Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

221. Despatch From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State⁰

No. 612

Helsinki, March 25, 1960.

REF

• Embdes 419, December 21, 1959—“Assessment of Finnish-Soviet Relations”¹

SUBJECT

• Domestic Factors Undermining Finland’s Power to Resist Soviet Domination

As a supplement to the despatch cited above, the attached report defines and analyzes the principal internal factors that are bringing about a basic change in Finnish conditions which are affecting the ability of the country to preserve its independence. The substance of the report and its successive drafts were intensively discussed by substantive officers of the Embassy, and the Chief of the Political Section has drafted the final report. The document is additional evidence of the need for countering the unfavorable trend for American interests in Finland which was suggested in the Embassy’s “Proposed U.S. Program for Finland”. Embdes 497, February 2, 1960,² to which the Department is giving careful and urgent attention.

E.O. Sessions

Enclosure³

Summary

The events of recent years clearly demonstrate that there is developing in Finland a political and psychological transformation which, if it continues, will ultimately lead to Soviet satellite status for Finland. The most crucial characteristics of this transformation are (1) the persistent rise in already substantial Communist strength and influence and (2) the increasing prevalence of a fatalistic concept of Fenno-Soviet relations. These are not transitory, superficial trends that can readily be reversed or eliminated. Behind them are at least three basic and interrelated influences: (1) the breakdown of cooperation between and the internal splintering of the Social Democrats and Agrarians, (2) the ascendancy of President Kekkonen, and (3) a deterioration of confidence in the western counterpoise to the USSR.

Loss of Finland’s independence does not appear imminent, but the country’s freedom of action, already severely limited by external geopolitical conditions beyond its control, is threatened with further circumscription by the continuous operation of these debilitating internal influences. The longer they persist as major determinants of Finland’s course the easier it will be for the Soviet Union to manipulate Finnish affairs and the less capability Finland will have to respond effectively in defense of at least its internal sovereignty. At present there is a strong tendency to belittle the danger, wish it away, accept it as inescapable, or simply not to recognize it, while those who see it and feel something can be done have so far demonstrated insufficient will or ability to reverse the trend.

Disintegration of Democratic Cohesion

Intense infighting among non-Communist elements is not foreign to Finland, but there is no postwar precedent for the extent and bitterness of the current struggles among the Agrarians and Socialists who once formed the nucleus of democratic strength in Finland. Nor have the possible consequences of domestic political conflict been so threatening to the nation as a whole. Spreading throughout the society—the Parliament, the trade unions, and numerous other significant institutions—conflict is undermining the cohesion of the country’s democratic majority.

Termination of any real semblance of the Social Democratic-Agrarian collaboration by mid-1957 removed the foundation for the modicum of political stability achieved in Finland after ejection of the Communists from the Finnish Government in 1948. Conflict between these two groups has grown in bitterness over the past three years, thus rendering prospects of durable reconciliation less and less likely, while no viable alternative base for reconstructed democratic strength yet appears in the offing.

Simultaneously, schisms within both Social Democratic and Agrarian ranks are reducing the possibilities that revived Social Democratic-Agrarian collaboration—even if achievable—could once again become an adequate basis for minimum political stability. The emergence of the Social Democratic Opposition (TPSL) and the Small Peasants Party as independent political organizations and the depth of their disputes with their parent parties have markedly reduced the influence a revived combination of regular Social Democrats and Agrarians could be expected to wield. Moreover, the Agrarian Party is plagued by an internal conflict between supporters and opponents of President Kekkonen.

Inevitably, cabinet crises have tended to become more frequent and prolonged; governments have become largely incapable of performing other than caretaker tasks. A portion of the electorate—particularly adherents of the disputing Social Democratic and Agrarian Parties—has been apathetic and disillusioned, some taking refuge in withdrawal from concern for political affairs.

Emergence of the Communist-controlled Finnish People’s Democratic League (SKDL) as the largest parliamentary group in the 1958 elections is principally attributable to the combined effect of the faithful turnout of SKDL supporters, the split in the Socialist vote, and the abstention of numerous disillusioned non-Communist voters. There is every likelihood that, in addition to enjoying these same advantages in the next elections, the Communists will benefit further from the breach that has appeared in Agrarian ranks with the foundation of the Small Peasants Party.

