Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

241. Operations Coordinating Board Report⁰

Washington, May 21, 1958.

OPERATIONS PLAN FOR GREECE

I. Introduction

A. Special Operating Guidance

1. Objectives.

a. An independent and stable Greece, cooperating in Free World defense and maintaining the will and ability to resist Communist subversion and influence.

b. Access by the United States and NATO to military facilities in Greece, and Greek cooperation with NATO countries.

c. Greek armed forces capable of resisting, as part of a concerted allied defense, direct Soviet or satellite attack.

d. Improvement of Greek-Turkish relations, and Greek participation in the further development of the Balkan Pact among Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

e. Settlement of the Cyprus dispute.

f. Lessening of Greek irredentism.

g. A Greek economy which can support reasonable economic development and assume a larger share of the cost of the Greek defense establishment.

2. International Role of Greece. The growth of Greek national self-confidence should be encouraged in the direction of making Greece a stronger ally. Irredentist tendencies, of which the Greek Orthodox Church is the foremost exponent, should be discouraged. The community of Greek and Western interests should be highlighted and the necessity stressed for settling, or at least avoiding intensification of, issues causing interallied tensions. Greek participation in international and regional organizations and projects furthering Western interests should be encouraged. Recognizing that the Balkan Pact¹ is dormant, Greece should be encouraged to develop closer relations with Yugoslavia in economic, cultural and related fields of activity as a means of weakening Soviet power in the Balkans. Such encouragement should be undertaken discreetly to avoid any further strain on Greek-Turkish relations, already damaged by the Cyprus dispute.

3. Impact of Cyprus on Greek Foreign Policy. The Cyprus question has permeated virtually all aspects of Greek politics and foreign policy. It has seriously harmed Greek-Turk relations, frustrated virtually all policies requiring Greek-Turk cooperation, such as in the Balkan Pact, and has even impaired Greek support for its ties with NATO and its Western allies. This factor should be kept carefully in mind in estimating the degree to which Greece identifies its interests with those of the West and the cooperation which can be expected from Greece in furthering Free World objectives in the area. The long term importance to Greece of good relations with Turkey as a close neighbor and the need for Greek-Turk consultations in facilitating a Cyprus settlement should continue to be emphasized in discussions with the Greek Government.

4. Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute. In encouraging the Greek Government to reach an understanding on the Cyprus question with the United Kingdom and Turkey, the U.S. should continue to emphasize the necessity that Greece assume its full share of responsibility, that both interim and long-term solutions should be sought, and that while the U.S. is prepared to assist the parties concerned procedurally, it does not intend to assume direct responsibility for any particular solution. In any efforts to assist the parties, the U.S. while recognizing the primarily international interests of the three countries, should not ignore the primarily local interests of the Cypriots. The U.S. is prepared to assist NATO in any reasonable attempts to assume a mediatory role.

5. Relations with Political Parties. The U.S. should not be overtly identified with any political party or figure and should retain friendly relations as feasible with all responsible leaders. Efforts should be made through these contacts to counteract local communist influence.

6. Greek Communist Party. In addition to efforts mentioned above to counteract local communist influence, U.S. officials should appraise carefully and move towards legalization of the KKE (Greek Communist Party). Following the banning of the KKE in 1947, the party’s leadership as well as many of its adherents went behind the Iron Curtain. Since 1949 there has been a gradual acceleration of propaganda designed to have the KKE made legal once more in a deliberate campaign of “forgetfulness” and “normalcy”. Successive Greek governments have relaxed the laws dealing with communism in Greece, but no government has, to date, seriously contemplated legalization of the KKE. However, the success of the Communist-front EDA in the May, 1958, elections may raise the issue again.

7. Aspirations for Area Leadership. While looking to the U.S. for world leadership, Greece considers that it is capable of playing a larger role in the Near East. Greece is jealous of the role envisaged by Turkey for itself in the area. The Greek desire to play a larger role in the Near East was in part responsible for the decision of the present government to give public support to the American Doctrine² after its announcement. However, it should be recognized that Greek sensitivities regarding the Arab states can be a restraint in the degree of open support which Greece can be expected to continue to give the American Doctrine. These sensitivities grow out of such factors as the Cyprus question, the Orthodox Church and Greek communities in such places as Alexandria. For example, the Greek colony in Egypt enables Egypt, if it wishes, to exert pressure on Greece. Greek views on an increased role in the area, therefore, should be entertained sympathetically, and opportunities sought to make appropriate use of such influence in furtherance of U.S. policy objectives, but caution should be observed in encouraging Greek initiative.

