158. Operations Coordinating Board Report0


I. Objectives and General Policy Directives

1. Short-Term Objectives

An independent Yugoslavia outside the Soviet bloc, capable of withstanding Soviet political and economic pressures, not actively engaged in furthering Soviet Communist imperialism, and with a potential for weakening the monolithic front and internal cohesiveness of the Soviet bloc.
Without jeopardizing the above objectives, reorientation of the Tito regime in the direction of political and economic liberalization and closer Yugoslav ties with the West in general and Western Europe in particular.

2. Long-Term Objective. Eventual fulfillment of the right of the Yugoslav people to live under a government of their own choosing, which maintains peaceful and stable relations with neighboring states, and participates fully in the Free World community.

U.S. Interest in Yugoslavia

3. The Tito–Kremlin break of 1948 and Yugoslavia’s position outside the Soviet bloc since then have served U.S. interests through the continued denial to the USSR of important strategic positions and other assets, and through the effects, both within and outside the Soviet bloc, of Yugoslav political independence and economic progress in the face of Soviet pressure.

4. U.S. policy in support of the maintenance of Yugoslavia’s independence constitutes an integral part of the broader U.S. policy which has as its objective the eventual attainment of complete national independence by all of the Soviet-dominated nations in Eastern Europe. The example of Yugoslavia, which has successfully maintained its independence of Soviet domination, stands as a constant reminder to the [Page 417] dominated regimes and serves as a pressure point both on the leaders of these regimes and on the leadership of the USSR. It is in the U.S. interest to take advantage of Yugoslavia’s potential influence in Eastern Europe and in uncommitted and newly-emerging countries, insofar as such influence tends to advance U.S. objectives.

U.S. Economic Assistance to Yugoslavia

5. The United States will continue to furnish economic and technical assistance to Yugoslavia in the minimum amounts needed for either or both of the following primary purposes:

To encourage Yugoslavia to pursue policies which will contribute to the attainment of U.S. objectives.
To assist Yugoslavia in avoiding undue economic dependence on the Soviet bloc.

To the extent possible without prejudicing the above primary purposes, such assistance should also attempt to influence Yugoslavia to give greater play to free economic forces within Yugoslavia.

U.S. Attitude Toward Tito Regime

6. The United States should avoid actions which, on the one hand, could be interpreted as unreserved endorsement of the Tito regime, or which, on the other hand, would encourage attempts to overthrow that regime by violence.

7. We should expect that, as a neutral nation, and as a Communist country, Yugoslavia occasionally may undertake actions and make statements which the United States cannot approve. We should not, however, be unduly irritated at this, or allow it to influence our judgment, as long as such actions do not undermine Yugoslav freedom of action vis-à-vis the bloc or otherwise jeopardize major U.S. foreign policy objectives. Moreover, we should evaluate Yugoslav statements within the context of Yugoslavia’s ideological and geographic positions.

II. Operational Guidance

Support for Yugoslav Independence

8. Yugoslavia continues to demonstrate the will to maintain its independence outside the Soviet bloc, despite Soviet pressures and blandishments. Its economy is developing favorably and its internal political situation appears stable. Nonetheless, as a small, still underdeveloped country, bordered on three sides by Soviet bloc countries, and viewed as a threat to bloc unity by Sino-Soviet leaders, it will continue to need economic and political support from the United States to help assure its independence.

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9. Make entirely clear, on a continuing basis, unflagging U.S. interest in Yugoslav independence through such means as high level visits in both directions, the provision of economic assistance, and effective U.S. diplomatic representation in Belgrade.

10. Continue to encourage Yugoslav trade with the United States and with other countries of the Free World and to provide such economic assistance as may be necessary in order to enable Yugoslavia to avoid undue economic dependence on the Soviet bloc.

11. Continue to permit the Yugoslavs to purchase U.S. military equipment and supplies as may be needed to avoid dependence on the Soviet bloc, as long as satisfactory U.S.-Yugoslav political relations continue to exist, also to train limited numbers of Yugoslav military personnel on grant or reimbursable basis.

12. [11 lines of source text and footnote (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

Economic Assistance

13. As noted in paragraph 8, while Yugoslavia’s economic position has improved, it continues to need U.S. economic assistance and cooperation. Primarily this assistance is intended to strengthen the basis of Yugoslavia’s independence, but it is also intended to contribute to a level of economic progress in Yugoslavia sufficient to illustrate in pragmatic terms to the other countries of Eastern Europe the benefits of Yugoslavia’s independent policy and associations with the West.