In the trade union movement the Communists have gained markedly in influence as a consequence of the Social Democratic split. As their dispute with the regular Socialists has solidified, the trade union supporters of the TPSL have progressively increased their collaboration with the Communists until it now includes the Executive Committee of the Finnish Confederation of Trade Unions (SAK). For the present, control of SAK has shifted from the regular Social Democratic faction to a coalition of TPSL supporters and the Communists. Similar developments are taking place in other important local and national organizations such as the cooperatives, youth groups, and sport associations.

Growth of Communist influence throughout the society has encouraged a tendency among certain non-Communists to advocate abandonment of the 12-year old policy of isolating the Communists from Cabinet positions. On abstract idealistic grounds, as well as on alleged practical grounds, it is argued that since the Communists represent such a large portion of a democratic community, they can no longer be ignored. There is some inclination to believe that Communist participation in the Cabinet should be tried as a means of achieving effective stable government. Also playing a role is anxiety over possible serious Soviet reaction to further prolongation of Communist isolation from the Cabinet. An argument with perhaps greater appeal is that governmental responsibility would severely limit the Communists’ freedom of action and inevitably lead to the discredit of the Communists and their policies and, thus, to their decline. Such argumentation was strong in two lengthy government crises of 1958; only because of the opposition of a portion of the Agrarian Party was Communist participation in the Cabinet avoided. That the TPSL and a portion of the Agrarian Party have supported the idea of experimentation with Communist participation in the Cabinet is one of the clearest demonstrations of the political deterioration that has occurred. In the decade prior to 1958 the one issue on which all democratic elements were united was isolation of the Communists.

Kekkonen’s Ascendancy

President Kekkonen’s ascendancy, combined with the effects of democratic disunity, has altered the nature of the Finnish Presidency and of Finland’s relationship to the USSR in a manner potentially dangerous to the country’s continued independence.

In Kekkonen’s hands, the Presidency has become an effective partisan instrument thanks to the President’s own skill and to the debilitation of his opponents through incessant conflict among themselves. When elected, Kekkonen was the able, aggressive, and firmly entrenched leader of the Agrarian Party. Breaking with the tradition of a non-partisan Presidency, he proceeded to exercise his new powers by the only method familiar to him—i.e., as a party leader. He unhesitatingly uses his office to advance his own ideas and interests and those of his Agrarian adherents. By thus making himself the focus of bitter controversy, Kekkonen lacks the prestige and the unifying authority which are ordinarily associated with the Finnish Presidency and which have been important elements in Finnish strength in the past.

Benefitting from national disunity, to which he has contributed, Kekkonen has been able to ensure that his views on Fenno-Soviet affairs prevail. He and his countrymen are in agreement that the country’s situation demands the smoothest possible relations with Russia. Differences have arisen because Kekkonen has breached the previously accepted limits of the policy of accommodation by making sacrifices in excess of those ordinarily associated with neutrality and the preservation of internal sovereignty. Due to the general opinion that a correct attitude toward the USSR is necessary, public criticism of Kekkonen’s management of Fenno-Soviet affairs can readily be and is misconstrued as opposition to amicable relations with the Soviet Union. Thus, effective open debate of the President’s policy—even if cautious and taking full account of the realities of Finland’s sensitive position—is practically precluded. Kekkonen makes full use of his resultant freedom of action, while much of the public, subjected to constant and unrebutted conditioning, remains unappraised [unapprised?] of the hazards involved in his policy. In consequence, Finland is drifting away from a course toward neutrality to one which, in effect, grants the Soviet Union—and encourages the Soviet Union to exercise—an increasingly influential voice in Finnish affairs.

Kekkonen, of course, is not a free agent. His scope of action is severely circumscribed by his country’s unfavorable geo-political position. Furthermore, he cannot be held responsible for such factors as the Socialist split, for the Soviet Union’s new-found aggressiveness and self-confidence, or for the leverage the USSR enjoys through Finland’s heavy dependence on trade with the Soviet Union and through the Treaties of Peace and Fenno-Soviet Mutual Assistance.

While Kekkonen may be guilty of over-confidence in his own ability to handle the Russians, there is no reason to doubt he is motivated by devotion to Finland’s welfare. Even though he may well be aware of the inherent dangers involved, he is apparently convinced that there is no practical alternative to his course. His avowed and not unreasonable objective is to create conditions in which the USSR has enough confidence in the permanency and determination of Finland’s neutrality to allow the Finns to pursue an independent, unmolested existence. Kekkonen is undoubtedly encouraged in the belief that this objective is achievable by the fact that his Agrarian Government enjoys good repute in Moscow and has had more freedom of action than its predecessors. Moreover, it cannot be incontrovertibly demonstrated that Finland would be more secure today if Kekkonen had followed another line.