8. Economic and Technical Assistance. Economic assistance, including Defense Support, PL 480, and the possible financing of sound loan projects under the Development Loan Fund, should continue as necessary in order to make possible the maintenance of an appropriate Greek defense position as well as to continue a modest rate of economic growth. Technical assistance emphasis should continue in the fields of agricultural and industrial productivity and marketing. The Greek Government should also continue to be encouraged to formulate a sound, long-range, economic development program.

9. Military Assistance. The U.S. is reviewing the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Greece and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Greek armed forces, of appropriately revising Greek force levels in the light of NATO requirements. This subject is under continuing review in the NATO annual review process. Nevertheless Greece should be encouraged to continue to increase its share of the total military budget gradually, looking toward a greater degree of military self-sufficiency, especially as the country’s gross national product grows. It must be recognized, however, that no Greek Government is likely to reduce significantly its economic development program in order to increase defense expenditures. Further, it should be noted that Greek opposition leaders have announced their intention to press for a reduction in Greek military spending.

10. Military Effectiveness. NATO military guidance and U.S. military judgments eventually may alter the size and composition of the Greek armed forces somewhat in favor of a smaller and more efficient force. Whether or not these force levels are reduced, U.S. efforts should be directed toward improving their effectiveness. It should be made clear in this connection that the U.S. military assistance program is based on the assumption that the Greeks will try to correct their own military weaknesses and deficiencies. Critical comments on these points may be required from time to time, but U.S. officials should miss no opportunity to commend Greek officials on progress towards improving the effectiveness of their armed forces.

11. Information and Cultural. U.S. information and cultural programs should seek to convince the Greek people that Greece’s alliance with the West represents the best means of maintaining political and economic independence. The programs should seek to promote confidence in the U.S. and in NATO by publicizing their military and economic strength and promote understanding of special aspects of U.S. policy of particular interest to Greece. The programs should seek to promote confidence in American leadership by publicizing U.S. achievements in scientific, cultural and social fields. The programs should emphasize the mutuality of Greek-American security interests and political ideals and give recognition to American heritage of Greek culture. At the same time, in view of the increasing respectability of the Soviets in Greece, the programs should publicize events and writings which expose Soviet strategy and those which emphasize the dangers inherent in the communist economic, political and cultural overtures designed to maneuver the country toward neutralism. The principal effort should be directed to Greek media officials and opinion-molders in the political, military, professional and educational fields, who are in turn capable of reaching large segments of the population.

12. Attitudes Toward U.S. Personnel Overseas. The Operations Coordinating Board has given particular attention over the past several years to ways and means of improving foreign attitudes toward U.S. personnel overseas. This involves both the positive actions which can be taken to improve these relationships as well as the removal of sources of friction and difficulties. The special report prepared by the Board, “United States Employees Overseas: An Inter-Agency Report,” dated April 1958,³ is an effort to provide on an over-all governmental basis a common approach and guidance in this field. All supervisory employees in the field should familiarize themselves with the substance of this report and all U.S. personnel should know the substance of the Conclusions and Recommendations set forth in Section V, Volume I. Attention is directed to the President’s remarks in the Foreword of the report.

13. Internal Security. The Soviet Bloc has carried on an offensive on diplomatic, trade and cultural fronts aimed at weakening Greek ties with the West, increasing popular support for front parties in Greece and fostering growth of a climate in which legalization of the outlawed Communist Party could be achieved. This effort is against a record of six years of political stability and reasonable economic growth. The Communist-front EDA won increased political power and prestige in the May 1958 elections as its number of seats in Parliament increased from 18 to 78. Thus, although the Greek Government remains firmly anti-Communist, EDA and the political groups which follow the Communist line have become a political force to be reckoned with.

14. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE), which has been illegal since 1947, has been following a policy of active participation in non-Communist and even non-leftist groups in the achievements of its aims. Greek security agencies have noted a significant decline in the fear of communism among the population and a general relaxation of vigilance even by public authorities.

