Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

35. Draft Paper Prepared by N. Spencer Barnes of the Policy Planning Staff⁰

Washington, June 15, 1959.

IMPLICATIONS OF KHRUSHCHEV’S VISIT TO ALBANIA¹

Summary and Conclusions

The significance of Khrushchev’s recent visit to Albania was highlighted by the level of Soviet representation, time spent, intensive propaganda output, heavy military overtones and slavish adulation shown by the Albanian leadership. The intent was evidently to demonstrate Soviet determination to hold Albania, against any internal or external attempts to detach it from Moscow’s empire, by all force necessary.

It is believed that this attitude represents a change; that inclusion of Albania in the Warsaw Pact² represented a calculated risk, but that the USSR would previously have backed down if confronted by internal insurrection backed by a Western hands-off ultimatum.

Reasons for the change are probably to be found in the missile balance. Faced by the prospect of NATO missile bases and atomic stockpiles in neighboring areas, the Soviets are trying to avoid this development through promoting a nuclear-and-missile-free Balkan area. Should such efforts fail they will probably install missile bases in Albania and perhaps Bulgaria. This will make these countries considerably more of an asset, militarily and in terms of prestige, to the Soviets, and a liability to NATO and Yugoslavia, than before. There will be a greater Soviet incentive to hold the area, and Western or Yugoslav incentive to detach it. Current Soviet stress on defense of Albania, and the slackening off in anti-Yugoslav propaganda, doubtless reflect apprehension as well as warning.

Once missile sites are in place in Albania the Soviets are likely to put enough force in the country to insure against a local take-over; and to apply the same criteria to this country as the West does to Berlin in respect to invasion, namely: to treat it as an area indefensible by conventional forces in limited action, but which protectors are committed to defend by strategic nuclear strikes if necessary. A bluff is possible; but no more probable than a US bluff over free-world outposts. Albania and Bulgaria will be more firmly cemented into Moscow’s empire than at present, chances of a Polish or Yugoslav-type evolution correspondingly reduced, and tension and danger of war increased.

These prospects have important enough implications for future developments in Europe to suggest two policy conclusions: First, that a thorough, serious and objective study be made of military, political and psychological pros and cons of missile and nuclear proliferation in the Balkans compared to mutual agreement on restrictions in certain areas. Secondly, for the sake of information and channel of influence the 1958 NSC directive to reestablish US diplomatic relations with Albania when appropriate³ should be implemented.

1. Significance and Meaning.

There is good reason to think that Mr. Khrushchev’s late visit to Albania had significance. As evidence are the facts that:

a) The Soviet delegation included highest-level representation: Mr. Khrushchev himself, together with N. A. Mukhitdinov, Party Praesidium and Secretariat member most closely concerned with Moslem areas.

b) Mr. Khrushchev spent more time on this visit than he has on any other visit to any European country in the “socialist camp” for several years.

c) The Soviet press and radio devoted space and attention to this visit at least comparable to that accorded any other bilateral manifestation of bloc solidarity in the last few years.

Beyond the significance in terms of general country-to-country relations, there were unusually strong military overtones. These included:

a) The presence of the Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky, and the coincidental appearance of the Chinese Defense Minister Peng Te-huai.

b) The emphasis given to missile bases.

c) The stress laid on defense of Albania.

d) The symbolism in Grotewohl’s⁴ presence and Khrushchev’s return via Budapest, pointing up the two countries where Soviet armed force has been used to suppress insurrection.

In addition, the Albanian leadership presented a picture of fawning subservience rare even in satellite annals: The adulation poured on all things Soviet, and Mr. Khrushchev in particular, by Hoxha, Shehu et al., would have satisfied Stalin at the height of his personality cult.

It is evident then, that the Kremlin has tried to create a very definite impression. It would seem to be this: That the USSR fully intends to use all force necessary to hold Albania as an integral part of the Soviet empire, against any internal or external attempts to detach it.

Such efforts suggest a significant change in the Soviet attitude toward Albania. It is true that the Albanian Government has always played the role of a willing satellite; and Albania was included in the Warsaw Pact. But recent developments show a different enough emphasis to indicate more than casual factors. An attempt to analyze these factors, and to estimate what change has taken place, is outlined below.