Regardless of Kekkonen’s motivations, however, the practical effect of his actions has been erosion of (1) the substance of independence, (2) the capacity to preserve it, and (3) Soviet willingness to respect it.

Kekkonen’s domination of Finland’s course is likely to be perpetuated for almost a decade unless there occurs a significant, and as yet unanticipated, change in the Finnish political situation. There is a strong possibility Kekkonen will be re-elected for a 6-year term in 1962 and, in any event, continuation of his influence for some time to come appears assured through gradual occupation of high public office by Kekkonen adherents.

Defeatism

The President with his countrymen shares a deeply felt and growing sense of isolation. This outlook is, of course, not new to Finland; political geography has made of Finland an outpost throughout its history. It is doubtful, however, that the conviction that Finland stands quite alone and helpless has been as acute since World War II as it is at present. The groundwork for this attitude was laid by the failure of western aid to materialize in meaningful quantity during the Winter War, the subsequent disaster experienced in military collaboration with Nazi Germany, postwar Soviet entrenchment well inside Central Europe, and the major shift in the balance of power brought about by the dramatic advance in Soviet military capability.

Despite bitter experience and the reality of Finland’s exposed and vulnerable situation, there was a period of optimism when Finland appeared to be progressing toward generally accepted status as an independent neutral nation. A turning point came about 1956 with the shattering of illusions by the Hungarian revolution which made a deep impression in Finland and shook confidence in the effectiveness of the western counterpoise to Soviet power. Coincidentally the weakening in Finland’s internal strength and powers of resistance to Soviet domination had reached a critical stage. The result has been an increasing inclination to adopt the fatalistic view that Finland has no real alternative to its present course which amounts to piecemeal surrender to the USSR. As the decay of resistance progresses it tends to dull concern about the consequences of Kekkonen’s actions, bitter internal conflict, economic ties with the USSR, disillusionment of the electorate, and the rise in Communist influence and strength. A clear example of how acceptance of the situation affects Finnish thinking is provided by the inclination in the economic community to lose sight of the political implications of trade with the USSR and to be motivated solely by the attractiveness of the ready market, long-term contracts, and high prices offered by the Soviet Union.

Positive Factors

While deep-seated democratic disunity, Kekkonen’s views, and the pervading sense of isolation have made themselves felt to the detriment of the nation’s independence, Finland is not on the verge of slipping into satellite status. To the harmful political and psychological transformation developing in Finland there is substantial, if disorganized, resistance. At present the positive factors supporting Finnish independence do not outweigh those creating the adverse trend described, but the country is still capable of taking some positive measures despite the known risk of Soviet displeasure. Kekkonen himself, even at the height of the 1958 crisis, declared that there can be no question of being “ideologically neutral” toward Finland’s Communists. Opposition to Communist participation in the Cabinet, although weakened, remains effective. The Social Democrats are reacting energetically to the Communist-Skogist move to control the trade union movement. Only a week after Mikoyan, during a late 1959 visit to Helsinki, stated that Finland has no need for a military establishment, spokesmen for all the non-Communist parties advocated an increase in the defense budget (which available information indicates has been obtained). It is possible that the recent invitation to President Eisenhower reflects an awareness of a need to strengthen Finland’s western ties. The Finnish Government has held the line against Soviet pressures for a substantially increased share of Finland’s foreign trade. Although it is probable the Finns would retreat should the Russians ultimately oppose the move, Finland is at least moving cautiously ahead with negotiations to associate with the EFTA.

Conclusion

The basic internal political and psychological weaknesses remain. The Finns have yet to be tested by another crisis in their relations with the USSR comparable to that of 1958, but the preponderance of evidence indicates that they are even less capable of a firm stand than they were 18 months ago. For the present, the deteriorating trend in Finland’s ability and determination to resist will continue unless the non-Communists can moderate their disputes and achieve some semblance of unity on basic issues, Kekkonen can be convinced of the existence of practical and desirable alternatives to his present policies, and the Finns gain greater confidence in the possibilities for preserving their independence.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/3–2560. Secret.
1. See footnote 1, Document 216.
2. Document 216.
3. Drafted by Nelson.