14. Consider Yugoslavia’s requests for assistance from U.S. lending institutions in accordance with relevant U.S. loan policy and the criteria set forth in paragraph 5 of this paper, giving special emphasis to those projects which will serve to tie Yugoslavia more closely to the economy of the Western Community.

15. Continue Title I PL 480 sales to Yugoslavia.

16. Continue the Title III PL 480 program in support of the American voluntary organizations in Yugoslavia.

17. Continue a Technical Cooperation Program1 for Yugoslavia since this not only will ultimately strengthen the Yugoslav economy but also is a most effective means of exposing influential Yugoslavs to Western equipment and technology and to the liberalizing influence of close working contact with Western colleagues.

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Utilization of Yugoslavia’s Potential as a Divisive Influence on Soviet-Bloc Solidarity and as a Counter to Bloc Influence in Uncommitted Countries

18. The Soviet Union and Communist China have renewed their efforts to nullify the influence of Yugoslav “revisionism” within the bloc since the turbulent events in Poland and Hungary in 1956 and they have undoubtedly met with considerable success. They also have attempted to counter the influence of Yugoslavia in the uncommitted and newly emerging nations. It is in the U.S. interest that Yugoslavia continue to exert a divisive ideological influence on the bloc and afford the uncommitted countries beneficial advice on the dangers of becoming overly reliant on the Soviet Union. At the same time, Yugoslavia’s influence in the uncommitted areas poses certain problems for the United States since Yugoslavia represents a Communist economic and political system, albeit a revisionist one.


19. Take advantage of appropriate opportunities discreetly to direct attention to Yugoslavia’s successful struggle for independence and to the beneficial results which have accrued from it.

20. Take advantage of appropriate opportunities to encourage the Government of Yugoslavia to influence adjoining Soviet-dominated countries to develop a more independent position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

21. Facilitate Yugoslavia’s efforts to remain in the public eye by such steps as high level visits to and from Yugoslavia and occasional support for Yugoslav candidates for prestige offices in international organizations.

22. Avoid a hostile or negative attitude toward Yugoslav representatives in Latin America and the uncommitted and newly emerging nations of Asia and Africa. Conduct ourselves toward such representatives in such a manner as to distinguish clearly between them and Soviet bloc representatives and to indicate that Yugoslavia, as an independent country, enjoys the respect and support of the United States. The United States should be prepared to accept a measure of Yugoslav economic and political influence in these areas, while remaining alert for any indication that Yugoslavia is actively encouraging the adoption of internal policies of a Communist orientation, particularly in Latin America, or systematically undermining U.S. interests in these areas.

Encouragement of Liberalization in Yugoslavia

23. Since Yugoslavia left the Soviet bloc many of the harsher aspects of Communist control have disappeared and a decentralized economic system has been established in which there are elements of a competitive-type market economy. Yugoslavia remains a one-party Communist [Page 420] state, however, and continuous efforts are made to orient the people towards a Marxist ideology. Thus the United States is faced with the problem of seeking simultaneously to establish and maintain a smooth and friendly working relationship with the present Yugoslav Government and to bring about a gradual liberalization in the Yugoslav economic and political systems.


24. Continue to seek procedures, consistent with U.S. internal security for expediting the issuance of non-immigrant visas to Yugoslav nationals, including representatives of Yugoslav industrial and trading enterprises, whose travel to the United States will serve United States objectives in Yugoslavia.

25. Encourage visits to Yugoslavia by prominent Americans including both high-ranking Government officials and individuals well known in the fields of art, science, professions, etc.

26. Encourage the development of closer cultural ties between Yugoslavia and the nations of the Free World, particularly those of Western Europe.

27. Continue current exchange programs with Yugoslavia and endeavor to negotiate a Fulbright Agreement with Yugoslavia and appropriate arrangements with the Yugoslav Government to facilitate the use of local currencies for PL 4022 purposes to the extent such use is authorized by the Congress.

28. Cooperate with private organizations in the development and implementation of non-governmental exchange programs between the United States and Yugoslavia such as that now being conducted by the Ford Foundation.

29. Utilize cultural presentations under the President’s Special International Program,3 and otherwise, to depict American cultural achievements and thus bring to the Yugoslav people a clearer concept of the range of cultural development in the non-Communist West. In this connection, be prepared to facilitate the presentation in the United States of Yugoslav cultural attractions.