2. Previous Situation.

Albania’s position to date within the Soviet empire, since the defection of Yugoslavia, can be briefly characterized as follows:

Its government has obediently followed Moscow in domestic and foreign policy. It has been perhaps the most conservative of satellite regimes in the sense of holding closely to Stalinist norms. It does not enjoy broad support; but despite considerable popular dissatisfaction there have been few recent signs of overt resistance and the regime appears firmly entrenched. This has been due both to maintenance of severe police controls and to unsatisfactory relations with the country’s neighbors, in turn tending to undercut opposition to native leadership. Economic conditions have been poor, requiring continuous help from the rest of the Soviet bloc. The standard of living, though rising slowly, is still very low.

Geographically, the country is unique among satellites in being separated from the rest of Moscow’s domain by intervening states. It is small in area and population and has very limited defense capabilities.

Against this background, it seems reasonable to estimate the Kremlin’s previous attitude toward Albania as resting on a calculated risk, along with the belief that, should the unexpected occur, it would be possible to disengage without too great loss. Moscow evidently assessed Albania as worth keeping as an outpost of communism and of Soviet power, despite its vulnerability and despite its being an economic liability; and the Kremlin was prepared to risk its prestige through inclusion of Albania in the Warsaw Pact. This decision probably resulted from a calculation somewhat along the following lines:

It would not be worth risking global war to hold Albania for the Soviets. But conversely, the small value of the country, in any terms, made it unlikely that either its neighbors or the Western power complex as a whole would accept the risk either, along with the onus of initiating war. In consequence, Moscow probably decided that there was slight danger of direct attack. Had it come, it would have precipitated a difficult decision for the Kremlin. But the latter presumably believed: (a) that the risk of attack from the NATO area was negligible; (b) that an attack from Yugoslavia or Greece, while less unlikely, was still improbable; and (c) that should the latter take place, it would be possible to send satellite forces against the aggressor, strike an attitude of moral outrage, and trust that an agreement based on the approximate status quo would materialize rather than total war. As a last-ditch position the Soviets might have backed down, thus depending on the prevailing international situation.

At the same time, Moscow probably weighed the possibility of losing Albania through internal revolt or a coup d’etat backed by subversion from abroad as, though still unlikely, considerably more of a possibility than loss through direct attack. And this apprehension must have increased after the Hungarian revolution. Such a situation, if the West had then announced it would not intervene unless the Soviets did, but would counter force with force, would have confronted Moscow with a distinctly unpleasant choice. It would have meant, either: (a) losing Albania, with attendant loss of prestige; (b) committing armed forces to what would probably have been a losing fight in limited, conventional war; or (c) committing all its military facilities, with attendant probability of invoking World War III. Faced with such a choice, it is believed that the USSR would have backed down, accepted the loss of the area and covered the loss of face with the pose that, though “provoked by domestic and foreign enemies of the people and supported by misguided masses”, the episode was still internal in a sense which did not warrant invoking the Warsaw Pact. This would, of course, have been exactly the opposite conclusion from that applied to the more accessible and strategically valuable Hungary.

3. Reasons for Change.

If, as seems probable, the recent spotlight on Albania means a change in the Soviet attitude toward this country, there must be fairly compelling reasons. It is suggested that the most plausible reasons are the following:

First, the Kremlin genuinely does not like the prospect of NATO missile bases in Italy, Greece and Turkey. Whatever the drawbacks to present generation IRBM’s, such bases will to some extent multiply the sources of potential atomic attack on the Soviet Union—and the Soviets are not quite sure the West will never strike first; will multiply targets the Soviets must eliminate if they make a first strike, as well as destroying the possibility of the host nation’s neutrality and ensuring its bitter enmity if they should strike; and provide a definite gain—particularly in Turkey—for an enemy in terms of missile range. Also, as time goes on the process of hardening, dispersal and improvement in missile design should increase the threat.