15. As a result of this relaxation and “in the interest of economy”, the Gendarmerie was reduced, in August 1956, from 15,670 to 13,300 and the City Police was reduced from 6,252 to 5,127. The Gendarmerie has an authorized peacetime force of 21,986 which could be increased to 23,356 in the event of international strife or hostilities. The City Police has an authorized strength of 8,573. These Greek security forces are moderately efficient, but there is room for improvement along the lines envisaged by the police training program.

16. In addition to these forces, there is a para-military force (TEA) of 83,530 men, loosely organized into 104 national defense battalions under the supervision of the Greek National Army. It has the mission of providing security to the local rural population and of contributing raw intelligence. One third of the battalions are located close to the northern borders, another third are near army concentrations in rear areas and the remainder are scattered throughout communications zones and in the islands.

17. Given the relatively favorable internal security situation in Greece it would seem that a modest U.S. internal security program should be adequate. Such a program should devote particular attention to border control (in view of the fact that nearly all of Greece’s lengthy land frontiers adjoin countries with Communist governments) and to the urban and industrial areas where local Communist organizations are strongest.

B. Selected U.S. Arrangements⁴ With or Pertaining to Greece

18. U.S. Involvements Which May Imply Military Security Guarantees.

a. NATO. In accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States is committed to regard an armed attack against Greece as an attack against itself and to take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security” of Greece.

b. Middle East Resolution. The United States by a Joint Resolution on the Middle East, signed by the President on March 9, 1957, announced its determination to assist Middle Eastern nations to maintain their independence. The resolution declared that the U.S. is prepared to commit its military force, on the determination of the President, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism whenever a victim requests such aid.

19. Other Arrangements.

a. Military and Economic Assistance. The basic agreement concerning all U.S. aid to Greece is that signed on June 20, 1947.⁵ Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, further agreements were signed on February 7, 1952 to bring Greece under MDAP.⁶

b. Joint Use of Facilities. A U.S.-Greek Agreement was signed in Athens on October 12, 1953⁷ providing for the improvement and use of certain air and naval facilities in Greece, in implementation of Article 3 of the NATO Treaty.

c. Status of Forces. The basic military assistance agreement of June 20, 1947 provided complete immunity for personnel of the military mission. This immunity was extended to other U.S. military personnel by subsequent agreements. Status was modified by the Status of Forces Agreement of September 7, 1956,⁸ based upon the Netherlands formula; however, JUSMAG retains its earlier privilege.

d. Atomic Energy. Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy was signed August 4, 1955.⁹ The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission has officially informed the Greek Government that the U.S. is extending a $350,000 grant to help pay for a one megawatt “swimming pool”-type research reactor, to be located in Athens and operated by the University of Athens. It is expected to be in operation by January 1959.

e. Voice of America Facilities. A ten year agreement for continued operation of Salonika Relay Base and Rhodes USCGS Courier broadcasting station concluded with Greek Government November 28, 1955, also provides for shifting of faculties now on Board the Courier to a land-based installation with the consent and cooperation of the Greek authorities. However, the proviso as regards transfer of USCGS Courier faculties to a land installation is inoperative due to Greek refusal, growing out of sensitivities regarding the Arab states, to permit a land-based installation intended for use in broadcasting to the Near and Middle East. The Greek Government, however, has agreed to negotiate a new base site which will permit greatly increased broadcasting power toward the Balkans in exchange for all of the Salonika Relay Base complex except certain shortwave transmitter equipment. USIA is including .funds for this purpose in its budget request for FY 1959.

II. Current and Projected Programs and Courses of Action

Individual action items when extracted from this Plan may be downgraded to the appropriate security classification.

A. Political

20. Seek to strengthen the conviction of the Greek leaders and the public that Greek interests lie with NATO, keeping them aware of the dangers of possible collaboration with the Soviet Bloc.

Assigned to: State

Support:USIA

Target Date: Continuing

21. Cooperate with Greece as feasible in the advancement of the principles of the American Doctrine, taking into account Greek sensitivities regarding their relations with the Arab states. Utilize on a moderate basis, and without overstimulating Greek aspirations, visits between Greek officials and officials of Balkan Pact and Middle Eastern countries as a means of advancing U.S. objectives in those countries.