30. As noted in paragraph 17, continue a Technical Cooperation Program in Yugoslavia.

31. Continue an active but circumspect USIS program in Yugoslavia. Information activities should emphasize the peaceful and constructive [Page 421] nature of U.S. foreign policies and show them to be compatible with the best interests of the people of Yugoslavia; should acquaint the Yugoslavs with the facts of U.S. economic assistance in terms of stronger Yugoslav economy, and, to the extent possible and without antagonizing the regime, they should encourage liberalization of Yugoslav internal political and economic arrangements, and encourage the people in their pro-Western orientation.

32. Continue VOA shortwave broadcasts daily in Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian.

33. Maintain Informational Media Guaranty Program4 to simulate sale of American publications and distribution of American motion pictures and television films.

34. As appropriate, encourage the Free Europe Committee5 to continue to resist any attempts by Eastern European émigré leaders to associate Yugoslav exile groups with the Committee or the Assembly of Captive European Nations.6

Closer Integration of Yugoslavia in the Western Economic and Political Community

35. The strengthening of Yugoslavia’s ties with the West is an effective means of influencing its future orientation and of lessening its susceptibility to Soviet pressure.


36. Encourage the continuing expansion of U.S.-Yugoslav commercial relations, including support of U.S. business in promotion of U.S. exports to Yugoslavia.

37. Encourage the further development of tourism between the United States and Yugoslavia and between Western European countries and Yugoslavia.

38. Continue U.S. participation in Yugoslav trade fairs and provide U.S. trade missions as appropriate.

39. Encourage expanded Yugoslav participation in the work of the GATT and such international economic organizations as OEEC, or its successor organization, and the introduction of such economic reforms in Yugoslavia as may be necessary to facilitate such participation. The question of supporting full Yugoslav participation in the GATT or [Page 422] OEEC should be decided in the light of the circumstances existing at the time Yugoslavia applies for such status.

40. Consider Yugoslavia on the same basis as free European nations in evaluating Yugoslav requests for U.S. export licenses so long as Yugoslavia’s export control practices are generally consistent with the objectives of the multilateral trade controls imposed against the Soviet bloc.

41. Utilize the opportunities afforded by the recent understanding reached between Yugoslavia and the United States for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy7 to further contacts between Yugoslav and American scientists, to bring young Yugoslav scientists to the U.S. for training in non-sensitive fields and to export to Yugoslavia reasonable quantities of materials and equipment needed for basic research and instruction in the atomic energy field, for source material exploration and for medical and normal industrial and agricultural purposes.

42. While recognizing that the Balkan Pact is dormant, encourage the continuing existence of the Tripartite Balkan Secretariat and the development of close Yugoslav relations with Greece and Turkey in economic, cultural and related fields.

43. Encourage the resolution of differences between Yugoslavia and Italy and between Yugoslavia and Austria with a view to promoting mutual understanding and improved relations in political, economic and related fields of activity.

44. In general, encourage Western European countries to adopt policies parallel to those of the United States with respect to Yugoslavia.

Utilization of US-Owned Local Currency in Yugoslavia

45. The major portion of U.S.-owned dinar holdings is earmarked for economic development and social projects in Yugoslavia and its utilization no longer poses a serious problem. There are, however, large balances of dinars reserved for U.S. uses for which normal U.S. requirements are relatively limited. Moreover, the understanding reached with the Yugoslavs that we will take their balance of payments position into account in using these dinars is a major obstacle to the purchase of goods for export.


46. A continued effort should be made to find effective uses for the dinar balances reserved for U.S. uses keeping in mind, however, current [Page 423] policy of the Bureau of the Budget, which subjects all “U.S.-use” local currencies to the appropriation process.

U.S. Personnel

47. The acceptance of the presence of official U.S. personnel on foreign soil directly affects our capability to achieve our national security objectives. To this end, programs should be developed and improved to encourage and strengthen the natural inclination of the individual American to be a good representative of his country and to promote conduct and attitudes conducive to good will and mutual understanding.


48. The OCB has developed a comprehensive document which serves as a guidance for senior U.S. representatives overseas:

“Report on U.S. Personnel Overseas (July 1959), including a Statement of National Policy and a Presidential Letter as well as a reprint of the Conclusions and Recommendations of a 1958 report.”8

49. Hold the number of U.S. official personnel in Yugoslavia to a strict minimum consistent with sound implementation of essential programs.

