Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

293. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to Secretary of State Herter, at Paris⁰

Athens, May 17, 1960.

Tosec 227.1. Taking advantage receipt today of Secretary’s May 11 bread and butter letter to Caramanlis¹ I called on Prime Minister, who after referring to breakdown at Summit reaffirmed solidarity of Greece with free world, with NATO and specifically with US. He also suggested would be good idea for American Government (or Big Four) to beat Russia to UN, either to present our open skies no peeking proposal,² or to consider situation created by Khrushchev’s behavior.

2. As contribution assessment world views on current situation, Greek Prime Minister’s observations follow in substance: Greek Government finds it difficult to understand timing May 1 U–2 flight, and even more difficult understand our admitting, after the event, what pilot was up to. “As Greek, I was baffled; as politician I thought admission damaging to allied cause. Maybe history will applaud you but in today’s world, as seen from Greece, only a great power could afford luxury of honesty in those circumstances”. However, having dealt ace to Khrushchev latter proceeded by grossness of his behavior to dissipate his assets. Khrushchev was probably looking, for reasons unknown, for excuse liquidate peaceful co-existence.

3. Present position, continued Caramanlis, that gangster face of communism is again exposed for world to see. Détente is revealed for phoney tactic it always was. Communism has steadily advanced since war. Its advance has been facilitated by free world mistakes and irresolution. Now is time for free world to close ranks, to recognize that our disagreements and quarrels are minor in terms of our common interests and the Communist threat. This is golden opportunity for free world. It may be turning point in modern history.

4. First we should consult as NATO allies. Then we should go to UN, thereby capturing free world initiative. And finally, whatever be tide, Greece stands with US.

5. It was impressive performance and I believe sincere one. (Some acknowledgment might be in order.)³ Opening observations should be read in context that few Greeks believe straight line is shortest distance between any two points. It is also illustrative of fact that Greece, not having been offered détente, regards it with extra suspicion and is not now adverse to being joined by US in ex–peaceful co-existence doghouse. Caramanlis may also have had eye (slightly malicious) on Menderes Moscow expedition.⁴

6. Greeks would clearly welcome project by free world to recapture initiative.

Briggs

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/5–1760. Secret. Repeated to Ankara and the Department of State, which copy is the source text. Herter was in Paris with President Eisenhower to attend the summit conference.
1. A copy of the letter, which thanked Karamanlis for the courtesies extended during Secretary Herter’s visit to Athens, is ibid., Greek Desk Files: Lot 61 D 456, Visits–Herter.
2. Reference is to President Eisenhower’s proposal for the inspection of nuclear test sites by aerial overflight.
3. On May 19, Eisenhower sent a personal message to Karamanlis in which he discussed the reasons for the failure of the Paris summit. A copy of this message is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Greece.
4. Menderes’ projected trip to the Soviet Union never took place. The Soviet Government lodged a formal complaint with the Turkish Government over the use of Turkish airfields by U–2 aircraft. Menderes’ government was subsequently overthrown by a military coup on May 27.