Assigned to: State

Target Date: Continuing

22. In encouraging Greece to keep the Balkan Pact among Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia in existence, the United States should emphasize its potential future value but should proceed cautiously and avoid heavy pressure which might be counterproductive in view of strained Greek relations with Turkey, and the significant improvement of Greek relations with Yugoslavia.

Assigned to: State

Target Date: Continuing

23. Keep under review our policy of encouraging the Greek Government to resist continuing Soviet and Greek Communist efforts to obtain legalization of the Greek Communist Party (KKE).

Assigned to: State

Target Date: Continuing

24. Hold to a minimum consistent with the program requirements the number of U.S. citizens employed by the U.S. Government in Greece; insure that newly assigned U.S. personnel receive orientation and that their dependents receive appropriate indoctrination in the field; and periodically remind them that they represent the United States abroad and are expected to maintain a high standard of personal conduct and of respect for local laws and customs.

Assigned to: All Agencies

Target Date: Continuing

25. Continue to support those elements in Greek labor which contribute to the strengthening of the Greek General Confederation of Labor (GSEE) in its anti-Communist efforts. Encourage better cooperation between the GSEE and the Greek Government in an effort to prevent repetition of the early 1957 wave of strikes.¹⁰

Assigned to: State, ICA

Support:USIA

Target Date: Continuing

B. Military

26. Continue to implement the military assistance program for Greece. The FY 1958 program provides additional F–84F aircraft, M–47 tanks, and maintenance and training support. The proposed FY 1959 program provides modernization, maintenance, and training support; major items of equipment include helicopters, heavy special-purpose vehicles, artillery, two destroyers (loan) and Air Force ground handling equipment and communications and electronics equipment. (Financial information appears in attached MSP Pipeline Analysis.)

Assigned to: Defense

Target Date: Continuing

27. Continue efforts to encourage Greece to increase its share of the military budget, including assumption of costs for maintenance and effective use of military end-item assistance, recognizing the political problem involved for the Greek Government of also maintaining emphasis on economic development.

Assigned to: State, Defense, ICA

Target Date: Continuing

28. Continue efforts through the medium of the NATO annual review and visits of JUSMAG officers to elements of the Greek armed forces, to implement U.S. military recommendations designed to stimulate Greek correction of military weaknesses and deficiencies, bearing in mind the guidance on this matter contained in paragraph 10.

Assigned to: Defense

Target Date: Continuing

29. Continue to review the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Greece and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Greek armed forces, appropriately revise Greek force levels in the light of NATO requirements.

Assigned to: Defense

Target Date: Continuing

C. Economic

30. Implement, as appropriate, the defense support program designed to maintain, and if possible, enhance Greece’s current contribution to its military effort. (Financing is shown in the attached MSP Pipeline Analysis.)

Assigned to:ICA

Target Date: Continuing

31. Implement PL 480 program for Greece in FY 1958 amounting to $19.8 million (export market value), designed to provide local currency for U.S. uses in Greece, for lending to Greek and U.S. private enterprises in Greece, and for support of the Greek development program.

Assigned to:ICA, State

Target Date: Continuing

32. Consider requests by Greece for assistance which meet the criteria of the Development Loan Fund.

Assigned to:ICA (DLF)

Target Date: Continuing

33. Continue to implement the Technical Cooperation program (see Pipeline Analysis), with emphasis on agricultural and industrial productivity and marketing.

Assigned to:ICA

Target Date: Continuing

34. Continue informal consultations with Greek economic ministries on their economic and financial policies, encouraging them to continue policies designed to maintain financial stability and reasonable economic growth.

Assigned to:ICA, State

Support:USIA

Target Date: Continuing

35. Encourage the Greek business and political community to recognize the importance of collaboration with private foreign capital and managerial talent, giving special attention to the need for local capital participation. Consider qualified American investments in Greece under the Investment Guaranty Program.

Assigned to:ICA, State

Support: Commerce (W), USIA

Target Date: Continuing

36. Encourage the development of appropriate national programs in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, including as appropriate, support for suitable research and training programs in the application of atomic energy to agriculture, medicine, industry and science.

Assigned to:AEC

Support: State, ICA

Target Date: Continuing

37. Encourage the Greek Government and business community to continue efforts to improve tourist facilities in Greece, particularly better hotel facilities and improved highways. Consider requests for appropriate assistance in these efforts.

