in contrast to spreading a little bit of aid everywhere.
Mr. Zorlu then said the Middle East nations feel more secure than ever before. This is particularly true since the CENTO meeting in Washington. Iran and Pakistan are stronger than previously and inclined to solve their problems with their neighbors. He cited the Pakistan-India and the Iran-Afghanistan relationship. He recommended that the President use all influence possible on the Afghans.1 They are not willing to be Soviet satellites, but fail to realize the danger of cooperation with the Communists. The Turks are attempting to encourage help from NATO in influencing the Afghans. He said the Iranians and the Pakistanis are more anxious about the Afghans than are the Turks. The Turks take comfort in the recent visit of the Afghan Foreign Minister to Pakistan2 and the fact of the President’s visit.
Mr. Zorlu expressed concern over Arab disagreements. This is largely the result of aggressive intentions on the part of Egypt despite efforts which Nasser makes to improve relations on the surface with the West. He blames Egyptian pressure largely for the weakness shown by Iraq. Zorlu fears the Iraqis less than the Egyptians because the Iraqis have no desire to dominate their neighbors. NATO is dedicated to preserving the status quo; Egypt is not. Therefore Egypt’s fate will be linked to the USSR. A strong measure in Zorlu’s view to remedy this situation would be for the United States to become a full member of CENTO.
Regarding the economy of Turkey, Mr. Zorlu expressed thanks for U.S. aid and economic stabilization the next year, and was gratified that they received such aid again this year with only a small cut in the special fund. In talks with Mr. Dillon the Turks have obtained the impression that these cuts might be restored. Turkey’s problem is that of coordinating the help which might come from Europe, particularly from Italy and Germany. While these countries have expressed willingness, they have [Page 823] shown no results thus far. A recent economic conference in Berne3 brought forth short-term credits only, aside from an effort to avoid duplication of aid between countries. If the U.S. would lead in coordinating economic aid to Turkey, the Turks would be most grateful. The Turks would like to enter the Common Market4 and again they desire our help. Some elements in NATO are conservative. This causes difficulties. The Marshall Plan would never have been implemented if it had been left up to the bankers.
The President said he had heard of the Turkish ambition in this regard, recognizes the need, and is sympathetic to the project. He mentioned that Mr. Clarence Randall is studying the problem now. Clarence Randall has advised thus far that this type of thing should be done through private capital. A strong advantage held by Turkey in attracting private aid is the fact that these companies have faith in the Turkish Government. However, these companies do require a capital accumulation of $125–130 million. The President concluded by saying that he is personally sympathetic to the project, and will have the problem studied as a matter of urgency. Experts will get together to study priorities and requirements.
The President told Mr. Zorlu that he shares Zorlu’s suspicion of summit meetings, particularly when they replace broader consultation. He has not been to one since 1955. He disapproves the idea of a few nations dividing the world. He does, however, firmly believe in the value of personal contact between heads of nations. With regard to advice to Afghanistan, he pointed out the distance of the United States plus its lack of common heritage and religion. He advised that Turkey might prove a better advisor to Afghanistan than the United States.
Regarding military strength, the President does not believe that the Russians at this time consider themselves superior to the U.S. Our retaliatory power is far greater than theirs. While our ICBMs may be somewhat slower in development, we do have IRBMs and the Atlas. The Atlas has now achieved a fantastic accuracy. Further, we have advanced type bombers with air-to surface missiles. The Soviets believe that general war would result in their destruction and the current technique is to distract people from the military situation and to compete economically.
The President said he favored trade with the Soviet Union when our side gets the best of the bargain. He does not condone giving secrets or aiding “leaps forward.” He is against the extension of long-term credits.
[Page 824]The President said he favors coordination of economic aid and will be glad to help. He has mentioned this to Macmillan, Gronchi, Segni and Pella.
Mr. Zorlu clarified his position on trade. He had not referred to normal trade but to trade through credits. The President reiterated that the United States has objected strenuously to the provision of five-year long-term credits by the UK to the USSR.
Zorlu expressed appreciation that the President will talk with Adenauer in favor of economic aid to Turkey. Some people feel that economic aid is injurious to an alliance. The Turks do not agree with this and are willing to accept aid from the NATO allies. Mr. Zorlu expressed pleasure with our military aid. He is glad to have the IRBMs. He has allocated the fields for its deployment; and wants to get them set up as soon as possible. He does not visualize much additional aid from Germany in the military field.
Regarding cultural relations, Mr. Zorlu spoke a word for the Middle East Technical University (METU) as a good place for help. Students come from all over the Middle East and are probably better off here in Ankara than they would be if they were students in the United States. He expressed pleasure at our aid to Ataturk University. The President said he was looking for a chance to commend this type of enterprise in a speech. Mr. Zorlu said there are three institutions of this type—the Middle East Technical University, the Middle East Institute of Administration, and Ataturk University.
Mr. Menderes in speaking for his government cited the remarkable identity between the Turkish and U.S. views, his pleasure at the President’s trip, and his pleasure at the President’s apparent realization of the dangers of a détente. Since no other country is so much “in line” with the United States as is Turkey, there is really very little to talk about.
It was decided that a communiqué would be worked out between Mr. Murphy and Mr. Zorlu to be released when finished. With some cordial remarks on the objects of the trip, the meeting ended.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International File. Secret. Prepared by Major Eisenhower.↩
- Eisenhower was scheduled to visit Afghanistan on December 9.↩
- Afghan Foreign Minister Naim visited Pakistan on November 20.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Turkey applied for EEC associate membership on October 31.↩