Note: The following NIE’s are applicable to Yugoslavia:

  • NIE 31–57 Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects—11 June 1957.9
  • NIE 11–4–59 Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1959–1964—9 February 1960 (See para. 108).
  • NIE 12–59 Political Stability in the European Satellites—11 August 1959 (See para. 26).
  • NIE 12.6–58 The Outlook in Poland—16 September 1958 (See paragraphs 51 and 52).10

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Annex A


50. A State Department exchange program has been operating in Yugoslavia since fiscal year 1958. This program is being gradually enlarged. In fiscal year 1959 it consisted of 22 grants under PL 402 at a cost of $60,077. All of these grants were awarded to Yugoslavs. The program for the current fiscal year (1960) consists of 29 leader and specialist grants under PL 402 at a cost of $118 thousand. 28 of these are for foreign grantees and one is for an American. The fiscal year 1961 budget as presented to Congress provides for 92 grants of which 51 are under PL 584 at a cost of $175 thousand in foreign currency and $68,900 in PL 402 dollar support. The implementation of this portion of the program will depend to a large extent upon the successful completion of negotiations currently being conducted for a Fulbright Agreement between Yugoslavia and the United States. There are 41 additional grants foreseen for fiscal year 1961 under PL 402 at a cost of $77,600 in appropriated dollar funds and $50 thousand in PL 480 foreign currency. These are for leaders and specialists under the regular exchange program as it now exists. Also included in the request to Congress are $75,000 in PL 480 foreign currency for the possible establishment of academic chairs and work shops in Yugoslavia, expendable over three years, and $9,800 for farm youth and teenager projects. The total program cost for FY 1961 is estimated at $495,700.

51. In the field of private exchanges the Ford Foundation is quite active and for two years now has been bringing over influential political and academic figures for visits and study in the United States. A number of students and scholars continue to come under private sponsorship and the Eisenhower Fellowship11 has brought at least two Yugoslavs to this country. It is anticipated that further Yugoslav nuclear scientists will come to the United States for study under programs of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, and it is possible that the Institute of International Education and the Rockefeller Foundation will eventually initiate programs for bringing Yugoslav students and scholars to this country.


52. Headquarters are in Belgrade. A branch office is maintained in Zagreb and a reading room in Novi Sad.

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53. Personnel complement consists of 15 Americans and 92 Yugoslavs. Twelve Americans and 67 local employees are stationed in Belgrade, three Americans and 23 local employees are in Zagreb, and two local employees in Novi Sad. Total cost of the FY 1959 program in Yugoslavia was $569,763; FY 1960 estimated at $594,007; FY 1961 estimated at $661,343.

54. Information centers (libraries) are maintained in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Novi Sad, with an average monthly attendance of about 10,000, 12,000 and 4,000 respectively. Other cultural activities include lectures, book translations and presentations, English teaching, and promotion of attractions sponsored by the President’s Fund.

55. USIA administers the exchange of persons program in Yugoslavia.

56. Publications produced in Yugoslavia include Pregled (Review), a monthly magazine of 15,000 circulation, daily bulletins in Serbian and Croatian with circulations of 4,000 and 6,000 respectively, pamphlets and other periodical publications.

57. Documentary films are shown through Yugoslav organizations to a large audience.

58. VOA broadcasts emanating from the United States carry a daily program for a total of one hour and forty-five minutes in Serbo-Croatian and 15 minutes in Slovenian.

59. The Information Media Guarantee Program administered by USIA amounted to $850,000 for FY 1959 and FY 1960. It is expected to continue at about the same level in FY 1961.

60. Under PL 480 (i) $190,000 has been allocated through FY 1960 for book translations, with $400,000 requested for FY 1961. Fifteen titles have been approved and accepted by the Yugoslavs, in a total program calling for the publication of some 64 textbooks and medical books in translation.

61. Under the President’s Special International Program, U.S. participation in the Zagreb International Trade Fair is planned for the fall of 1960, and the Eastman String Quartet made an extensive tour of the country in March 1960.



62. The ICA program in Yugoslavia is designed to assist that country

to maintain and strengthen its national independence;
to liberalize its political and economic character.