Assigned to: State, ICA

Target Date: Continuing

D. Information and Cultural

38. Continue information programs which include (1) operation of libraries and library programs; (2) assistance to the Greek Government in the establishment of Greek lending libraries; (3) distribution of books, periodicals, films and wireless file material; (4) production of periodicals, pamphlets and unattributed newsreel footage; (5) support of VOA and production of radio programs for VOA and local use; and (6) publication of selected American books by Greek publishers. In this connection, develop extensive personal contacts with Greek media representatives at all levels to facilitate placement and development of material favorable to U.S. objectives.

Assigned to:USIA

Support: State

Target Date: Continuing

39. Continue efforts to stimulate publicity for the Technical Cooperation, economic assistance and military aid programs for the purpose of creating a better understanding of their aims and benefits.

Assigned to:USIA

Support:ICA, Defense

Target Date: Continuing

40. Strengthen activities which will contribute to better relations between the U.S. military group and the Greek community.

Assigned to:USIA, Defense

Target Date: Continuing

41. Cooperate with Athens and Salonika Universities in the creation of curricula to include more subjects pertaining to U.S. history, literature, etc.

Assigned to:USIA, State

Target Date: Continuing

42. Strengthen existing cultural ties and counter the increasing efforts of the Soviets in this field by arranging for and supporting visits of American musicians, writers, artists and others through the President’s Special International Program.

Assigned to: State, USIA

Target Date: Continuing

43. Stimulate activities to maintain ties with those Greeks who have studied or visited in U.S.

Assigned to:USIA

Support: State, Defense, ICA

Target Date: Continuing

44. Proceed as feasible with the establishment of a Greek-American cultural center financed in part from PL 480 funds when available, and in part by private contributions.

Assigned to: State, USIA

Target Date: Continuing

45. Continue the Exchange of Persons program under PL 402 with emphasis on political, educational and cultural leaders.

Assigned to: State, USIA

Target Date: Continuing

46. Continue to support U.S. educational institutions in Greece through PL 480 and Fulbright programs.

Assigned to: State, USIA

Target Date: Continuing

E. Internal Security

47. Proceed with a modest Technical Assistance Program in Civil Police Administration. This assistance as presently planned includes furnishing police advisers in such fields as administration and organization, training, laboratory and scientific investigation, communications, traffic control and other police matters, as well as furnishing a limited amount of commodity assistance. Be prepared upon request of the Greek Government to provide participant training in the United States or third countries for police officials.

Assigned to: ICA

Target Date: Continuing

48. Within available funds, in conformity with mutual security policy concerning the supply of military consumables, program and deliver uniforms and items of individual equipment, other than arms, to the Greek National Army, with the understanding that Home Defense Forces (among other internal security forces) are to be eligible to obtain uniforms and items of individual equipment thus rendered surplus to the army.

Assigned to: Defense

Target Date: Continuing

Note: Latest National Intelligence Estimate is:

NIE 32–56, The Outlook for Greece, June 26, 1956.¹¹

0. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Greece. Secret. A title page, covering memorandum, statement of purpose and use, and an MSP pipeline analysis are not printed. In the undated covering memorandum, Elmer Staats noted that the Board revised and concurred in the Operations Plan for Greece at its May 14 meeting, and that the plan superseded the December 11, 1957, Operations Plan for Greece and a draft dated May 6. A copy of the December 11, 1957, Operations Plan is ibid. Destruction of the May 6 draft was authorized and no copy was found.
1. For text of the Treaty of Bled, signed August 9, 1954, by Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, see RIIA, Documents on International Affairs, 1954, pp. 197–200.
2. See footnote 8, Document 239.
3. A copy of this report, which outlined legal, personal, and community relations problems facing U.S. personnel overseas, is in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Overseas Personnel.
4. See State Department publication Treaties in Force for additional arrangements. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. For text, see 61 Stat. 2907.
6. For text, see 3 UST 4569.
7. For text, see 4 UST 2189.
8. For text, see 7 UST 2555.
9. For text, see 6 UST 2635.
10. Apparently a reference to a series of localized general strikes which the GSEE called in May and June 1957 in protest against the labor policies of the Karamanlis government. The strikes began in Athens on May 28, 1957, with a 24-hour general strike and were gradually extended throughout the country.
11. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXIV, pp. 566–567.