If Moscow so assesses the presence of missile bases in the neighboring NATO countries, as a real though perhaps not major threat, it should try to prevent their establishment. Propaganda has, and will be, used. But there is little to suggest it will be successful. In consequence, the threat of Albanian missile bases is being brought into play. The Soviets probably think this gambit does afford some real leverage. Missiles and atomic warheads in Albania are, in a sense, the counterpart of NATO capabilities in southeastern Europe. Albania is small, but it has over 10,000 square miles, and a very respectable number of missiles can be installed in this space. The Soviets would gain a multiplicity of attack points, and of targets the West would have to destroy. It would gain range of several hundred miles compared to Soviet bases, providing added utility for the Soviet stock of shorter-range missiles. The gain in range would be considerably less compared to possible locations in other satellites. But it seems quite probable that Moscow would prefer not to scatter missiles in more satellite areas than necessary; and that in choosing, they would select areas where the internal situation was least likely to get out of hand. It should require less Soviet strength to insure against local seizure of bases in a country as small and weak as Albania than in, say Hungary, or to a lesser degree in other satellites. Further, while it is impossible to foresee in advance just how the situation would unfold, it seems conceivable that in a crisis the USSR might find Albanian bases useful as a kind of pawn, the threat of using which might inhibit the use of missiles from one or more neighboring NATO countries on a quid pro quo basis.

So, on the whole, the Soviets probably consider Albanian missile bases as a real, if limited, asset, and an equally real liability for the West.

4. Current Soviet Strategy.

They are now using the stick of this asset/liability, along with the carrot of a nuclear-and-missile free Balkan and/or Adriatic area, in an effort to prevent installation of NATO missile bases. Probably they would accept some sort of deal whereby elimination of Albanian bases were traded against similar concessions in another part of the area. Or they might play this card against concessions on Berlin. They must, however, have serious doubts that the West is prepared for such a deal. There have certainly been no indications to date that it is. Should no deal be possible, the Soviets will have the choice of proceeding with their threat or of forgetting the whole thing. The second course would mean exposure of recent threats as groundless, involving a sacrifice in prestige and future credibility, and would leave the atomic missile field in the Balkan area free for NATO. The Kremlin must already have given thought to this problem. If the tentative decision had been to admit a bluff later, it seems doubtful the Soviets would have gone out of their way recently so to commit their prestige. Nevertheless, a bluff is of course possible; and its likelihood presumably depends on pros and cons of the alternative.

The alternative involves—if no “deal” arranged in the meantime—proceeding in fact to establish missile bases in Albania. The presence of such bases—probably attended by expansion of submarine facilities—would add considerable value to that piece of real estate. The military value of the bases and missiles themselves would be consequential. In addition, Soviet prestige would be far more heavily committed than at present. The Soviets would want a high degree of assurance that the bases—and so the country—could be held. They would probably put enough Soviet force into Albania to insure effectively against danger through internal action—something not too difficult. They would also realize that, as Albania gained value as an asset to them, it would become a greater liability to the West and neighboring countries. Even more than NATO, Yugoslavia would presumably have serious misgivings over the acquisition by its small and unfriendly neighbor—despite their being under Soviet control—of military capabilities more destructive than those of Yugoslavia itself. Just the prospect of such capabilities should worry the Yugoslavs; and, judging by latest reports, this is precisely what is happening.

Both the rise in Albania’s value occasioned by the bases, and to a somewhat lesser degree the anticipation of such a rise due simply to the threat, should thus increase chances of an effort to detach Albania from Moscow’s empire. The overtones of Khrushchev’s visit suggest that Moscow is quite aware of this; that there is at least some apprehension on this score; and that a strong effort is being made to forefend such action through giving warning of the consequences. The Kremlin has taken the risk of threatening installation, and may easily be prepared to take that of actual installation, of missile bases. It should consequently try to minimize chances of its calculation misfiring, first by expressing determination to hold Albania, as a deterrent; and secondly by damping down the anti-Yugoslav campaign as an inducement. Both these moves are already underway.

