Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

324. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 33–58

Washington, December 30, 1958.

PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY¹

The Problem

To estimate the present situation and probable developments in Turkey over the next few years, with particular reference to Turkey’s political and economic stability and its role in the Western Alliance.

Conclusions

1. Turkey remains the strongest friend of the US in the Middle East. Its firm anti-Soviet policies enjoy wide domestic support, and there is little likelihood that Soviet gestures will weaken the Turks’ basic distrust of the USSR or their policy of alliance with the West. (Paras. 9, 33, 45–46)

2. Internally, the country faces serious problems—most of them arising from its efforts to become a modern state quickly. There is growing antagonism between Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and the opposition over Turkey’s critical economic problems and the government’s political repressions. Popular dissatisfaction over these issues is apparently strengthening the opposition Republican Peoples Party of former President Inonu. Meanwhile, the adroit Menderes faces dissensions and possible defections within his own Democrat Party but he has at least an even chance of keeping control of his party. (Paras. 10–13, 17–18)

3. We do not believe that these troubles will lead to a revolutionary situation between now and the next elections, which are not due before late 1961. Barring drastic economic deterioration or extreme political provocations, the chance of a military coup remains slight. (Paras. 15–16)

4. Turkey’s severest problems are economic. Brought near to bankruptcy by mismanagement and overambitious development efforts, it gained a reprieve in 1958 with the commitment of $359 million in US and other Western credits and aid, as well as agreement by its foreign creditors to reschedule pressing debt payments. In turn, the government is pledged to a soundly-conceived stabilization program designed to bring spiraling inflation under control, improve Turkey’s critical international financial position, and renew the flow of essential imports. It has already taken promising first steps, such as a long-overdue devaluation of the lira. (Paras. 11–12, 20, 23)

5. On balance, however, there is little more than an even chance that the government will sustain the effort needed to achieve the program’s objectives in the face of the political risks involved in adhering to the required austerity measures. There will be continuing Turkish pressures on the US to liberalize the terms of the aid already committed, and a persistent belief that in the last analysis aid would not be cut off even if Turkish performance falls short. (Paras. 20–22, 36)

6. Turkish-Greek tensions over Cyprus continue. So long as this situation exists, military cooperation between the two in NATO will probably remain minimal. However, recent informal talks between the Turkish and Greek foreign ministers have resulted in a tentative plan for a solution which offers some hope that progress may be made in the controversy.² (Paras. 37–39)

7. In the Middle East, Turkey is not likely to abandon its policy of resistance to Nasser and the movement he represents. Cooperation with Israel regarding Middle East problems is likely to increase. Turkey views the growth of Communist influence in Iraq as a serious threat to Turkish security. Turkey would probably be critical of any US moves, especially in the Arab world, which it construed as being soft on neutralism. (Paras. 40–46)

8. There has been some strengthening of Turkey’s armed forces, but substantial improvement depends largely on overcoming the serious shortage of personnel trained to maintain and operate the advanced equipment furnished by the US. (Paras. 29–32)

[Here follows the remainder of the estimate.]

0. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. The cover sheet indicates this is an advance copy of NIE 33–58. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows: “Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 30 December 1958.”
1. This estimate discusses Turkey’s prospects primarily in the light of events since the publication of NIE 33–56, “Turkey As an Ally,” dated 21 February 1956. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. For documentation on the Zorlu-Averoff conversations and the solution of the Cyprus crisis, see Part 1, Documents 169 ff.