Office of the Historian

330. Memorandum for the Record0

Ankara, March 2, 1959.

SUBJECT

  • Conversation with Mr. Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister, Turkey
  • TIME
  • 1030 to 1130 hours, Thursday, 5 February 1959
  • PLACE
  • Prime Minister’s Office, Ankara, Turkey
  • INDIVIDUALS PRESENT
  • Mr. George McGhee1
  • Admiral Arthur W. Radford
  • Ambassador Fletcher E. Warren
  • Mr. Rustu Zorlu, Turkish Foreign Minister
  • Mr. Melih Esenbel, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

After a friendly welcome, the Prime Minister entered into a full scale discussion on Iran with Mr. Zorlu’s participation.

The line taken by the Prime Minister corresponded to that reported in recent conversations by Ambassador Warren.2 The Prime Minister stated that the Turkish government viewed the present situation in Iran with utmost seriousness. To the Turkish government it represented a crisis of the greatest magnitude. If the Shah signs an agreement with the Soviets,3 the Baghdad Pact would be rendered negative and the way would be opened for ultimate domination of Iran by the Soviets. Under such circumstances, Pakistan, and probably Afghanistan, would eventually fall under Soviet domination. In Iraq, where he was already pessimistic, the government would also, in all probability, fall under Soviet control. He considered that the Arab states were already lost to the West. Nasser could not be counted on at all. He was asking as his price for cooperation with the West impossible terms including support [Page 792] against Israel; nationalization of oil, and dominance in the Middle East. (Later, however, he indicated that although there were no assurances that Nasser would change, every effort should be made to obtain reorientation of his policy.)

The Prime Minister pointed out the serious adverse effect on Turkey’s position if Iran left the Baghdad Pact. He pointed out that the Turks had largely been responsible for persuading Iran to join the Pact, but that Iran had not gotten the economic and military aid they hoped for. The US should do everything it could to supply them, basing its policy on support of the Baghdad Pact.

He pointed out that if Iran comes under Soviet domination, Turkey would be vulnerable both from Iran, Iraq and Syria. This would, he implied, create need for an increase in Turkish military requirements. Although he recognizes the weaknesses of the Shah personally and his position in Iran, the Turkish government sees no alternative but to try to persuade the Shah, who is Western orientated, to remain in the Baghdad Pact. The Shah was dominated by fear of Russia and his present effort, although misguided, was directed toward alleviating Russian pressure. He could only do this if he had adequate US support, which could take the form of increased assurances from the US through the Bilateral Agreement and increased economic and military aid.

In discussing American military and economic aid to Turkey, the Prime Minister indicated gratitude for aid given in the past, which he felt had been effectively utilized by the Turks. He felt the Stabilization Agreement was a useful and necessary step and gave assurance that the Turks were going to carry it out scrupulously. He stated that he had no apologies for Turkish economic and development policy prior to this agreement. The Turkish government could have taken no other course.

In discussing his forthcoming trip with Mr. Zorlu to Switzerland to meet with the Greek Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on Cyprus,4 the Prime Minister expressed determination to reach agreement on this issue. He expressed some concern as to whether the Greek officials had a similar determination. He did not volunteer any other details of the issues outstanding with the Greeks and was not questioned on this point.

  1. Source: Department of State, Turkish Desk Files: Lot 61 D 37, Prime Minister and Cabinet. No classification marking.↩
  2. A subcommittee to study the Middle East, composed of McGhee and Radford, visited Turkey January 31–February 7.↩
  3. Apparently reference is to a conversation on Iran between Warren and Zorlu on February 1. Warren reported on this discussion in telegram 2185 from Ankara, February 1 (Department of State, Central Files, 788.5/2–159) and telegram 2190 from Ankara, February 2 (Ibid., 601.8287/2–259). No record of a conversation with Menderes has been found. The Prime Minister had been out of Turkey for most of the previous 2 weeks.↩
  4. Reference to a proposed non-aggression pact between Iran and the Soviet Union.↩
  5. See Part 1, Document 307.↩