Moscow must, however—unless the threat of installations be a pure bluff—have considered at least the possibility that the calculation will misfire; that in one way or another, before or after bases are in place, perhaps at a time of general crisis, the Albanian Government may come under pressure which could lead to military action. In so considering, either this possibility has been written off as too improbable to worry about, or else plans of how to cope with the situation have been considered. Certainly, taking into account the addition to Albania’s strategic value which would have been created, Moscow should be much less likely to retire from the area with no more than an attempt at face-saving than it was before. An additional reason for willingness to take greater risk now may be the Kremlin’s assessment of an increasingly favorable change in the overall East-West power balance.

5. Prospective Situation.

It must be assumed that the Soviets—while capable of making mistakes—are able to make fairly realistic judgments of the situation they say they will create. Publicly, Khrushchev recently stated that: “anyone who tries to encroach on the frontiers of Albania … will have to deal with the full might of the socialist camp”; and “any imperialist infringement of Albania’s freedom and independence will inevitably suffer complete failure. Now, when we dispose of such perfected techniques, we can support you with sufficient strength even without sending troops directly into Albanian territory”.⁵

The implication is clear that, while the Kremlin recognizes the difficulty in bringing adequate conventional forces to bear on a military action in Albania, without first violating Yugoslavian or Greek neutrality and thus threatening expansion of the conflict into global war, it may now be prepared to initiate “limited atomic war” by sending missiles directly against the forces or the homeland of any nation which invades Albania. The assumption presumably is that this threat should be adequate to deter; that if not it could be followed up by a small-scale, essentially warning though appreciably destructive nuclear/missile attack; and that the only situation under which the USSR risked serious retaliation would be one where the US had decided on global war anyway—a decision which they would expect to depend on more weighty considerations than simply the aim of detaching Albania.

In essence the changed Soviet attitude, the new decision made or pending, would mean that the Soviets were preparing to apply the same criteria to Albania as those the US applies to Berlin: an area which we know can not be directly defended against determined attack, but which we say we will protect through strategic bombing or total war if necessary. It seems reasonable to believe that this is now—or will be if no agreement on a nuclear-free area militarizes—the case, and that it was not the case before; that the possibility of Albania following the Yugoslav—or even Polish—example has existed, but will be ruled out in the future, leaving only the Hungarian way open as a protest against satellization; and that Khrushchev’s visit to Albania has forecast the change. As stated above, the Kremlin may still be bluffing. But the likelihood of its bluffing here seems no greater than that of the US bluffing in Berlin or Iran, or Turkey or South Korea. It seems more reasonable to think that the Kremlin is preparing to use such force, including missiles, as thought necessary to defend Albania—even though this would usher in a period of uncertainty as to whether and which side might first decide global war were imminent and make a first nuclear strike against the enemy’s heartland. As a possible alternative the Soviets might counter a move against Albania by seizure of one or more of the free world’s exposed outposts. This would also raise tension to or beyond supportable limits.

6. Policy Alternatives.

If the above analysis is substantially correct, it would seem to leave two courses of action open to the US:

The first would be to pay no attention to the Soviet threats and proceed as presently planned with programs for missile sites and atomic stockpiles in any NATO areas deemed appropriate.

The second would be to promote some quid pro quo for Soviet abandonment of their Albanian—and perhaps Bulgarian—missile projects.

7. Factors Affecting Decision.

Current policy, as well as Soviet preference for the alternative, strongly suggests adoption of the former course. There are other cogent arguments for it; and it may be the preferable choice. The decision, however, would seem to have an important enough bearing on future developments in Europe as to warrant a thorough, serious and objective study of pros and cons. It is suggested that the following factors are among those which might be taken into consideration:

a) Military

(i) The addition to Soviet military capabilities which would be furnished by missile installations and atomic warheads in Albania, and secondarily in Bulgaria. This would take into account gain in range (accuracy of strike, ability to use stocks of short-range missiles, etc); and increase in number of bases (added bases for offensive strike, and of targets for removal by the West). These added capabilities could be adjusted for estimated future effects of hardening, dispersal and improved design. The comparison would be with the effectiveness of missiles located only in the USSR, or in the USSR and other satellites outside the area considered.

(ii) The same factors applied to missile bases in Greece, Italy and Turkey, separately and in combination, in comparison with effectiveness of NATO missile capabilities located outside these respective areas.