The current and prospective programs of Technical Cooperation and Special Assistance address the various aspects of the problems inherent [Page 426] in seeking to achieve these objectives. Through Technical Cooperation, ICA is undertaking to create links with Yugoslavia which will permit expanded contact between Yugoslavs and the West. Through this program ICA also is helping Yugoslavia to increase the technical competence of training and research institutions whereby the country’s productive capacity—industrial and agricultural—will be increased. The Special Assistance program is in direct support of this program for it finances the acquisition of equipment, tools, machinery, etc. to be used for demonstration and training.

Current Programs

63. U.S. assistance during the past ten years has made it possible for Yugoslavia to avoid undue economic dependence on the Soviet bloc and has strengthened the foundation upon which Yugoslav independence rests. This assistance has made it easier for Yugoslavia to undertake a number of liberalizing measures during this period; agricultural collectivization as such has been abandoned and forced deliveries terminated; decentralization has in fact been carried out in all sectors of the economy, allowing freer play of market forces. Industrial production and exports have increased steadily. In the agricultural sector, the Yugoslavs have achieved virtual self-sufficiency in wheat. As a result of the hybrid corn program initiated in 1953, the yield per acre has increased by 30 percent on an average, with increases on many individual farms of 100 percent and over. With U.S. support, the Yugoslavs have established English Language Training Centers in all of the six republics; today, English is fast becoming the second language of Yugoslavia. Through the Technical Inquiry Service and distribution of industrial information and translations, individual industrial plant managers and returned participants throughout the country are provided with a wide range of up-to-date technical information.

64. The Technical Cooperation program (in FY 1960, $1.9 million) is the center of the U.S. activities designed to create closer ties between Yugoslavia and the West. It operates both through the medium of visits by Yugoslavs to the U.S. and Western Europe, and by the employment of American technicians in Yugoslavia. Supporting TC activities include a technical inquiry service, the establishment of English language training centers, developing relationships with American universities, trade associations, and scientific institutions, and furnishing equipment and supplies for key demonstrations. The hostility and suspicion with which the Technical Cooperation program was first regarded have largely been overcome, and, at the request of the Yugoslav Government, the program will be considerably expanded in FY 1961.

65. The Technical Cooperation program has been supported by Special Assistance grants ($2.3 million in FY 1960) for the purchase of [Page 427] demonstration equipment and supplies. However, with the increase in loans from the DLF, which are now the major source of U.S. economic assistance to Yugoslavia, non-project Special Assistance is being phased down in FY 1960 to one loan ($3 million for coking coal).

66. Under the economic development program utilizing local currency generated by the Section 402 and PL 480 programs, grant funds have been programmed for the construction of grain storage, vocational education, and public health facilities; loan funds are being utilized for projects in industry, mining, transportation, power, and agriculture, including a large irrigation project. Section 402 sales ended in FY 1959. PL 480 Title I sales have now been sharply reduced following the achievement by the Yugoslavs of virtual self-sufficiency in wheat production.

Future Programs

67. For FY 1961, tentative plans are that Project Aid will consist of a $3 million Technical Cooperation program with a $1 million Special Assistance grant for the purchase of demonstration equipment and supplies.


68. Since the termination of grant military assistance to Yugoslavia in December 1957, the U.S. has provided military equipment to Yugoslavia on a Mutual Security Military Sales basis, thereby contributing to the independence and pro-Western reorientation which are the objectives of U.S. policy for Yugoslavia.

69. Inasmuch as Yugoslavia neither receives grant military assistance nor is joined with the U.S. in collective security arrangements, Yugoslavia’s forces are not considered as “Mutual Security Forces.”

70. Grant military assistance to Yugoslavia commenced in FY 1952. From that time until the program’s termination in 1957, the U.S. provided Yugoslavia with over 200 jet aircraft, 8 small naval vessels, as well as tanks, vehicles, and miscellaneous Army equipment. Since the termination of aid, Yugoslavia has purchased small quantities of equipment under the Mutual Security Military Sales (MSMS) provisions of the Mutual Security Act.12

71. It is expected that the U.S. will continue to sell limited quantities of military assistance under the MSMS program. Such assistance will probably consist primarily of spare parts, ammunition, and training.

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Annex B


(Prepared by CIA without inter-agency coordination as an informal document for use by the OCB working Group and as background for the information of the OCB and the NSC.)