It may be noted in this connection that strictly from the standpoint of geography and range when set against available alternative site areas, a de-missiled “Balkan Peninsula” alone would restrict Soviet capabilities more than Western; if Italy were added the restriction in range would be about equal; and if Asiatic Turkey were included the West would lose considerably more.

The general consideration might also be noted that mutual restrictions in military effectiveness of NATO members and Soviet satellites usually tend to give a differential advantage to the Soviets due to comparative unreliability of satellite forces. This would be largely counteracted here, however, by the fact that missile and/or atomic capabilities would almost certainly remain under strictly Soviet rather than satellite control.

Still another military factor could involve tactical atomic weapons. The net military balance might be different depending on whether only missile bases were considered for exclusion from a given area, or all atomic capabilities.

b) Political

(i) The effects of a firmer Soviet grip on Albania, and to a lesser extent perhaps Bulgaria, which may be anticipated from installation of Soviet-controlled missiles. This would include a probable sharp reduction in chances for Soviet influence to ebb from the Balkans, or of satellite progress toward the Polish or Yugoslav model; a general tendency toward freezing lines between antagonistic power blocs, with inhibitions to spread of influences across bloc boundaries; and an overall increase in tension in the area. The above might be compared with estimates as to what opportunities would otherwise exist for an eventual “softening” of the bloc through increased influence from its closer neighbors and from the West.

c) Psychological

The question as to whether the will to carry out NATO obligations in a crisis on the part of such nations as Greece, Italy or Turkey, would be adversely affected by not having atomic-equipped missiles located on their own territory. Also, whether the threat of missile attack from Albania could neutralize an otherwise more powerful element in the NATO complex, such as Italy.

Courses of Action.

If a careful study of all factors should indicate a net loss to the West from any mutual denial of missile facilities and/or atomic capabilities, the Soviet threats should certainly be brushed off. If the reverse, it should not be difficult to stimulate a unilateral Greek offer to refuse missile bases or atomic stockpiles, conditional on an Albanian agreement to do the same; or to broaden the area by extension to Bulgaria and Rumania on one side and an appropriate counterpart on the other; or to throw some type of limited non-aggression pact, e.g. between Albania and Italy, onto the scales. Probably no deal offered would satisfy the Soviets, and they would certainly bargain and propagandize for a better one. But they might settle for a region that would appear to give a net overall advantage to the West.

In any event, regardless of pros and cons of policy, the prospective increase in Albania’s strategic importance should put an added premium on carrying out the directive contained in NSC 5811/1 of May 24, 1958, which states: “When appropriate, recognize and establish U.S. diplomatic relations with Albania, subject to certain conditions, including a guarantee of correct treatment of U.S. diplomatic personnel and satisfactory settlement of the question of the validity of pre-war treaties between Albania and the United States.” The action should now be appropriate; even the limited gain from information and analysis of local conditions, plus the channel for doing business and exerting any influence possible, that a US Mission would provide should certainly be worthwhile. Albanian authorities have several times in the past hinted at a desire to renew diplomatic relations. They may or may not be prepared for the move now, but there are numerous indirect ways of finding out with no embarrassment to the US.

0. Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Albania. Confidential. According to a handwritten note on the source text, this paper was discussed at the Policy Planning Staff meeting on June 23. The minutes of the meeting read as follows: “After considerable discussion it was agreed that more information should be received before taking a position on the alternatives set forth in the memorandum. This information will come from replies to be received from telegrams sent to Rome and Belgrade.” A copy of the minutes is in Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 70 D 190, Minutes of Meetings.
1. See Document 36.
2. On May 14, 1955, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Communist nations signed a multilateral treaty of “friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance” at Warsaw, which was ratified by all signatories on May 30. See Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXV, pp. 33–34.
3. For text of NSC 5811/1, see Part 1, Document 6.
4. While in Albania Khrushchev had talks with East German Premier Otto Grotewohl.
5. Ellipsis in the source text. Reference is to a speech by Khrushchev at Shkodar, Albania, on May 27. For text, see Pravda, May 28, 1959.