72. General. Belgrade’s state relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe showed a limited improvement during most of the recent period manifested by the January visit and high level conversations held in Moscow by top trade unionist Vukmanovic-Tempo.13 The authoritative Soviet party organ Kommunist, however, breaking precedent with Soviet efforts in the past year to win Yugoslav support through an outward appearance of amicability, bitterly attacked Yugoslavia for its failure to follow Moscow’s line on the U–2 plane incident and the summit. It accused Tito of “directly or indirectly” supporting the United States on numerous international issues and warned Belgrade that the bloc would continue to attack “revisionism.” The Soviet attack followed closely that of Communist China which, together with Albania, had been leading the bloc attack on Yugoslavia. Party relations with the bloc remain deadlocked, and diplomatic relations with Peiping and Tirana are virtually suspended. The bloc once again rejected a Yugoslav request for observer status on the Council for Mutual Economic Relations (CEMA).

73. Economic. Yugoslavia’s trade with the bloc leveled off in 1959, amounting to about $320,000,000 or 25 percent of Yugoslavia’s total imports and 31 percent of exports. Yugoslavia remains sensitive to the possibility of economic blockade and the government limits bloc trade to roughly 25 percent of total trade—a percentage that would obviate the necessity of a substantial shift of exports to Western markets. Intermittent negotiations with Moscow concerning Soviet credits suspended in 1958 have been fruitless.

74. Yugoslav Reaction. Yugoslavia is continuing to develop and exploit its international role “between the blocs” and supports a policy of “détente” and “coexistence.” Tito has criticized the foreign policies of the West while stepping up political and economic relations with the “uncommitted” nations. Continued sniping from Albania probably has [Page 429] been a large factor in Yugoslav skepticism of bloc efforts to create a “Balkan zone of peace.” Belgrade continues its steady criticism of Communist China, which it regards as a Stalinist throwback bent on upsetting international détente. More recently resumption of criticism from other bloc nations has resulted in a renewal of Yugoslav critiques of certain bloc domestic and foreign policies.

75. The Outlook. Yugoslav insistence on independence in internal affairs and Belgrade’s active attempts to play a significant international role by closing ranks with Asian and African neutrals will continue to strain Yugoslav-bloc relations. Any stable truce between Moscow and Belgrade is unlikely, but neither side wishes state relations to be completely ruptured.

  1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Yugoslavia. Secret. A title page, a memorandum noting OCB concurrence, a statement of purpose and use, and three appendices (a list of selected U.S. arrangements with Yugoslavia, a financial and military aid analysis, and a list of P.L. 480 agreements and ICA-administered programs) are not printed. The report was approved by the OCB at its July 6 meeting. Minutes of the OCB meeting are Ibid., Preliminary Notes.
  2. For text of the economic cooperation agreement signed in Belgrade January 8, 1952, see 3 UST 1.
  3. For text of P.L. 80–402, U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, see 62 Stat. 6.
  4. The International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act of 1956, approved August 1, 1956 (P.L. 84–860). For text, see 70 Stat. 777. The OCB was responsible for the administration of the program.
  5. For text of the Information Media Guarantee Agreement, see 3 UST 5052.
  6. Created in 1949, this organization engaged in studies of conditions in the Communist-ruled nations of Eastern Europe.
  7. Established in September 1954, this body, made up of exile leaders and organizations from Albania, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, and Romania, met annually to discuss the problems of their nations and encourage anti-Communist activities.
  8. Five officials representing the Yugoslav Federal Commission for Nuclear Energy visited the United States February 28–April 1 for a tour of U.S. nuclear installations and discussions with U.S. officials regarding bilateral cooperation in peaceful employment of nuclear energy. Documentation on the Yugoslav nuclear program is in Department of State, Central File 611.6845.
  9. This report commented on legal, personal, and community relations problems facing U.S. military and civilian employees serving abroad. (Ibid., OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Overseas Personnel)
  10. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXVI, pp. 777778.
  11. The last three NIEs are in Department of State, INRNIE Files.
  12. The Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships were established in October 1953 to facilitate extended visits to the United States and abroad for journalists, educators, government officials, businessmen, and other professional people.
  13. For text of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, P.L. 665, enacted August 26, 1954, see 68 Stat. 832
  14. Vukmanovic-Tempo, the head of the Yugoslav Trade Unions Front, visited Moscow January 6–26 for what was officially reported as a vacation. During his stay he met with Soviet Premier Khrushchev on January 26.